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ARTICLES
PARSING GOOD FAITH:
HAS THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED ARTICLE VI
OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY?
DAVID A. KOPLOW*
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has long been the cornerstone of the
international effort to retard the spread of nuclear weaponry to additional countries, now
appreciated as the greatest post-cold war threat to international peace and security.
Under this treaty, the parties also undertook to pursue in good faith additional
negotiations leading to further reductions in nuclear weapons-and, in fact, such
subsequent bargaining has recently yielded dramatic, far-reaching successes. Professor
Koplow, however, argues that in one crucial respect, the United States has been derelict
in implementing the obligations of the NPT: Recent American presidents have rigidly
refused to participate in negotiations that could lead to a comprehensive nuclear test ban
treaty, abolishing all nuclear explosions everywhere. Although the NPT's requirement
of test ban negotiations is ambiguously stated, a close reading of the legal materials
establishes that it was a key ingredient in the basic bargain of the NPT, and that
numerous countries consider it a major, unresolved treaty controversy. Professor
Koplow contends that this United States refusal to pursue a test ban treaty is not merely
unwise strategy, it is a violation of the country's international law commitments,
exposing the United States to legal remedies and undermining both the global non-
proliferation regime and the more general campaign to build support for a new world
order based upon greater fidelity to the rule of law.
I. INTRODUCTION
These are heady days for disarmament. Progress is being registered
with unprecedented speed and depth across a wide range of longstanding
security concerns, and American negotiators and their counterparts from
other countries are racing past obstacles that seemed impenetrable only a
few years ago. The bargaining range has engulfed strategic nuclear
forces,t conventional arms,2 chemical weapons,3 and all manner of other
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author thanks the
Lawyers Alliance for World Security for support in the preparation of this article. The
author also thanks George Bunn, Jonathan Dean, Eric Fersht, Gary Milhollin, and John
Rhinelander for their assistance and commentary on earlier drafts. A shorter version of
this Article will be published in the Fletcher Forum of World Affairs.
1. Substantial cuts in nuclear offensive systems have been negotiated in the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-
302 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
military questions." Even the debate about strategic defense, for a decade
U.S.S.R., S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter START
Treaty] (not in force), and additional reductions have already been slated. Dunbar
Lockwood, The Pen-Chant for Peace, 48 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1992, at 10;
Helen Dewar, Senate Moves Toward Ratification of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1992, at A6; Don Oberdorfer & R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush, Yeltsin
Agree on Massive Nuclear Cuts, WASH. POST, June 17, 1992, at Al. Outside the realm
of signed agreements, the leaders of the United States and the former Soviet Union have
issued dramatic parallel statements of intention to reduce their nuclear weaponry even
further. R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush, Yeltsin Add Momentum to Cuts in Atomic Stockpiles,
WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1992, at A18; Serge Schmemann, Gorbachev Matches U.S. on
Nuclear Cuts and Goes Further on Strategic Warheads, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, § 1,
at 1.
2. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Nov. 19, 1990, 30
I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter CFE Treaty] regulates deployment of specified categories of military
hardware throughout the continent. Subsequent negotiations, dubbed CFE IA (regarding
reductions in military personnel in the area) and CFE II (regarding further cuts in
equipment) are already underway. CFE-IA Agreement Signed; CFE Treaty Goes Into
Effect, FOREIGN POL'Y BULL., Sept./Oct. 1992, at 44; JonathanDean & Randall Watson
Forsberg, CFE and Beyond, 17 INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1992, at 76; Thomas Graham,
Jr., The CFE Story: Tales from the Negotiating Table, 21 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-
Feb. 1991, at 9.
3. Negotiations have recently concluded on a multilateral Chemical Weapons
Convention [hereinafter CWC], a comprehensive ban on the development, production,
deployment and use of chemical munitions in combat. John M. Goshko, Draft Chemical
Arms Pact Approved After 24 Years, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1992; Agreement Reached on
Chemical Arms Draft Treaty, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1992, at AIo; Lee Feinstein,
Germany Proposes Chemical Weapons Compromise, 22 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July-
Aug. 1992, at 25; THOMAS BERNAUER, THE PROJECTED CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION: A GUIDE TO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
(1990). The United States and the Soviet Union have also concluded a bilateral
Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures
to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, June 1, 1990,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 I.L.M. 932, and a Memorandum of Understanding Regarding a
Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, September 23, 1989, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 28 I.L.M. 1438-43.
4. Arms control efforts have embraced a variety of "confidence-building
measures" which do not directly require reductions in military strength, but do ease the
fears about any possible surprise attack, through implementation of devices to enhance the
"transparency" of national military structures, such as prior notification of military
maneuvers, invitations for observers, permission for short-notice inspections, etc. See
Treaty on Open Skies, S. TREATY DoC. No. 37, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (not in
force); Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures and Conventional Disarmament in Europe, Sept. 19, 1986, in UNITED STATES
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS: TExTs AND HISTORIES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 323 (1990); ARMS CONTROL
AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Alan Platt ed., 1992).
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
the most resilient sticking point, has become more civil, if not yet fully
convergent.5 Everywhere, it seems, arms control is advancing.
In one salient area, however, there has been little or no progress in
the modem era, and it is, unfortunately, the one area that has stood for
decades in the eyes of many other countries as the primary litmus test of
superpower sincerity and achievement in disarmament. This conspicuous
exception to the record of recent advances in arms control concerns the
American policy toward nuclear test ban proposals-arrangements which
would culminate the generation-old effort to halt forever all nuclear
explosions around the globe. The United States' torpid refusal to budge
on this crucial issue, and its insistence upon continuing nuclear weapons
testing and development, have reflected an attitude still mired in the
outmoded cold war context and now threaten to disrupt pursuit of'some
of the most important national and global security goals in the coming
decades, in particular undermining the urgent efforts at nuclear non-
proliferation.
This Article explores the United States' unwillingness to pursue test
ban agreements more vigorously and measures that performance against
existing legal obligations. The question of nuclear testing policy has long
been at the top of the international agenda for arms control, and it has
been ensconced in numerous U.S. treaty obligations, most notably the
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 19636 and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968.' In particular, article VI of the NPT
imposes a clear legal commitment upon the United States to pursue "in
good faith" negotiations toward further measures of arms control such as
a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT)-yet the Reagan and
Bush administrations overtly turned in other directions. The contention
of this Article, based upon a legal analysis of the object and purpose of
the NPT and other instruments, is that this American behavior now
constitutes a material breach of the treaty, exposing the United States to
specific, damaging legal remedies and to continued political opprobrium
and undermining our ability to gain international consensus upon a
strengthened non-proliferation regime.
5. David Hoffman, U.S., Russia Seek to Create Missile Warning Site, WASH.
POST, Feb. 19, 1992, at A24; Yeltsin Suggests Joint Missile Defense, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 38; Michael Wines, Bush and Yeltsin Declare Formal End to
Cold War; Agree to Exchange Visits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1992, § 1, at 1 (American and
Soviet presidents discuss possiblejoint development of an advanced defense system against
ballistic missiles.).
6. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter LTBT].
7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPTI.
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The Article begins by providing the necessary background on the
relevant international arms control treaties and the accompanying security
concerns. Part II thus presents both the NPT, and its focus on avoiding
the spread of nuclear weapons capability, and the LTBT, and its
preliminary regulation of nuclear weapons testing. Part II studies the
intersection between these two sets of commitments (and their respective
progeny) and considers the international community's linkage of them in
political and legal terms. It also updates the global security picture,
discussing the contributions of American presidents Ronald Reagan and
George Bush and their Soviet and Russian counterparts, Mikhail
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin.
Part III then scrutinizes the language of article VI of the NPT, asking
three urgent questions. First, to what extent did the parties actually
contemplate that a nuclear test ban would become the centerpiece of the
superpowers' NPT obligation-why have other disarmament achievements
not adequately discharged the responsibility? Second, what, precisely, is
the commitment assumed under article VI-in particular, what should we
understand the term "good faith" to require in these international treaty
negotiations? Third, what are the consequences of a violation of this
provision of the treaty-what potential international liability has the
United States now incurred, and how might this ongoing controversy
jeopardize United States non-proliferation policy?
Part IV presents the "bottom line" of the Article, marshalling the
case that the United States has committed a material breach of its
obligations under the NPT. The Article is unable to be precise about
exactly what behaviors are now required of the United States or about
what specific timetable is mandated for negotiation or conclusion of the
next step in the sequential evolution of test bans. But it is incumbent
upon the United States to do something-a vague and aspirational
obligation is not necessarily a void and meaningless one-and recent
American policies, refusing even to talk about a comprehensive test ban
agreement, fall short of our international responsibilities.
Finally, the Conclusion offers some ruminations about the larger
political and legal context of the test ban controversy, arguing that in the
long term, it is profoundly in the American interest to promote greater
global adherence to the rule of law and augmented respect for good faith
compliance with even imprecise treaty terms. More than any other
nation, the United States has a major stake in enhancing the world's
reliance upon the legal trappings of full treaty compliance, and our recent
posture toward nuclear test ban policy has thus been short sighted and
ultimately self-defeating. The United States should therefore return to the
negotiating table and pursue a comprehensive test ban treaty, seeking to
register significant achievements no later than the opening of the 1995
1993:301 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Review Conference for the NPT, before our ongoing noncompliance does
further violence to the fabric of international law and security.
II. NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR TESTING
Efforts to retard the spread of nuclear weapons have long gone hand-
in-hand with efforts to restrict the testing of nuclear explosive devices,
and this Part charts that convoluted history. The overlaps between these
two areas of disarmament policy continue unabated into the current
milieu, affecting relationships among the United States, the
Commonwealth of Independent States, and all other participants in the
global security regime.
A. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has been
committed to endeavoring to halt the spread of nuclear weapons! As the
"nuclear club" began inexorably to expand, American efforts intensified,
amidst apprehensions that indiscriminate proliferation of nuclear
technology could generate intractable security problems for the United
States and others.9 President Kennedy's famous 1963 prediction, that the
world might contain up to twenty-five nuclear-capable countries by
1975,10 reflected a profound concern about the complexity of that type
8. Among the earliest proposals aimed at safely moving beyond the American
post-World War II monopoly on nuclear weaponry were the Baruch Plan (for international
control over nuclear research and development), Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal
(sharing the technology for civilian applications of nuclear power), and a raft of
multilateral arms control suggestions. See INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND
AGREEMENTS 94-116 (Coit D. Blacker & Gloria Duffy eds.', 2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
Blacker & Duffy]; COMMrrrEE ON INT'L SECuRrrY AND ARMS CONTROL, NAT'L
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 233-37
(1985) [hereinafter NAS]; LLOYD JENSEN, NEGOTIATING NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 54-58
(1988).
9. The United States conducted its first nuclear explosion in 1945; the Soviet
Union in 1949; the United Kingdom in 1952; France in 1960; and China in 1964. In
addition, India conducted one nuclear explosion in 1974. Known Nuclear Tests
Worldwide, 1945 to December 31, 1991, 48 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1992, at 49.
10. GLENN T. SEABORO, KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV AND THE TEST BAN 198-99
(1981) (In response to a question at a press conference, Kennedy said, "I see the
possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in
which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons. I regard that as
the greatest possible danger. . . ."). See also Blacker & Duffy, supra note 8, at 131;
JENSEN, supra note 8, at 52; Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the
President, The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without a Test Ban Agreement
(1963) (secret memorandum, declassified and available through National Security Archive,
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of global structure, as well as an American resolution to spearhead efforts
to forestall it."
Nuclear non-proliferation provided one of the earliest topics for
superpower attempts at collaboration, and resistance to further
dissemination of nuclear weapons was one of the few security-related
issues that the United States and the Soviet Union were occasionally able
to agree upon, even during the depths of the cold war. 2 Today, as the
world shifts attention away from exclusive preoccupation with the
problems of the traditional East/West axis, toward increasing concern for
the North/South dichotomy, 13 nuclear proliferation has once again been
U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy 1945-1991 File, document 892) (predicting that
"about 16 countries, excluding the four present nuclear countries, will be able to acquire
at least a few nuclear weapons and a crude delivery capability during the next ten years").
11. American leaders have consistently spoken out against the spread of nuclear
weapons and have sometimes made it a key national priority. President Jimmy Carter,
for example, initiated a major International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE),
attempting to educate other countries about the dangers of reliance upon weapons-grade
materials in civilian power production. Blacker & Duffy, supra note 8, at 165-66;
JENSEN, supra note 8, at 71-73. The United States Congress, too, has been active,
contributing major legislation designed to tighten controls over nuclear development and
exports. Blacker & Duffy, supra note 8, at 166-67 (citing 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Act).
12. The United States and the Soviet Union peppered each other with arms control
proposals, including various non-proliferation schemes, during the 1950s and 1960s, but
mutual distrust (and the desire to retain some ability to collaborate on nuclear matters with
alliance partners) prevented them from reaching major areas of agreement. JENSEN, supra
note 8, at 54-59; Blacker & Duffy, supra note 8, at 153-54. Overall, the Soviet Union
has accumulated a good record of support for non-proliferation objectives (except,
importantly, for its early assistance to the Chinese nuclear program), probably at least as
good as that of the United States. William C. Potter, Exports and Experts: Proliferation
Risks From the New Commonwealth, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 32;
JENSEN, supra note 8, at 70, 76-77; William C. Potter, Soviet Nuclear Export Policy, in
LIMrFINO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 213-52 (Jed C. Snyder & Samual F. Wells, Jr. eds.,
1985).
13. Expert international panels have long stressed the growing potential instability
and conflict resulting from the extreme disparities in wealth between the developed and
the developing world. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ISSUES (BRANDT COMMISSION), NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SURVIVAL (1980) and
COMMON CRISIS NORTH-SOUTH: COOPERATION FOR WORLD RECOvERY (1983);
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ISSUES (PALME
COMMISSION), COMMON SECURITY: A PROGRAMME FOR DISARMAMENT (1982). In
contrast, Robert M. Gates, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, recently testified
to the Senate Armed Services Committee that due to the end of the cold war and the
reductions in Soviet military spending and capability, the threat to the United States of
deliberate nuclear or conventional attack by the states of the new Commonwealth of
Independent States "has all but disappeared for the foreseeable future." George Lardner,
Jr., Republics'Procurement ofArns Said to Plunge, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1992, at A20.
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thrust into a high profile. 4 Few scenarios can be as horrific as the
possibility that Saddam Hussein, Moammar Gadhafi, or others of their ilk
would soon possess weapons of mass destruction," and the rest of the
world has recoiled against that eventuality. 6  Even the Bush
administration, criticized for allowing the search for commercial
advantage to prolong imprudent weapons-related sales to Iraq, 7
responded with an "Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative," designed
to tighten access to critical materials and technology." Today, nuclear
14. See Security Council Summit Declaration: "New Risks for Stability and
Security, " N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1992, § 1, at 4 (United Nations Security Council
highlights the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the importance of the NPT); Michael
Wines, Statements by Bush and Yeltsin Declare Formal End to Cold War, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1992, § 1, at 1 (reprinting joint declaration of intention to "work actively together
to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated technology");
Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation, I PUB. PAPERS 768 (June 4,
1990); Bush Approved Covert Action By CIA to Halt Spread of Arms, WASH. POST, June
21, 1992, at A20 (new presidential directive authorizing international intelligence activities
to interdict proliferation reveals a major post-cold war shift in American defense
priorities).
15. Some experts have argued that, at least in some situations, a degree of nuclear
proliferation might not be such a bad thing: It could contribute to deterrence of regional
hostilities and perhaps promote a modicum of restraint in local conflicts. Moreover, the
eventual spread of nuclear knowledge and materials may be inevitable and irreversible,
so the United States and others should seek merely to contain, and to adapt to, this
propensity, rather than to defeat it. William Pfaff, The Mushroom Spreads, BALT. SUN,
Jan. 30, 1992, at 26; JENSEN, supra note 8, at 53-54. Most people, however, have
adopted the opposite viewpoint, seeing the diffusion of nuclear weapons as a dangerous
and hostile possibility, one that public policy can and should attempt to defeat. Thomas
W. Graham, Winning the Nonproliferation Battle, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1991,
at 8; Joseph S. Nye, New Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation Policy, 256 SCIENCE 1293
(1992); NAS, supra note 8, at 226-28.
16. The contemporary inspections inside Iraq conducted by the United Nations and
other international organizations have highlighted the ability of international renegades to
acquire advanced weaponry, the dangers that they pose, and the difficulty of rooting them
out, even with extraordinary on-site access. Trevor Rowe, U.N. Still "Concerned"About
Iraq, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1992, at A19; Bill Gertz, Biological Arms Elude Inspectors,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992, at Al; Joseph F. Pilat, Iraq and the Future of Nuclear
Nonproliferation: The Roles of Inspections and Treaties, 255 SCIENCE 1224 (1992).
17. Gary Milhollin, Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1992, (Magazine), at 30; Arms Trade and Nonproliferation, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Technology and National Security of the Joint Economic Comm., 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1990) (statement of Gary Milhollin) and 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 62 (1991) (statement of Senator Bingamen) [hereinafter Hearings].
18. Hearings, supra note 17, at 76 (statement of Richard Clarke); id. at 113
(statement of James LeMunyon). See also ACTIVITIES TO PREVENT NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H. Doc. No. 135, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991) (reviewing all federal activities related to the effort to halt the spread of
nuclear weaponry).
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non-proliferation has finally attained its deserved degree of public
salience: Arresting the spread of advanced weaponry is now recognized
as one of the most crucial policy objectives for national security into the
next century. 19
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has stood for two decades as
the centerpiece of the global effort to deal with this threat of
proliferation.' The NP'f now has 150 parties (more than any other
arms control accord),21 it is widely regarded as one of the most
19. President Bush has said,
[l]t is essential in these times of great change and great promise, and of major
progress in arms control, that the community of nations work together even
more diligently to prevent nuclear proliferation, which poses one of the
greatest risks to the survival of mankind. I urge all states that are not party
to the NPT to join and thereby demonstrate their support for the goal of
preventing nuclear proliferation, and I call upon all states party to the Treaty
to join our efforts to secure the integrity of the NPT, which benefits all
countries.
Nuclear, Chemical Weapons, and Missile Non-Proliferation, ISSUES BRIEF (U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C.), May 22, 1990. See also George
D. Moffett, III, Baker: Weapons Proliferation Problem, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, May
5, 1992, at 6, interview with Secretary of State James Baker III, who commented that:
[Nonconventional weapons] proliferation is a major problem, maybe one of
the two most pressing problems in the world. I would couple it with regional
conflicts. It was that [combination of problems] that led to the Gulf war. It's
that combination that we're also dealing with in North Korea, in India-
Pakistan.
20. Leading international experts have underscored the importance of the NPT:
the Secretary-General of the United Nations has called the NPT "essential" and "most
constructive." Message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reprinted in
NUCLEAR WAR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 9 (Sadruddin Aga
Kahn ed., 1986) [hereinafter Khan]. Olaf Patme called the NPT "the most important
political and legal instrument we have for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. And
I do not hesitate to characterize the NPT as one of the most important international
treaties signed since World War II." Keynote Address, reprinted in Khan, supra, at 20,
24. President Johnson considered the NPT "the most important international agreement
limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began." WILLIAM EPSTEIN, THE LAST
CHANCE: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL 103 (1976) [hereinafter LAST
CHANCE]. See also Joseph Rothlat, The Foundations for a Strengthened Non-Proliferation
Regime, in Khan, supra, at 63, 68 (NPT's "continuation is most important for world
security"); Lewis Dunn, An American Perspective, in Khan, supra, at 382, 388 (NPT "is
a cornerstone of international efforts to erect and sustain effective barriers to the further
spread of nuclear weapons.")
21. Membership in the NPT continues to grow: During 1991, Zambia, Tanzania,
South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Lithuania all became parties, DISARMAMENT NEWSL., Dec.
1991, at 14, and by mid-1992 the number of parties had reached 150, with several others
expected to join shortly. DISARMAMENT NEWSL., June 1992, at 4; DISARMAMENT
NEWSL., Aug./Sept. 1992, at 4.
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successful weapons regulation regimes in history,' and it has spawned
a series of related and implementing accords, which wrap potential
proliferators inside a dense web of legal constraints.'
The NPT itself embodies an intricate series of compromises and
tradeoffs. On one side, the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS)
committed themselves (a) not to receive, manufacture; or otherwise
acquire nuclear explosive devices, either directly or indirectly,' and (b)
to accept international safeguards, under the auspices of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),' permitting on-site inspection and other
intrusions to verify compliance with those underlying obligations.' On
22. Numerous authorities credit the NPT, and the non-proliferation regime it
centers, with the unexpected success in averting the spread of nuclear weapons. See Sam
Thompson, The NPT Regime, Present and Future Global Security: An American View, in
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY 151, 164 (David DeWitt ed.,
1987); Lewis A. Dunn, The NPT and Future Global Security, in NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra, at 13, 22.
23. See Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb.
14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco]; Treaty on the Prohibition
of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the
Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701,
10 I.L.M. 146 [hereinafter Seabeds Arms Control Treaty]; Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985,
24 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Treaty of Raratonga]; JOZEF GOLDBLAT, TWENTY YEARS OF
THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 41-47 [hereinafter
GOLDBLAT, TWENTY YEARS] (1990) (discussing the treaties creating nuclear weapons free
zones). See also Mohalned ElBaradei, The Role of International Atomic Energy Agency
Safeguards in the Evolution of the Non-Proliferation Regime: Some Lessons for Other
Arms Control Measures, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOsIUM 95 (Julie Dahlitz & Detlev Dicke eds.,
1991) (describing the treaties negotiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency to
apply international safeguards on countries' peaceful nuclear activities.)
24. NPT, supra note 7, art. II.
25. The IAEA maintains a world-wide network of "safeguards" measures and
equipment to monitor the production and consumption of nuclear materials, to account for
materials' whereabouts, and to provide timely detection of any diversion to weapons
purposes. NPT parties negotiate individual safeguards agreements with the IAEA to
provide close access into facilities with nuclear activities. Jon Jennekens, /AEA
Safeguards-What They Are and What They Do, DISARMAMENT 1990, at 89; NAS, supra
note 8, at 251-65; Pilat, supra note 16; LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND WORLD NUCLEAR ORDER (1987).
26. NPT, supra note 7, art. III. See generally DAVID FISCHER & PAUL SZASZ,
SAFEGUARDING THE ATOM: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (1985) (describing the technology,
law, and politics of the IAEA safeguards system); DAVID FIsCHER, STOPPING THE SPREAD
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE PAST AND THE PROSPECTS 120-42 (1992). In 1990, the
IAEA had safeguards agreements in effect with 82 NNWS; in 1989, the agency conducted
more than 2000 inspections in 42 countries. A.Yu. Meshkov, Nonproliferation and
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the other side, the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) undertook (a) not to
assist or encourage any NNWS in acquiring nuclear weapons,27 (b) to
share the benefits of peaceful application of nuclear power for civilian
purposes," and (c) to attempt to curb the nuclear arms race at an early
date.2
Unlike most other arms control agreements, therefore, the NPT is
fundamentally asymmetric.' It requires the "have not" states to
forswear a weapons capability that their NWS neighbors have apparently
found useful, even essential, to their security.3 It requires the "have"
countries to pony up a technology transfer, sacrificing what could
otherwise be a significant commercial advantage in the international
Limitations on Deployment, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:
MILITARY AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS 85, 86-87 (Paul B. Stephan III & Boris M.
Klimenko eds., 1991) [hereinafter Stephan & Klimenko].
27. NPT, supra note 7, art. I.
28. The NWS pledge to share the myriad possible peaceful benefits of the atom
actually had two separate components. Under article IV, the advanced states undertook
to disseminate the technology related to nuclear power generation. Under article V, they
agreed to provide access to nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes, such as
mining or civil engineering. Interest in nuclear power has fluctuated during the past two
decades, as nuclear anxieties and adverse economics have affected both supply and
demand; interest in peaceful nuclear explosions has consistently declined, but may be
making a resurgence. JENSEN, supra note 8, at 67-69; William J. Broad, A Soviet
Company Offers Nuclear Blasts for Sale to Anyone With the Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
1991, at A18.
29. NPT, supra note 7, art. VI.
30. Most other multilateral arms control treaties, such as Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, in UNITED
STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 133 (1990)
[hereinafter BWC], and the forthcoming CWC, supra note 3, apply identical restrictions
upon the arsenals of all parties. Some treaties do require asymmetric reductions to reach
common ceilings, but few are as unequal as the NPT. But see CFE Treaty, supra note
2 (establishing starkly different quotas for permissible levels of conventional forces in
Europe for the different parties.)
31. Of course, many argue that possession of nuclear weapons would not help the
NNWS pursue their legitimate security objectives, and that it would complicate, rather
than assist, their search for stability and development. Sometimes, however, these
arguments seem to have a bit of hypocrisy when coming from the NWS. See comments
of Hans Blix, director general of the IAEA: "There is something paradoxical about
nuclear-weapon States desperately urging non-nuclear-weapon States not to do what they,
themselves, find it indispensable to do: namely to continue developing nuclear weapons."
Hans Blix, The Role of the IAE.4 and the Existing NPT Regime, in Khan, supra note 20,
at 56.
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marketplace.' Both sides agree to perpetuate a nuclear oligopoly in
favor of the handful of economically and militarily sophisticated states
who happened to be the first to invent nuclear weapons, requiring all
others to eschew that avenue in pursuit of security and status.33
For all of this, the NPT has accumulated a significant, albeit mixed,
record of achievement. The number of states known to possess nuclear
weapons has grown, but not at the exponential rate feared earlier.'
Most states are solid in their compliance with their treaty obligations,
although some have behaved with a blatantly cynical indifference to the
true import of the terms.' The inspection apparatus has benefitted from
technological and political improvements,' yet more substantial
strengthening remains to be accomplished.37 Most dramatically, several
of the key holdout countries-states repeatedly identified as "problems"
32. The nuclear-weapon states have made "voluntary offers," allowing the IAEA
to implement safeguards on selected civilian power facilities. These safeguards play no
direct role in arms control verification (since the military installations are exempt) but they
do demonstrate to NNWS and others that the safeguards are inoffensive, inexpensive, and
feasible. ElBaradei, supra note 23, at 104; U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS 223-27 (1990) [hereinafter ACDA TREATY BOOK].
33. The NPT defines a nuclear weapon state as a country which manufactured and
exploded a nuclear device before January 1, 1967. NPT, supra note 7, art. IX.3.
34. Four states (Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa) have been widely
regarded as "undeclared" nuclear powers, possessing the capacity to deploy nuclear arms
at will and to use them in combat. LEONARD S. SPECTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB 3
(1988). South Africa, however, has recently reversed course, and appears to have begun
the process of abandoning its nuclear prowess. See infra note 39.
35. Iraq's harassment of international inspectors and disruption of their search
activities have become well-known. Michael Z. Wise, U.N. Body Says Iraq Failing to
Cooperate, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1992, at All; Michael Z. Wise, Iraq Is Ordered to
Destroy Suspect Facility, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1992, at A36. North Korea, too, has
long tantalized the international community, sometimes pledging to permit effective
international verification of its nuclear activities, but at other times undercutting the
proposed requirements. Leonard S. Spector & Jacqueline R. Smith, North Korea: The
Next Nuclear Nightmare?, 21 ARMS CONTROLTODAY, Mar. 1991, at 8; David E. Sanger,
North Korea Reveals Nuclear Sites to Atomic Agency, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at AS;
Don Oberdorfer, N. Korea Says U.S. Blocks Progress on Nuclear Inspection, WASH.
POST, Sept. 30, 1992, at A24.
36. As new types of nuclear power facilities are developed and brought on line,
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has crafted additional inspection tools
and techniques. ElBaradei, supra note 23, at 109-11.
37. Keeping an Eye on a Nuclear World, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Nov. 1991,
at 3, 5 (interview with IAEA Director Hans Blix; suggestions for improvement in IAEA
routines); Michael Z. Wise, Nuclear Agency Reasserts Inspection Rights, WASH. POST,
Feb. 27, 1992, at A33 (IAEA to undertake additional short-notice inspections.)
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for the NPT regime-have now signaled their intention to join." South
Africa," France,' and China" have all recently adhered to the treaty,
and other key actors, such as Argentina and Brazil, are now assuming
comparable obligations outside the scope of the NPT itself.42
Nevertheless, several crucial players remain aloof from the NPT,
including India, Pakistan, Israel, Cuba, and others. Chief among the
complaints of some of these holdout states' have been allegations that
38. In addition, several newly-independent republics of the former Soviet Union
have joined the NPT (e.g., Lithuania) or have declared their intentions to adhere (e.g.,
Ukraine). DISARMAMENT NEWSL., Dec. 1991, at 14; Dunbar Lockwood, Ukraine to Join
STARTandNPT; All Tactical Nukes Removed, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, May 1992, at 16.
39. David B. Ottaway, South Africa Agrees to Treaty Curbing Nuclear Weapons,
WASH. POST, June 28, 1991 at A25; David B. Ottaway, South Africa Said to Abandon
Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A23.
40. France to Sign Treaty on Non-Proliferation, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1992, at
A16.
41. NEWSBRIEF (Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation), Spring
1992, at 2 (China deposited instrument of ratification of NPT on March 9, 1992); David
Holley, China Considering Signing Nuclear Pact, WASH. POST, June 19, 1991, at A22.
For years, China had remained aloof from the NPT and from international non-
proliferation efforts generally, deriding them as superpower attempts to preserve global
hegemony. More recently, China has become at least a vocal supporter of efforts to
constrain the spread of nuclear weapons, linking non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament,
and particularly calling for the United States and Russia to conclude a comprehensive test
ban treaty. He Qian Jiadong, China's Position on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, in Khan,
supra note 20, at 33, 34. Process of Nuclear Disarmament in the Framework of
International Peace and Security, with the Objective of the Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons, letter from the head of the Chinese delegation addressed to the Chairman of the
Disarmament Commission, United Nations General Assembly (April 24, 1992)
A/CN.10/166. The actual Chinese record on non-proliferation, however, remains
troublesome. Bill Gertz, China Continues Nuclear Testing; U.S. May Respond, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1992, at A3. In addition, there have been reports that China is now
preparing to accept a comprehensive nuclear test ban. George Leopold, Erperts Suggest
China May Accede to Ban on Nuclear Tests, DEFENSE NEWS, June 22-28, 1992, at 12.
42. AVERTINO A LATIN AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE (Paul L. Leventhal &
Sharon Tanzereds., 1992) [hereinafter Leventhal & Tanzer]; Jon B. Wolfsthal, Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile to Implement Tlatelolco Treaty, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1992,
at 27; Jean Krasno, Brazil, Argentina Make It Official, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Apr.
1992, at 10; John R. Redick, Argentina and Brazil's New Arrangement for Mutual
Inspections and IAEA Safeguards, NUCLEAR CONTROL INST., Feb. 1992; Eugene
Robinson, S. America Steps Back From Atomic Brink, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1992, at
A29.
43. Some NNWS have also criticized the NWS record of compliance with article
IV, which contemplates assistance, or at least meaningful cooperation, in developing the
technology for exploitation of the power-generating potential of the atom. Many
developing states contend that the level of direct support promised as part of the "basic
bargain" of the NPT has not yet been forthcoming, because the supplier states have been
too restrictive in the application of their national export policies regarding access to
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the treaty is unacceptably "discriminatory"" (in confining NNWS to a
permanently inferior position) and that the NWS have not yet adequately
honored their article VI obligations to pursue timely disarmament.45
Some of these holdouts-as well as many leading states that had long
ago joined the NPT-stress that the treaty was originally designed to
combat equally two distinct forms of proliferation: the more familiar
"horizontal proliferation," meaning the spread of nuclear weapons
potential to additional states; but also "vertical proliferation," defined as
the intensification-the qualitative improvement and the quantitative
nuclear materials and technology. In some instances, non-parties to the NPT have
benefitted from greater assistance than has been provided to treaty parties. NAS, supra
note 8, at 245; JENSEN, supra note 8, at 68.
44. See Nabil Elaraby, Practical Problems with Multilateral Arms Control
Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, supra note
23, at 45, 48.
Dissatisfaction with the two-tier nature of the NPT has had reverberations on other
areas of arms control, too. For example, regarding the international regulation of
chemical weapons (CW), the leading states vacillated: Sometimes they pursued a
comprehensive CW agreement, banning all forms of production and use by all countries;
at other times, that global effort appeared too ambitious, and activists proposed a more
modest non-proliferation treaty, which would at least freeze the status quo, before
additional countries could acquire CW capability. As a matter of geo-politics, however,
the partial regime, confined to a non-proliferation arrangement perpetuating the existing
asymmetry in CW capabilities, was unacceptable to many countries, and prolonged pursuit
of the comprehensive treaty was the only plausible solution. William Epstein, The
Nuclear Testing Threat, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, July-Aug. 1990, at 35, 36.
Moreover, the occasional efforts of leading supplier states to coordinate their
individual national export control policies regarding potential chemical warfare agents (or,
for that matter, regarding other potential military materials, such as missile technology
or other weapons-capable equipment) have been largely confined to informal, low-profile
operations. A leading rationale for maintaining the relative obscurity of these cartels is
the desire to avoid exacerbating the affront to the target countries' sensitivities, which
might occur if the control regimes were elevated into formal multilateral treaty
arrangements that blatantly excluded the "have not" states. See Willam J. Broad, 27
Countries Sign New Atom Accord, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, § 1, at 15; UNITED STATES
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AoENCY, BIG FIVE INITIATIVE ON ARMS TRANSFER
AND PROLIFERATION RESTRAINTS, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS
TRANSFERS 1990, at 23 (1990); Ian Anthony, The Missile Technology Control Regime, in
ARMS EXPORT REOULATIONS 219, 220 (Ian Anthony ed., 1991).
45. From the outset, the starkly two-tier nature of the NPT has drawn criticism
from those who assert that the NNWS are giving up more, in terms of potential avenues
for pursuit of security, than are the NWS, who have accepted only the indefinite
commitment of article VI. Joseph F. Pilat & Robert E. Pendley, Conclusions, in BEYOND
1995: THE FUTURE OF THE NPT REGIME 165, 166-67 (Joseph F. Pilat & Robert E.
Pendley eds., 1990); Blacker & Duffy, supra note 8, at 157, 159; Martin G. Bustillo,
Linkages Between Vertical and Horizontal Non-Proliferation, in Leventhal & Tanzer,
supra note 42, at 171, 176-81.
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growth-of the nuclear arsenals of the NWS. '  A treaty regime that
sought to combat only the first danger, without sufficient attention to the
parallel hazards of the second, would be politically unsound and legally
incomplete.4'
A primary vehicle for exposing these differences of perspective has
been the NPT review conferences, mandated every five years by article
VIII of the treaty." These assemblies, designed to "review the
operation" of the treaty,49 have been well attended, 5' they have
generated significant improvements in the execution of the treaty
obligations,5 and they have also been de facto converted into
international plebiscites on the popularity and effectiveness of the treaty
46. Bustillo, supra note 45, at 171, 174. Similarly, the disarmament lexicon
sometimes differentiates between a "qualitative" arms race (in which countries develop
increasingly deadly types of weaponry) and a "quantitative" arms race (in which countries
deploy larger numbers of weapons, or in which additional countries come to possess the
specialized weaponry).
47. Blacker & Duffy, supra note 8, at 154-55. When the United States and the
Soviet Union initially presented their proposed draft of the NPT in 1967, it did not have
any provision comparable to the current article VI. The NNWS then insisted that a
commitment to arms control negotiations be inserted into the text. Many NNWS might
not have signed the treaty if it had failed to incorporate an obligation for the NWS to
constrain their nuclear arms race. Blacker & Duffy, supra note 8, at 157; JENSEN, supra
note 8, at 59; Nonproliferation Treaty Hearings on Executive H Before the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (July 1968) [hereinafter 1968 Hearings].
See infra, text accompanying notes 182-215.
48. NPT, supra note 7, art. VIII.3.
49. The review conference provision of the NPT expressly directs attention to the
goals articulated in the preamble. ('Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty,
a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to
review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the
Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.") NPT, supra note 7, art.
VIII.3.
50. Eighty-four treaty parties (including virtually all those with any significant
nuclear-related activities) and 16 other state observers attended the 1990 review
conference.
51. During the 1990 review conference, the parties reached a substantial measure
of agreement on a range of critical outstanding issues, including improvements to the
IAEA safeguards and inspections regime, and the extension of more satisfactory security
assurances from NWS to NNWS. These issues had eluded international diplomats for
years, yet the review conference was able to reach agreement on 95% of the necessary
provisions. Charles N. Van Doren & George Bunn, Progress and Peril at the Fourth
NPT Review Conference, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 1990, at 8; Leonard S. Spector
& Jacqueline R. Smith, Deadlock Damages Nonproliferation, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
Dec. 1990, at 39; Fourth NPT Review Conference Ends in Deadlock, DISARMAMENT
NEWSL., Oct. 1990, at 2.
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arrangements. 2 To date, four such review conferences have been held.
Two of them (including the 1990 event) dissolved in anomie, unable even
to reach consensus on any type of meaningful final document or report.53
The chief cause of the discord on each occasion was the unrequited
interest in a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty-the superpowers'
inability or unwillingness to discharge their article VI obligations in this
area was alleged to be so fundamental that the other, truly productive
accomplishments of those review conferences were tossed out in the
ensuing debate over CTBT policy.'
By the 1995 Review Conference, the stakes will be even higher.
Under article X, the parties are to assemble after the treaty has been in
force for twenty-five years, "to decide whether the Treaty shall continue
in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period
or periods."'5 This provision is interestingly ambiguous, and an
unprecedented debate has swirled around the question of what will happen
52. Success and failure at the review conferences have come to symbolize the
global state of the non-proliferation regime, and commentators stress the parties'
accomplishments (or lack thereof) as harbingers for the future of the NPT. Spector &
Smith, supra note 51; William Epstein, Conference a Qualified Success, BULL. ATOM.
SCENTISTS, Dec. 1990, at 45.
Other treaties have emulated the NPT in incorporating regular review conferences.
See BWC, supra note 30, art. XI1; Seabeds Arms Control Treaty, supra note 23, art. VII;
Burrus M. Carnahan, Treaty Review Conferences, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 226-30 (1987).
53. Joesph E. Pilat & Robert E. Pendley, Introduction, in BEYOND 1995: THE
FUTURE OF THE NPT REGIME, supra note 45, at 3; Van Doren & Bunn, supra note 51;
Spector & Smith, supra note 51. When the conference produces no final report, the draft
report, embodying the hard-won agreements on outstanding issues (safeguards, security
assurances, etc.), is deprived of legal significance. But see FISCHER, STOPPING THE
SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 26, at 112 (after the failure of the 1990
review conference, several delegations arranged for most of the tentatively-agreed portions
of the draft final report to be circulated to all members of the IAEA; the salvaged
document has no legal effect, but it may yet help promote fresh agreements on some
points); John Simpson, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime After the 1990 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, in VERIFICATION REPORT 1991: YEARBOOK
ON ARMS CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEmENTS 27, 37 (J. B. Poole ed., 1991)
[hereinafter Poole] (consequences of failure to conclude a consensus final document). ,
54. At the 1990 review conference, the NNWS, led by Mexico, insisted upon
including a strong CTBT message in the final declaration; the United States refused.
Since the conference operates by consensus, rather than voting, there was no way to
resolve the impasse. Van Doren & Bunn, supra note 51; Spector & Smith, supra note
51.
55. NPT, supra note 7, art. X.2. The 1995 meeting may thus be characterized
alternatively as the Fifth Review Conference or as the Extension Conference. See
Simpson, supra note 53, at 39.
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if the parties are unable, by majority vote,' to decide upon a future for
the NPT at the 1995 conference: Will the treaty expire, will it
automatically be extended indefinitely, or will some other avenue be
found?57 Parties' dissatisfaction with the NPT to date suggests that the
1995 Review Conference may be controversial and contentious, on arms
control issues no less than others.
In any event, the future of the NPT-and with it, the future of the
global effort to constrain the spread of nuclear weapons-will be in the
hands of its parties in 1995, and the NNWS attitudes toward its
obligations will be central in any renewal of the obligations. Important
changes may therefore occur in the international non-proliferation regime
at the time of the next review conference, and evaluation of the record of
American and other compliance with article VI surely will be central.
B. Nuclear Test Ban Treaties
Testing has long been crucial to the development of nuclear
weapons.5" Although it may be theoretically possible for a country
56. The NPT ensures a special position for the United States, the Soviet Union,
and the United Kingdom in some, but not all, treaty matters. The assent of these three
countries was required before the treaty could enter into force for any state (art. IX.3),
and they also retain a right to veto any proposed amendments to the treaty (art. VIII.2).
However, the treaty provides that the 1995 decision about extension of the treaty is to be
taken by a simple majority vote, with no reserved powers for the three depositaries (art.
X.2).
57. Thomas Graham, The Duration of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty:
Sudden Death or New Lease on Life?, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 661 (1989); George Bunn &
Charles N. Van Doren, Options for Extension of the NPT: The Intention of the Drafters
of Article X.2, in OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES: THE NPT EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF
1995, PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION STUDY No. 2
(1991). The NPT is remarkably difficult to amend, due to article VIII.2, which requires
the support of all parties who sit on the IAEA Board of Governors before an amendment
can enter into force for any party. See David Fischer, The 1995 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference: Issues and Prospects, in NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION: AN AOENDA FOR THE 1990S, at 155, 160-62 (John Simpson ed., 1987).
58. Any country would be less inclined to build, deploy, and threaten to use a
weapon that has not been thoroughly tested. For example, if the superpowers had been
prevented from testing new types of nuclear warheads at particular points in history, they
might have been compelled to refrain from producing weapons such as MIRVs and cruise
missiles. David A. Koplow & Philip G. Schrag, rapporteurs, Phasing Out Nuclear
Weapons Tests, Belmont Conference on Nuclear Test Ban Policy, reprinted in 26 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 216-20 (1989) [hereinafter Belmont Report]; NAS, supra note 8, at 231.
Today, a new series of "third generation" nuclear weapons, including many considered
for possible adaptation in the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") program, has been
moving toward the testing phase, and a prompt CTBT would preclude them. Dan
Fenstermacher, Arms Race: The Next Generation, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Mar. 1991,
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today to develop a crude atomic device without conducting experimental
explosions," the actual practice of countries has generally been to test
extensively prior to production or deployment of new nuclear arms.'
The articulation of a test ban treaty, therefore, has long been appreciated
as a key step toward heading off the invention and dissemination of new
forms of nuclear warheads.6' Since the 1950s, therefore, a nuclear test
ban treaty has consistently been at the top of the international
disarmament agenda, retaining a unique degree of public salience.62
The first test ban agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of
1963,' confined only the location of nuclear tests, restricting the
explosions to deep underground caverns where the radioactivity and other
products would be safely contained, not venting into the biosphere. 4
at 29; Belmont Report, supra, at 219-20.
59. FISCHER, STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 26, at
156. Of the four "undeclared" nuclear countries, only India is known for certain to have
conducted even a single weapons test; Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa were able to
assemble at least an unsophisticated nuclear capability without extensive experience with
explosions. SPECTOR, supra note 34, at 3-4.
60. The United States had never tested the atomic bombs that were dropped on
Japan at the end of World War II, but the United States and the Soviet Union both
undertook testing at a high rate throughout the cold war era, with the United States
conducting some 936 explosions and the U.S.S.R. 715. Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide,
1945 to December 31, 1991, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1992, at 49.
61. Countries conduct nuclear test explosions for many purposes, such as
verifying the reliability of weapons already in the stockpile, measuring the effects of the
blasts against military targets, etc. The primary motivation, however, has been to develop
new types of nuclear weapons or to improve upon existing designs. OLIVER THRANERT,
SOVIET POLICY ON NUCLEAR TESTING, 1985-1991, at 5-10 (1992).
62. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 32, at 37 (1990); PHILIP G.. SCHRAO,
GLOBAL ACTION: NUCLEAR TEST BAN DIPLOMACY AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR 8-15
(1992); Report of the Secretary-General on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (Mar. 24,
1980) [hereinafter Goldblat Report]; Thomas Graham, Jr., Limitations on Nuclear
Weapons, in Stephan & Klimenko, supra note 26, at 51-59; Josephine A. Stein, Progress
Toward a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban?, in Poole, supra note 53, at 43.
63. LTBT, supra note 6. The conclusion of the LTBT was preceded by a long
exchange of public and private negotiations and by a series of unilateral moratoria, during
which the nuclear states voluntarily refrained from all testing. The LTBT was the first
truly significant United States-Soviet Union arms control accomplishment, and it broke
new ground in addressing a wide range of questions such as internal and alliance politics,
nuclear strategy, and East-West rivalry. G. Allen Greb & Warren Heckrotte, The Long
History: The Test Ban Debate, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Aug.-Sept. 1983, at 36; Blacker
& Duffy, supra note 8, at 126-34; JENSEN, supra note 8, at 17-29.
64. The LTBT was perhaps more successful as an environmental protection
measure (in keeping radioactive debris out of the atmosphere) than as an arms control
accomplishment (since the NWS simply adapted to conducting their weapons development
experiments underground, with as much vigor and success as they had previously achieved
through their atmospheric explosions). SEABORO, supra note 10, at 286-87; Belmont
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The LTBT was explicitly only a partial step,' representing incomplete
progress toward the ultimate objective of a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) which had eluded the negotiators due to a lack of
consensus concerning the applicable verification structures.' In the
preamble to the LTBT, the negotiating states declared that they were
"[s]eeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end."67
Moreover, in article I of the treaty, immediately after the passage that
proscribed tests in selected environments while permitting them to
continue underground, the parties stated,
It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this
subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty
resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions,
including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of
which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty,
they seek to achieve."
Continuing pursuit of a CTBT was therefore both an underlying
assumption of the LTBT and a continuing commitment imposed by it, and
the issue remained intensely active in international disarmament
diplomacy.'
Report, supra note 58, at 209; JENSEN, supra note 8, at 31-32.
65. Most people outside the United States refer to the 1963 agreement as the
"Partial Test Ban Treaty," and even the United States Secretary of State, upon signing the
accord, referred to the "unfinished business" remaining to be accomplished. Miguel
Manin-Bosch, Amendment Conference to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, 14 DISARMAMENT
83, 86 (1991). See The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson
Administration, Policy and Negotiations, Comprehensive Test Ban (1968) (top secret
memorandum, declassified and available through National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Policy 1945-1991 File, document 1234) (summarizing United States
government internal and international efforts in pursuit of further testing restrictions
during the 1960s).
66. The United States and the Soviet Union exchanged numerous proposals for
on-site inspection of suspicious events and for the installation of automated seismic
detectors inside each country. At times, it appeared that the gap between their respective
verification positions was quite small, but they were unable to reach complete accord.
They therefore settled for an agreement prohibiting testing in the atmosphere, in outer
space, and under water (environments for which the existing national verification
capabilities were deemed adequate), while permitting-at least as an interim
measure-explosions confined underground. SEABORG, supra note 10, at 176-81;
SCHRAO, supra note 32, at 15-19; ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 32, at 37-44.
67. LTBT, supra note 6, pmbl., para. 3.
68. LTBT, supra note 6, art. I, § 1(b).
69. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 19-27; JENSEN, supra note 8, at 34-48.
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Two additional bilateral United States-Soviet Union treaties contained
further incremental progress: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of
1974' and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976"'
confined the size of underground nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons
yield.' This level was still large enough to permit the development of
all manner of new types of nuclear warheads, and the rest of the world
was generally unimpressed by the superpowers' accomplishment.'
Nevertheless, these accords perhaps embodied enough stepwise progress
to provide the negotiators with a fig leaf of coverage for their claims of
fidelity to the ongoing arms control obligations.' Moreover, the TTBT
restated, and to some extent amplified, the obligations of the LTBT, in its
preamble5 and in the direct language of operative article I: "The Parties
shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution
to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon
tests. "76
As discussed below, these two treaties did not enter into force until
they were supplemented by additional verification protocols in 1990.7
They have remained strictly bilateral; no effort has been made to secure
the adherence of nuclear powers other than the United States and the
Soviet Union (and Russia, its successor state for these purposes).7"
70. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 3,
1974, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. ExEc. Doc. N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter
TI'BTI.
71. Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28,
1976, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. ExEc. Doc N, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) [hereinafter
PNET].
72. The traditional mechanism for measuring the size (or "yield") of a nuclear
explosive is in tons of TNT equivalent. A 150 kiloton weapon, for example, has a force
comparable to 150,000 tons of TNT, and is roughly ten times as powerful as the bomb
dropped on Hiroshima at the end of World War II.
73. SCHRAG, supra note 62, at 23; JENsEN, supra note 8, at 34-39.
74. The TTBT was concluded in 1974 but was not submitted to the United States
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification until after the PNET was finished in 1976.
Shortly thereafter, President Carter elected to defer ratification of both treaties, opting
instead to concentrate on negotiating a CTBT. In 1980, the Reagan administration
concluded that the verification provisions of the treaties were inadequate, and entry into
force was again delayed, this time until two 1990 protocols (see infra note 92) were
drafted. Belmont Report, supra note 58, at 210-11.
75. TTBT, supra note 70, pmbl., para. 3 ("Recalling the determination expressed
by the Parties to the [LTBT] in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all
test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, and to continue negotiations to this end.").
76. TTBT, supra note 70, art. I, § 3.
77. See infra note 92.
78. China has recently tested a nuclear device having a yield several times greater
than the 150 kiloton ceiling of the TTBT. Barbara Crossette, Chinese Set Off Their
Biggest Nuclear Explosion, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at Al.
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Throughout, there have been episodic efforts to renew the direct
pursuit of the principal objective, a CTBT. During the Carter
administration, negotiators from the United States, the Soviet Union, and
Great Britain labored through several rounds of bargaining over three
years, achieving substantial agreement on the content of the fundamental
obligations and the accompanying verification provisions. 9  Key
elements eluded them, however, and no treaty was reached.' As noted
below, the Reagan administration then suspended the negotiations, and
they have not been resumed."1
In sum, the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts is closely
intertwined with the history of nuclear test ban efforts. Both have been
appreciated as fundamental devices for arresting the nuclear arms race and
the further spread of the weaponry, and both have been the subject of
countless resolutions of support-expressed with diminishing patience for
the delay-in the United Nations General Assembly and in affiliated
disarmament negotiating bodies.' At a time when the NPT parties, and
especially the NNWS, are contemplating the 1995 opportunity to breathe
new life into the non-proliferation regime, the article VI connection to
nuclear test ban policy becomes especially problematic.
79. HERBERT F. YORK, MAKING WEAPONS, TALKING PEACE: A PHYSICIST'S
ODYSSEY FROM HIRosHImA TO GENEVA 282-323 (1987); Report on CTh Negotiations,
DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1980, at 47-48.
80. Among the unresolved sticking points were crucial verification issues such as
the number and location of seismic monitoring stations to be installed in the territory of
the parties, and the rights and functions of the personnel conducting on-site inspections.
YORK, supra note 79, at 302-10. These difficulties, in turn, arose largely from the failure
of political will among the national leadership of the negotiating countries-with the
United States giving a priority to SALT II over CTBT, and with the Soviet Union
invading Afghanistan and thus ending all hopes for major arms control accomplishments.
Id. at 316-19.
81. The most recent major forum for continuing international deliberations on
testing limitations was the 1991 Amendment Conference for the LTBT. At this event,
prompted by a request from one-third of the parties to the treaty, representatives debated
whether to attempt to achieve a CTBT via use of the amendment provisions of the LTBT.
Although many states expressed strong interest in this route, the United States succeeded
in squelching the effort. ScMAG, supra note 62.
82. Marin-Bosch, supra note 65, at 89 (United Nations General Assembly has
adopted over 70 resolutions on nuclear testing; other international bodies have expressed
continuing interest, as well); JENSEN, supra note 8, at 43 (the average vote on recent
CTBT resolutions in the General Assembly has found 121 states in favor); William
Epstein, The Nuclear Testing Threat, BuLL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, July-Aug. 1990, at 35,
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C. The Posture of the Reagan and Bush Administrations
The recent American leadership was no friend of CTBT. The
Reagan and Bush administrations undertook three separate stratagems
designed to fend off the international and domestic pressures favoring
further testing limitations.' First, most directly, the Reagan
administration terminated the ongoing CTBT negotiations that had been
underway between 1977 and 1980." The United States declared, in
varying terms, that a timely comprehensive test ban treaty was no longer
an American negotiating goal; it might remain as a long term ultimate
objective, but it was not something to be pursued under current
circumstances.'
83. Over the past decade, the United States House of Representatives frequently
voiced support for some type of additional test ban limitations, for a reciprocal
moratorium on testing, and for the prompt initiation of CTBT negotiations. In 1992, the
Senate also supported such measures, for the first time. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 192-
94; Helen Dewar, Senate Votes Overwhelmingly for Far-Reaching Nuclear Testing
Moratorium, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1992, at A4; R. Jeffrey Smith, Administration
Considers Limiting Nuclear Tests, WASH. POST, May 25, 1992, at Al; Diane G. Simpson,
Nuclear Testing Limits: Problems and Prospects, 33 SURVIVAL 500-16 (1991).
84. JENSEN, supra note 8, at 41-42. The Reagan administration was committed
to a program of massive defense buildups, and nuclear weapons testing was essential to
the development of new types of bombs and warheads. id. While continuing to
categorize CTBT as a "long-term objective," the Reagan administration concluded that
.as long as the United States and our friends and allies must rely upon nuclear weapons
to deter aggression, however, some level of nuclear testing will continue to be required."
Department of State Report, U.S. Policy Regarding Limitations on Nuclear Testing,
Special Report No. 150 (Aug. 1986), reprinted in UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AOENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1986 (1991), [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 19861 448, 451. The Bush administration added,
"Nuclear weapons will continue to play a critical role in U.S. national security strategy.
So long as this is the case, the U.S. must be free to conduct nuclear tests to ensure the
credibility of our forces. The U.S. has not identified any further limitations on nuclear
testing beyond those now contained in the TI'BT that would be in the U.S. national
security interest." Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties with the
U.S.S.R.: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
110 (1990) [hereinafter SFRC Hearings) (written responses from Ambassador Lehman to
Senator Pell).
85. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 27-29; INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION, TOWARD
A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR WARHEAD TEST BAN 12-13 (1991); JENSEN, supra note 8,
at 42. Secretary of State George Shultz commented, "Now, it is our view, and I think
it is almost an obvious proposition, that as long as you have nuclear weapons, you have
to conduct tests, and so you put the cart before the horse if you say, 'Let's stop tests.'"
News Conference Remarks (Oct. 7, 1986), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT
1986, supra note 84, at 618, 620. ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman stated in 1987 that
a CTBT would be pursued only, "way, way, way down the road ... when there's peace
on earth and good will towards men." R. Jeffrey Smith, Negotiators Face Hurdles on
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Second, the United States attempted to divert attention from the
CTBT question by focusing upon the TTBT and PNET. 6  These
relatively modest treaties, observed in practice by the United States and
the Soviet Union for over a decade, had never been formally ratified and
brought into force." The Reagan and Bush administrations highlighted
alleged uncertainties or inadequacies in the verification arrangements for
the accords," and devoted years to arguments, to experiments," and
then to painstaking bilateral negotiations,' over mechanisms and
equipment that could redress the shortcomings.91 Eventually, elaborate
Range of Arms Issues, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1987, at A20.
86. In unguarded moments, Reagan administration officials were blunt in stating
their objective of shunting attention away from possible progress toward a CTBT and
focusing instead on the TTBT and PNET, which were acknowledged to be of marginal
importance in any circumstances. Frank I. Gaffney, Test Ban Would Be Real Tremor to
U.S. Security, DEFENSE NEWS, Sept. 5, 1988, at 36-37; John Horgan, Test-Ban
Countdown, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 16; SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 42 n.164.
87. Both the United States and the Soviet Union declared in 1976 their intention
to abide by the 150 kiloton ceiling pending ratification of the treaties. ACDA TREATY
BOOK, supra note 32, at 186.
88. It is technically difficult to evaluate the size of a distant underground nuclear
explosion and impossible to be confident about whether a particular test was slightly above
or slightly below the 150 kiloton ceiling. The Reagan administration nonetheless alleged
that "Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of
legal obligations under the [TTBTJ." Report from President Reagan to the Congress:
Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements (Feb. 1, 1986), reprinted in
DOCUMENTs ON DISARMAMENT 1986, supra note 84, at 27, 50. More recent expert
analysis has reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the earlier estimates of the size
of Soviet tests were artificially inflated by consistent mistakes about the seismic
transmission properties of the geology of the test site. U.S. CONORESS, OFF. OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, SEISMIC VERIFICATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES 124-26 (1988).
89. At American insistence, the Soviet Union agreed to participate in a series of
experiments to assess the effectiveness of various methods of short-range measurement of
the size of underground nuclear explosions. Agreement Between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. on the Conduct of a Joint Verification Experiment (May 31, 1988); SFRC
Hearings, supra note 84, at 2-3 (Lehman testimony describing the experiment program);
THRANERT, supra note 61, at 64-66.
90. The verification protocols were drafted during six rounds of negotiations, they
were signed in June 1990, and they entered into force in December 1990. U.S. Nuclear
Testing Policy, 2 DEP'T STATE DISPATCH 626 (1991); R. Jeffrey Smith, Superpowers to
Resume A-Test Talks, WASH. POST, May 12, 1989, at A30. Each protocol is substantially
longer and more detailed than the original treaty to which it is attached-and those treaties
had incorporated, at the time of their signature, the most elaborate and detailed arms
control verification mechanisms yet concluded. See S.N. Kiselev, Nuclear Testing, in
Stephan & Klimenko, supra note 26, at 76, 79-82 (Soviet perspective on the protocol
negotiations).
91. Under the protocols, the United States has the right to employ a variety of on-
site instruments to measure the size of Soviet underground nuclear tests. In addition to
traditional seismic monitoring equipment, the United States insisted upon the right to use
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verification protocols were drafted to supplement the TTBT/PNET
inspection powers,92 and in 1990 the long-delayed accords were
effectuated. By elevating these relatively minor perfecting agreements to
such primary importance, the United States thus effectively interposed
additional time-consuming steps into the already-convoluted, incremental
progress toward a CTBT.
Once the TTBT and PNET were in place, however, the Bush
administration confronted an unwelcome legacy from its predecessor's test
ban policy. In 1986, President Reagan had explicitly promised the
Congress and the Soviet Union that further talks on additional testing
limitations would commence "immediately" after the TIBT/PNET
question was resolved.' That bargain had bought the administration
four additional years of unconstrained testing, but now the commitment
was a burden for testing zealots. The Bush administration eventually
decided simply to renege on Reagan's assurances, delaying the initiation
"hydrodynamic" measuring equipment, originally resisted by the U.S.S.R. U.S. Nuclear
Testing Policy, supra note 90; Thrinert, supra note 61, at 67-69. These long-sought
inspection rights have been rendered largely moot, due to the Soviet and Russian
moratoria on nuclear testing.
92. Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon
Tests, June 1, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 I.L.M. 969 [hereinafter 1990 TTBT Protocol];
Protocol to the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, June
1, 1990, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 I.L.M. 1025 [hereinafter 1990 PNET Protocol].
93. In an October 10, 1986 letter sent to the chairs of the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees just before departing for a summit meeting, Reagan wrote:
I intend to inform the General Secretary in Reykjavik that, once our verification
concerns have been satisfied and the [TTBT and PNET] treaties have been ratified,
I will propose that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately engage in
negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program-in association
with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons-of limiting
and ultimately ending nuclear testing. These steps we can take in the near
future-steps which will show the world that the United States is moving forward.
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1986, supra note 84, at 624, 625.
The commitment to pursue additional test ban negotiations was reaffirmed in a joint
communique issued on September 15, 1987, after a Shultz-Shevardnadze ministerial
meeting. The two parties announced that they had agreed to pursue "full-scale stage-by-
stage negotiations on nuclear testing," to embrace the preparations for a "joint verification
experiment" on seismic and other monitoring, and the modification of the TTBT and
PNET. Following that, they would "proceed to negotiating further intermediate
limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation
of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process." Michael R. Gordon,
Issues on Nuclear Testing to Be Resolved in Formal Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1987,
at A6.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
of any follow-on negotiations, and swallowing the domestic and
international outrage.'
Even more disingenuously, the Bush executive branch averred that
it would need "a period of observation" after the entry into force of the
TTBT and PNET, to study their implementation (even though the United
States and the Soviet Union had, defacto, been living under the unratified
treaties' terms since 1974) before deciding whether additional testing
limitations made sense." The Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency then testified in 1990 that this post-TTBT delay in
initiating negotiations on further testing restrictions would be a period of
"months" rather than "years."' However, through the end of the Bush
administration, no additional treaty talks were underway, there appeared
to be little movement or bureaucratic flexibility inside the United States
government regarding test ban options,' and a statutory deadline for the
administration to submit a report to the Congress on a proposed schedule
for the resumed talks had long since passed unfulfilled."
As a third dilatory tactic, the United States floated in the
international arena a series of plausible-sounding yet ultimately-specious
arguments questioning the wisdom and feasibility of a CTBT. As each
of these contentions was laboriously rebutted by experts, the
administration fell back on other arguments, presenting a "moving target"
of glib rationales for continued testing. Eventually, the entire line of
94. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 83-86; R. Jeffrey Smith, Breaking Pledge, U.S.
to Defer Underground Nuclear Test Talks, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1990, at A24; Warren
Strobel, U.S. Delays Talks on Underground Nuclear Tests, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1990,
at A9.
95. U.S. Nuclear Testing Policy, supra note 90, at 627; SFRC Hearings, supra
note 84, at 22-23, 40 (Lehman testimony, responding to a question about whether the
administration policy might not result in a CTBT even in another 50 years: "[l]t is clear
that our long-term objective is not something that will be achieved very quickly.")
96. Lehman testimony at SFRC Hearings, supra note 84, cited in ScHRAo, supra
note 62, at 187-88.
97. R. Jeffrey Smith, Administration Considers Limiting Nuclear Tests, WASH.
POST, May 25, 1992, at Al.
98. The Simon Amendment to the fiscal year 1992 defense budget authorization
act (section 340) required the president to submit by February 5, 1992 a report to the
Congress specifying a tentative calendar for initiating negotiations on further test ban
arrangements, together with a statement of the goals that the United States would pursue
in the talks. Two months after the deadline had passed, three senators (including Sen.
Sam Nunn, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee) wrote a letter to the
president, complaining about the lack of action. INST. FOR DEFENSE AND DISARMAMENT
STUDIES, ARMS CONTROL REPORTER 608.B.227 (1992). See also 136 CONG. REC.
S13,760 ((daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990) (exchange of letters between members of Congress
and executive branch regarding conformity with earlier promises of "step by step"
progress on nuclear testing)).
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excuses collapsed-assertions about verification loopholes," stockpile
reliability,' °° weapon safety, 101 retention of laboratory expertise, 102
and the rest were sequentially refuted. The final, honest posture was the
Bush administration's closing line: No CTBT could be effectuated so long
as the United States retains a nuclear arsenal and the possibility of
refining, improving, or adding new types of warheads to it. Only in
some far-off future world where nuclear deterrence is no longer central
would the United States begin to discharge its obligations to conclude a
halt to nuclear explosions."
Recently, the quixotic opposition to a CTBT took other odd turns.
The Bush administration redoubled its stated commitment to the non-
proliferation effort,' °4 and announced that the United States would
99. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 88; STEVE FETrER, TOWARD A
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN 107-58 (1988); Belmont Report, supra note 58, at 236-43
(current or planned verification networks could ensure high confidence in other state's
compliance with a CTBT).
100. Belmont Report, supra note 58, at 229-35 (existing or projected procedures
can adequately ensure the reliability of the United States arsenal of nuclear weapons into
the foreseeable future); FETTER, supra note 99, at 69-106; INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION,
supra note 85, at 20-24.
101. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 190-91 (at most, only a few additional low-yield'
tests would be necessary to certify that "insensitive high explosive" (a safer, more robust
triggering mechanism) could be inserted into existing nuclear devices); Tom A. Zamora,
Put a Safety Cap on Testing, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Mar. 1992, at 25.
102. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 29 (national weapons laboratories are valuable
assets, but they can be sustained, and unfortunate "brain drain" avoided, via the award
of other types of contracts). In the same vein, the United States is now subsidizing the
Russian military and scientific establishment, in order to help induce weapons experts to
retrain for other types of employment, instead of selling their nuclear or other expertise
as mercenaries in the global arms market. John J. Fialka, Russian Scientists Change Their
Work, Not Always Along Lines the U.S. Likes, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1992, at A16.
103. A recent administration policy paper reported that:
A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term US objective. Such a
ban must be viewed in the context of a time when the United States no longer
needs to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and
stability, and when it has achieved:
-Broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions;
-Greatly improved verification capabilities;
-Expanded confidence-building measures; and
-Greater balance in conventional forces.
U.S. Nuclear Testing Policy, supra note 90, at 627; U.S. Policy Statement on Nuclear
Testing, quoted in INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION, supra note 85, at 13.
104. Statement by the President and Fact Sheet on Nonproliferation Initiative (July
13, 1992) [hereinafter Statement and Fact Sheet]. But see Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., The
Nonproliferation Noninitiative, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July-Aug. 1992, at 2; Paul
Leventhal & Daniel Homer, Bush's Voodoo Nonproliferation, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR,
July 20, 1992, at 18 (arguing that the newly-announced policies do not incorporate many
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unilaterally cease the production of fissile material for additional nuclear
weapons1" and also would halt all existing programs for developing
additional types of nuclear warheads and bombs.1" In July 1992, the
government further declared that the future program for explosive testing
of nuclear devices-already scaled back due to budgetary
constraints"' 7-would henceforth be restricted to only six tests per year
(roughly one-third the size of the traditional program), with no more than
three tests per year greater than thirty-five kilotons yield, and with all the
tests being dedicated to assessing the safety and reliability of weapons
already in the stockpile, rather than to the development of new types. 108
This testing strategy was immediately criticized as unnecessary-experts
asserted that only a handful of tests would be needed, under any plausible
assumptions, for stockpile safety and reliability assurances at this
point. "  Still, the administration was unwilling to suspend testing, to
important changes).
105. Statement and Fact Sheet, supra note 104; R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush Formalizes
Halt to Nuclear Production, WASH. POST, July 14, 1992, at A6; Michael R. Gordon, It's
Official: U.S. Stops Making Material for Nuclear Warheads, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1992,
at A18. The United States has not produced any plutonium since 1988 or any highly
enriched uranium since 1964, and the facilities for manufacturing those elements are
mothballed or obsolete, so the announced suspension of production was simply an official
recognition of the existing reality. In fact, the United States now has a large surplus of
the fissile materials. Id.; Jon B. Wolfsthal, White House Formalizes End to Fissionable
Materials Production, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July-Aug. 1992, at 25; Vladimir lakimets
& Olzhas Suleimenov, New Tests Mean New Nukes, 48 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Oct.
1992, at 12.
106. The. United States has not produced new nuclear warheads since July 1990,
and President Bush canceled plans to manufacture the only remaining new type of nuclear
weapon still under advanced development. R. Jeffrey Smith, Administration Considers
Limiting Nuclear Tests, WASH. POST, May 25, 1992, at Al, A6; R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S.
to Halt H-Bomb Production, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1992, at Al. But see R. Jeffrey
Smith, 5 Sites Considered for New Nuclear Weapons Facility, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,
1992, at A3 (United States is considering construction of a new plant to manufacture the
plutonium triggers for new nuclear warheads); David C. Morrison, PSSST! The Cold
War's Over, 24 NAT'L J. 1380 (1992) (Department of Energy is continuing funding for
concept studies of four new designs for future nuclear weapons).
107. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 187 (budgetary constraints drove the annual
number of American nuclear weapons tests down from 14 in 1988, to 11 in 1989, and to
8 in 1990); R. Jeffrey Smith, Administration Considers Limiting Nuclear Tests, WASH.
POST, May 25, 1992, at Al (United States would conduct only six tests next year).
108. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Tightens Limit on Nuclear Tests, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 1992, at A5; R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush Rejects ProposedLimits on Underground Nuclear
Tests, WASH. POST, July 15, 1992, at A16; George Leopold, U.S. Officials Waver On
Nuclear Arms Tests, DEFENSE NEWS, July 13-19, 1992, at 11.
109. John Horgan, Counting Down, Sci. AM., Aug. 1992, at 20; Dunbar
Lockwood, Bush Declares New Testing Limits; Few Changes Actually Planned, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, July-Aug. 1992, at 26; Ray E. Kidder, Prepared Statement on The
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open CTBT negotiations, or to consider writing additional testing
constraints into law."'
In all of this, the United States government was willing to take the
diplomatic and political heat for frustrating the world's desires for more
prompt and substantial limitations on testing."" In international
assemblies such as the 1990 NPT Review Conference" 2 or the 1991
LTBT Amendment Conference,"' the vast majority of participants
strongly endorsed the concept of a CTBT, leaving the United States and
only a handful of allies-sometimes solely the United Kingdom" 4-in
uneasy isolation.
Reliability and Safety of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test Requirements,
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (July 23, 1992).
110. One Bush administration official has said,
We have committed to a step-by-step process, and we remain committed to
that approach. We do not see a comprehensive test ban (CTB) as very useful
in a modern age of arms control when we are sitting down with our former
adversaries, cooperating on how we eliminate nuclear weapons, how we
control them, and how we maintain stability.
Ronald F. Lehman, Lehman's Lessons: The Arms Control Agenda, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Dec. 1991, at 8, 12. Another official stated, "[Als long as we rely' upon nuclear
weapons for deterrence, we will need to test them." Robert Barker, Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, quoted in Dunbar Lockwood, France Announces
Testing Halt; Congress Debates Similar Measure, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1992,
at 17.
111. There are genuine questions regarding the sincerity of some other states'
expressions of interest in a CTBT. Some NNWS may harbor their own nuclear
ambitions, and they could be using the superpowers' failure to conclude a CTBT as
merely a handy excuse for avoiding constraints upon their own programs. SCHRAO, supra
note 62, at 28; ZiBA MOSHAVER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN THE INDIAN
SUBCONTINENT 108-33 (1991); Belmont Report, supra note 58, at 221-24. Similarly,
France and China both elected not to participate in the trilateral test ban negotiations
conducted during the Carter Administration. Although France recently suspended its
nuclear testing (and pledged a longer moratorium if the other NWS follow suit), see
William Drozdiak, France Sets Moratorium on Nuclear Arms Tests, WASH. POST, Apr.
9, 1992, at A18, China has continued its program unabated. Barbara Crossette, Chinese
Set Off Their Biggest Nuclear Explosion, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at Al; Bill Gertz,
China Continues Nuclear Testing; US May Respond, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1992, at A3.
112. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 127-31; Van Doren & Bunn, supra note 51;
Spector & Smith, supra note 51.
113. SCHRAO, supra note 62; Tom A. Zamora, LTBT Amendment Conference to
Continue, But No Test Ban in Sight, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1991, at 14.; Marin-
Bosch, supra note 65, at 83.
114. See NPT Not Linked to CTB, DISARMAMENT TIMES, May 1990, at 3
(interview with [an Kenyon, Counsellor on United Kingdom delegation to the CD;
recapitulating British view, consistent with that of United States government, that arms
control measures other than CTBT will satisfy the article VI obligations).
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Recently, the Congress, too, has joined the fray in a significant
way." 5  Landmark legislation, passed in the waning moments of the
102nd Congress, has dramatically altered the United States approach to
the subject of nuclear test bans. 1 6 The act required an immediate nine-
month moratorium on testing (October 1, 1992 through July 1, 1993);
after that, no more than five tests per year are allowed for the next three
years, and all of those permitted explosions must be devoted to assessing
and improving the safety and reliability of existing weapons, rather than
to developing new types of bombs."" Beginning on October 1, 1996,
there will be a second moratorium, this time of unlimited duration, unless
some other state conducts a nuclear test. In addition, the new law
requires the president to submit to the Congress, by March 1, 1993, a
report containing a schedule for resumption of CTBT negotiations with
Russia and a plan for achieving a multilateral test ban treaty by 1996."'
D. The Russian Perspective
In recent years, the Soviet Union has emerged as a consistent
champion of additional restraints upon nuclear testing. There may be a
115. The House of Representatives had frequently voted in favor of additional
constraints upon nuclear testing; in 1992, the Senate concurred for the first time. See
Dunbar Lockwood, Bush Opposition to Test Ban Under Increasing Pressure, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, June 1992, at 25; Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Tightens Limit on Nuclear
Tests, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1992, at A5; Helen Dewar, Senate Votes Overwhelminglyfor
Far-Reaching Nuclear Testing Moratorium, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1992, at A4; Pamela
Fessler, Senate, Administration on Path to Confrontation on Testing, 50 CONG. Q. 2184
(1992).
116. The Bush administration had opposed additional test ban legislation, and
threatened to veto the bill. Paul Nitze & Siegfried Hecker, Weapons Testing We Can't
Do Without, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 1992; Paul Wolfowitz, Testing Is Still Needed, USA
TODAY, Aug. 3, 1992, at. 8A; Nuclear Test Curb May Lead to Veto of Defense Budget,
WASH. TIMES, July 29, 1992 (arguing that continued nuclear testing is necessary and
noting that executive branch officials would recommend presidential veto of legislation
incorporating a test moratorium). However, the testing limitations were ultimately
attached to the bill authorizing funding for the "superconducting supercollider" research
project in Texas, which the president strongly supported, and administration officials at
the last moment reluctantly acceded. Tom Zamora-Collina, Nuclear Weapons Take a
Dive, BuLL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Dec. 1992, at 6; Andrew Rosenthal, White House Fight
on Collider Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1992, at 1; Helen Dewar, Overturning Bush
Policy, Congress Suspends Underground Nuclear Testing, Sept. 26, 1992, at All; John
Isaacs, The Senate That Can Say No, 48 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1992, at 6.
117. See Ray E. Kidder, How Much More Nuclear Testing Do We Need?, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1992, at 11.
118. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
102-377, § 507, 106 Stat. 1343 (1992). See also CONG. REC. S13,948-68 (daily ed. Sept.
18, 1992).
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
variety of explanations for this interest: budgetary shortfalls, the political
leadership's desire to constrain the military, the public's newfound
interest in environmental protection and antinuclearism,"' as well as the
effort to curb the nuclear arms race.12°
Mikhail Gorbachev was out in front on this issue early in his tenure
in office, declaring unilateral moratoria on Soviet nuclear weapons testing
from July 26, 1985 to February 26, 1987, and again from October 19,
1989 to October 24, 1990.121 He made CTBT a priority in his foreign
policy, emphasizing his willingness to conclude a far-reaching pact
incorporating exceptionally intrusive verification,"2 and tabling a new
proposed draft CTB treaty text." His successor, Russian President
Boris Yeltsin, has continued a third unilateral moratorium, which began
October 6, 1991, and has recently extended that test suspension into mid-
1993, to match the American initiative."2 Yeltsin has also declared his
own profound interest in a CTBT, a phased reduction in the number of
annual tests conducted by each side, or at least a resumption of
negotiations on a new test ban agreement'2-but at the same time, he
has undertakenpreparations to resume testing if the United States does not
reciprocate. " Of course, the process of converting unilateral
declarations of this sort into a binding international agreement is complex,
119. The "green" movement inside the former Soviet Union, prompted by
apprehensions about a repetition of the Chernobyl fiasco and by despair over the state of
the environment, has successfully campaigned to reduce, and possibly to preclude, future
explosions at the two traditional Soviet nuclear test sites. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 63-
64, 187; Diane G. Simpson, Nuclear Testing Limits: Problems and Prospects, 33
SURVIVAL 500, 507 (1991).
120. Vladimir lakimets & Olzhas Suleimenov, New Tests Mean New Nukes, BULL.
ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1992, at 12.
121. INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION, supra note 85, at 46; THE LAST NUCLEAR
EXPLOSION: FORTY YEARS OF STRUGOLE AGAINST NUCLEAR TESTS (A HISTORICAL
SURVEY) 81-98 (Valentin Falin ed., 1986) [hereinafter Falin]; THRkNERT, supra note 61,
at 17-45.
122. SCHRAo, supra note 62, at 186.
123. Kiselev, supra note 90, at 82-83.
124. Fred Hiatt, Russia Extends Test Ban, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1992, at A25.
125. SCHRAG, supra note 62, at 199 n.17; Gorbachev's Remarks on Arms Cuts,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, § 1, at 12.
126. Walter C. Clemens, Yeltsin's Ominous Move to Resume Nuclear Testing,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, May 11, 1992, at 18; Dunbar Lockwood, France Announces
Testing Halt; Congress Debates Similar Measure, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1992,
at 17. As in the United States, powerful military and bureaucratic elements inside the
U.S.S.R. and Russia have pressed for the resumption of nuclear tests. Fred Hiatt,
Russian Test Site Displays Pride, Perils of a Superpower, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1992,




with many opportunities for foundering on issues such as verification, but
at least the rhetoric from Moscow has been unambiguously positive.1"
In fact, the recent "box score" of nuclear weapons testing reveals
that in the past two years, the United States has conducted a total of
fifteen tests, the Soviet Union only one, France twelve, China two, and
the United Kingdom two." The ball is thus squarely in the United
States' court on CTBT, with the American political leadership now
providing the most important brake on the international community's
desire for a permanent halt to testing.
III. THE MEANING OF ARTICLE VI
With this background, we now proceed to parse the meaning of
article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Three distinct questions must
be addressed: First, how important is a CTBT in particular to the
fundamental disarmament obligation; second, what does "good faith"
mandate in pursuit of negotiations in this context; and third, how might
the international community appropriately respond to a finding of an
American breach of this provision of the treaty?
A. Why Is CTBT the Key to Article VI?
The relevant passage of the NPT is hardly a model of clarity and
precision in drafting:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.129
This paragraph may be read as establishing two similar but distinct
negotiating objectives: (a) measures relating to cessation of the arms race
127. See Falin, supra note 121, at 196-285 (reprinting numerous documents from
1985-86 in which Gorbachev called for a halt to nuclear tests).
128. Known Nuclear Tests Worldwide, 1945 to December 31, 1991, BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1992, at 49. Over a longer term, since 1980, the total number of tests
per country is: United States 167, Soviet Union 188, China 10, France 100, and United
Kingdom 14. Id. France recently announced a halt to its testing program but has also
prepared to resume the explosions in 1993 if the United States fails to reciprocate. Alan
Riding, France Suspends Its Testing of Nuclear Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1992, at
AS; Simon Haydon, Nuclear Test Site Defended, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992.
129. NPT, supra note 7, art. VI.
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and to nuclear disarmament, and (b) a treaty on general and complete
disarmament. The second goal, general and complete disarmament, has
largely been the focus of an independent set of international deliberations
and posturing, with its own unique history; it is less relevant in the
current context. 130
How, then, is the first goal, cessation of the arms race and nuclear
disarmament, converted into a mandate for a CTBT? What did the
negotiators in 1968 have in mind for this aspect of article VI? Was this
simply noncommittal language designed to provide a general spur for
arms control across the board, or was the indirect vocabulary of the
article a type of "code language" for a commitment to developa CTBT?
To answer these questions, we need to consider both the perspective of
international law and, more broadly, the realities of global politics.'31
There are two distinct approaches to the interpretation of an
international legal instrument: the "literalist" or "textual" approach
favored by most international authorities, such as the International Court
of Justice, 132 and the "contextual" or "intentionalist" approach typically
130.. See infra text accompanying notes 210-11; United Nations: General Assembly
Resolutions on General and Complete Disarmament, Dec. 6 & 9, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 469
(1992); V. Goldansky & V. Davidov, A Nuclear Test Will Guarantee The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation, in I PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WAYS TO SECURrIY 15, 22-23 (1990)
(describing most recent GCD proposals); GLENN T. SEABORo, STEMMING THE TIDE:
ARMS CONTROL IN THE JOHNSON YEARS 80-81 (1987); 1991 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 95-
108, U.N. Sales No. E.92.IX.1; James F. Leonard, Proliferation and World Order,
Address before the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association 5 n.1 (Aug. 10,
1992) (transcript available through Washington Council on Non-Proliferation).
131. Burrus Carnahan has noted in connection with the NPT that at the highest
level of abstraction, international law is uncertain in its standards for treaty interpretation.
Some authorities adopt a "restrictive" style of interpretation, reading a treaty's terms
narrowly, on the grounds that each country is sovereign and that constraints upon its
autonomy are therefore not lightly presumed; a clear act of consent is required before a
term may legitimately be read into a treaty. Other authorities, however, proceed from an
"effective" proposition, arguing that a treaty should generally be construed liberally or
expansively, to help ensure that it is able to effectuate the goals and objectives that the
parties had intended. Burrus Carnahan, Legal Obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, with Special Reference to the Issue of a Comprehensive
Test Ban 6-7 (Jan. 4, 1991) (unpublished paper prepared for Off. of Arms Control, Dep't
of Energy). See also Treaties and Other International Agreements, Interpretation, 14
Whiteman DIGEST at 380-84. In evaluating the NPT, either maxim of interpretation
would lead to the same result.
132. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31.1, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (in force, US not a party) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 (1986)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The traditional international approach to treaty interpretation
focuses heavily upon the exact words of the document and is reluctant to go behind the
plain language to inspect the parties' intentions or objectives. Analysis of the negotiating
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adopted by American courts and commentators. 133 At the initial stages,
however, the two strategies coincide, and all authorities concur that the
task of construing an international agreement should ordinarily begin with
close analysis of the text itself, confined essentially to the four corners of
the document.
Here, article VI does not explicitly refer to a CTBT, failing to
specify what "effective measures" would be appropriate to achieve the
articulated goals. The treaty preamble, however, does provide additional
insight into the parties' "object and purposes," and sheds light upon the
intended referent of the article VI language." The preamble reports
that the negotiators were:
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space and under water [i.e., the LTBT] in its Preamble to seek
to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this
end. 135
history (traveaux preparatoires) is therefore considered a "supplementary means" of
interpretation, to be consulted only when analysis of the text itself leaves the meaning
obscure or absurd.
133. American legal authorities have been more willing to defer to the intentions
and objectives of the treaty drafters, and to inspect the drafting history carefully to derive
the meaning of the language used in the treaty. American courts, therefore, tend to
evaluate the traveaux much more readily than do the international authorities (although
Justice Scalia, among others, resists the easy recourse to legislative history).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 132, §325, reporters' notes 1, 4; Carnahan, supra note 131,
at 3-6; United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989); Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522 (1987).
134. A treaty preamble does not ordinarily contain legally operative provisions,
but it can supply a probative record of the parties' object and purposes. In the NPT, this
function is underscored by article VIII.3, which establishes the five-year review
conferences, specifying that these proceedings are being instituted "in order to review the
operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the
provisions of the Treaty are being realized." The CTBT paragraph was added to the draft
NPT preamble on March 11, 1968, in response to several nations' demands that the treaty
more explicitly address the linkage between non-proliferation and a test ban. Mexico: The
Link Between the Provisions of the NPT Regarding Nuclear Disarmament Measures and
Those Regarding the Review Conferences and the Limited Duration of the Treaty (Fourth
NPT Review Conference Working Paper NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/CRP.3, Sept. 4, 1990)
[hereinafter Mexico Paper].
135. NPT, supra note 7, pmbl., para. 11.
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CTBT is the only future arms control measure specifically mentioned in
the preamble (or anywhere else in the treaty)," and it is asserted in a
context that makes its association with article VI unmistakable. 37
At this first level of analysis, most observers would conclude that the
core meaning of article VI remains ambiguous in this regard and that the
role of CTBT, in particular, in fulfilling the obligations requires
additional clarification. Where dissection of the text alone fails to resolve
such an interpretation question, authorities turn to inspection of a
subservient hierarchy of other source materials. The Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties cites "context" (other instruments executed at the
same time as the treaty), "subsequent agreements" (later documents in
which the parties reveal their interpretation of the original accord),
"subsequent practice" (statements and behaviors manifested after the
conclusion of the treaty), and "the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion.""s
In analyzing the NPT, three types of such legal materials are
available. They are, chronologically: (1) social context (in this case, the
political and military circumstances prevailing at the time of the
negotiation and conclusion of the treaty); (2) drafting history (that is, the
sequence of proposals and commentary relevant to what became article VI
and associated passages); and (3) subsequent practice (what the parties
have said and done about the disarmament obligations, especially within
the specialized setting of the review conferences established for this
purpose). The following subsections consider each of these types of
materials in detail.
136. The preamble does include a paragraph referring to the goals of "cessation
of the nuclear arms race" and "nuclear disarmament," in addition to the paragraph about
test bans. Id. para. 9.
137. LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 94. See also Final Declaration of the Third
Review Conference of the NPT, reprinted in JOZEF GOLDBLAT, TWENTY YEARS OF THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 138, 144 (1990)
[hereinafter TWENTY YEARS] (in reviewing the NPT, the conference addresses the treaty
article by article, with the relevant preambular paragraphs associated; paragraphs 8-12 are
discussed in conjunction with article VI). The United Kingdom (one of the key NWS
negotiators) explained in 1968 that "the Preamble is ... wider than... Article VI in the
disarmament field and indicates in some detail what needs to be done," quoted in
Mohamed J. Shaker, The Third NPT Review Conference: Issues and Prospects, in
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY 3, 10 (David DeWitt ed., 1987).
But see Carnahan, supra note 131, at 14-16 (preamble does not establish primacy of
CTBT).
138. Vienna Convention, supra note 132, arts. 31.2, 31.3, 32.
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1. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF ARTICLE VI
Article VI was conceived and drafted in a legal and political milieu
that strongly associated it with test ban. proposals.'39 Since the end of
World War II, the question of spreading nuclear capability had been a
consistent global concern, addressed in a variety of national proposals and
international resolutions, but with little immediate satisfaction.
Limitations upon nuclear testing were concurrently seen as a critical
device-the single most important tool-for promoting the needed
restraint. 40
A major step forward was achieved in 1961, when the United
Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the "Irish Resolution,"
calling upon all states, especially the nuclear powers, to conclude an
international agreement to refrain from transferring or acquiring nuclear
weapons. 41' The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
(ENDC) then took up the issue, receiving and debating various
139. Regarding the background of the NPT, see generally ACDA TREATY BOOK,
supra note 32, at 89-97; U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1969) [hereinafter ACDA HISTORY]; Mexico Paper, supra note 134;
SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, passim; MOHAMED I. SHAKER, THE
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979
(1980) [hereinafter SHAKER, ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION].
140. Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation (Jan. 21,
1965) (secret memorandum, declassified and available through National Security Archive,
U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy 1945-1991 File, document 1104) (stressing the
importance of heightened United States attention to the spread of nuclear weapons, and
identifying pursuit of a CTBT as the first policy tool to promote a non-proliferation
treaty); Dep't of State, Background Paper on National Attitudes Towards Adherence to
a ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty and to a Non-Proliferation Agreement (Dec. 12, 1964),
(secret memorandum, declassified and available through National Security Archive, U.S.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy 1945-1991 File, document 1078) (linking a CTBT and
a non-proliferation accord).
141. U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961).
See SHAKER, ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 139, at 3-30; GEORGE BUNN,
ARMS CONTROL BY COMMITrEE: MANAGING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS (1992);
LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 62-63; SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130,
at 78-79.
142. ' The ENDC was the leading multilateral body for negotiating disarmament
accords. Members included the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and other major powers, including key NNWS. SHAKER, ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION,
supra note 139, at 67-84. In modified form, the ENDC (now reconstituted as the 40-
member Conference on Disarmament) has continued to play a major role in elaborating
arms limitation measures.
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proposals and alternative drafts over the next several years."4 The
most important interim declaration was reflected in General Assembly
Resolution 2028 in 1965, which recorded consensus on five principles that
should guide the articulation of a non-proliferation treaty, including the
notions that the treaty should embody a "balance of responsibilities" and
should be a step toward total nuclear disarmament. ' "
In 1966, the United States and the Soviet Union, as co-chairs of the
ENDC, initiated a series of private consultations in which they reached
tentative agreement on the basic nontransfer and nonacquisition provisions
of a possible multilateral non-proliferation accord." 5 After an extended
period of arduous consultations with their respective allies,4 the two
co-chairs tabled separate but identical drafts of a nuclear non-proliferation
treaty in the ENDC on August 24, 1967."47 Extensive debate ensued
in both the ENDC and the General Assembly, and numerous
143. See MASON WlLLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEwORK FOR
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (1969); LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 66-68; Mexico
Paper, supra note 134, at 3-6.
144. U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
Principle (b) is "The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities
and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers . . . . "; principle (c) is "The treaty
should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more
particularly, nuclear disarmament .... ." See ACDA HISTORY, supra note 139, at 139.
145. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 32, at 91. An earlier American draft
treaty had been criticized by many NNWS for failing to include sufficiently strong
language mandating nuclear arms control in general and CTBT in particular. See ACDA
HISTORY, supra note 139, at 43 (Nigerian delegate asserts that a non-proliferation treaty
would not be durable unless it was accompanied by a CTBT and other initiatives); id. at
44 (Mexican delegate regards CTBT "as an essential condition for a nonproliferation
treaty and the minimum goal of the non-nuclear countries"); id. at 44 (Swedish and United
Arab Republic delegates speak of the need to link non-proliferation to other arms control
measures); id. at 75-76 (many states link CTBT to non-proliferation treaty).
146. NATO and other allies were intensely interested in any treaty or other
institutions dealing with nuclear matters, and they did not easily or automatically defer to
American preferences. The especially controversial issues at the time concerned the
potential inhibitions upon the generation of civilian nuclear power and the possible
creation of a nuclear Multilateral Force (MLF) which might allow for some sharing within
NATO of the American nuclear weaponry. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 32, at 90-
91; SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 83-130, 169-87, 287-306;
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., The Non-Proliferation Treaty (Dec. 24, 1968) (top secret
memorandum, declassified and available through National Security Archive, U.S. Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Policy 1945-1991 File, document 1237); BUNN, supra note 141, at 66-
72.
147. Reprinted in UNITED STATES ARMs AND CONTOL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1967, at 338-41 [hereinafter DOCUMENTs ON
DISARMAMENT 19671. See also LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 71 (Soviet Union




modifications were proposed by the other participating countries
(especially the non-nuclear-weapons states, who had attached growing
urgency to the proliferation problem"4 ), leading to a sequence of
revised draft texts."4 9
The NNWS had several concerns about the original 1967 draft treaty,
but perhaps foremost among them was the criticism that the co-chairs had
developed a "discriminatory" sinecure for themselves, with the world
being irretrievably divided into two castes: those advanced industrialized
societies of the first and second worlds, who would be juridically entitled
to possess the ultimate weapon, and those poor, developing countries of
the third world, who would be shorn of that option." 5 The NNWS
therefore vociferously demanded that the NWS do something to "balance"
the obligations of the treaty, to preserve more fully the equality of
autonomous (albeit, very differently situated) sovereigns."'
The NNWS were not generally clamoring for retention of the right
to possess nuclear arms themselves; instead, they insisted that the NWS
undertake some sort of parallel disarmament obligations of their own, to
mitigate the two-tier system that was being established. This tradeoff was
asserted as part of the "basic bargain" of the NPT, a "quid pro quo" for
the NNWS abnegation of nuclear arms.152
148. The NNWS were not passive or resistant on the question of nuclear non-
proliferation. At the 1964 African summit conference and at the Cairo conference of non-
aligned states, significant attention was devoted to collective expression of the need to
avoid the spread of nuclear weaponry. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 32, at 91; LAST
CHANCE, supra note 20, at 64-65.
149. Seven progressively refined texts were generated between the August 24,
1967 version and the final presentation of a complete treaty to the General Assembly on
May 31, 1968. The General Assembly endorsed the draft text on June 12, and it was
opened for signature on July 1. See U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16A, at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/6716/Add.1 (1968).
150. LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 75-78; Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at
6-8 (citing sttements from Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, India,
Sweden, and Romania arguing that a non-proliferation treaty must include a commitment
to nuclear arms control.)
151. ACDA HISTORY, supra note 139, at 86-88 (reporting comments and proposals
from Brazil, India, the United Arab Republic, Burma and Romania generally arguing that
the non-proliferation treaty must include a requirement for nuclear disarmament, and
frequently citing CTBT as a leading instrument for accomplishing this objective);
SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 161-62.
152. ACDA HISTORY, supra note 139, at 58, 106 (United States ambassadors
declare that the notion of quid pro quo is inappropriate, since the NPT will enhance the
security of all states, including NNWS.) President Johnson, however, later acknowledged
the NNWS position, saying:
The non-nuclear states have wanted their renunciation of nuclear weapons to
be matched with a binding pledge by the nuclear powers to negotiate a halt in
the arms race. . . they have asked us to pledge ourselves to move towards
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The United States was initially somewhat surprised by this
outpouring of NNWS interest in nuclear disarmament,153 and resisted
the characterization of article VI as being the "pricetag" for the rest of
the NPT. American officials argued that arresting the spread of nuclear
weaponry was as much in the NNWS' interest as it was in the NWS'. No
additional compensation should be required to induce countries to do what
was manifestly to their own national security advantage: Halting
proliferation was good in itself, independent of whatever might also be
accomplished in the nuclear disarmament efforts.".
The NNWS, however, pressed the argument, asserting that they, too,
had a stake in arresting and reversing the nuclear arms race, because the
continued possession of weapons of mass destruction by any country
imperiled all countries.' Therefore, on January 18, 1968, a new
provision, which became article VI, was added to the co-chairs' draft
text, under which the superpowers accepted the special responsibility to
deal with "vertical" proliferation at the same time as "horizontal"
proliferation." Through it all, the United States never enthusiastically
that ultimate goal. They feel the restraints they will voluntarily accept give
them the right to such a.pledge .... [The U.S. and the Soviet Union] have
jointly pledged our nations to negotiate towards the cessation of the nuclear
arms race .... The obligations of the non-proliferation treaty will reinforce
our will to bring an end to the nuclear arms race. The world will judge us by
our performance.
Warren H. Donnelly & Robert L. Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference
of 1985, reprinted in ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION OF THE
CONORESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 99TH CONO., 1ST SESS., NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
FACTBOOK 577, 579 (Jt. Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
FACTBOOK].
153. SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 367.
154. WiLLRICH, supra note 143, at 162. The United States also argued the
converse point: that nuclear arms control was profoundly in the self-interest of the
superpowers, and would be pursued vigorously for that reason, independent of the NPT.
United States statement to the ENDC (Feb. 6, 1968), reprinted in UNITED STATES ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, at 36, 37
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968].
155'. Darryl Howlett & John Simpson, The NPT and the CTBT: An Inextricable
Relationship?, ISSUE REVIEW (Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation),
Mar. 1992, at 6. The eight non-nuclear members of the ENDC had also played a lead
role in developing General Assembly Resolution 2028, supra note 144, in 1965,
elaborating the principles that the ENDC should observe in negotiating a non-proliferation
treaty, emphasizing a balancing of mutual NWS and NNWS obligations. William Epstein,
The Linkage Between a Nuclear Test Ban and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, in NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 132, 133-34 (M.P. Fry et
al. eds., 1990).
156. ACDA HISTORY, supra note 139, at 98 (description of new proposed text)
and 150 (reprinting the proposal); LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 77-79; Mexico Paper,
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embraced the notion that this was the appropriate "offset" needed to
"balance" the NPT, but the NNWS never abandoned that characterization,
and the notion of a "quid pro quo" has endured. 57
The NNWS negotiators were keenly aware of the less than
satisfactory precedent of the LTBT in mandating successor arms
limitations, and they determined to do better than solely a preambular
reference or a vague statement of intention in the NPT. 5 1 They insisted
that the commitment which eventually became article VI must be legally
binding, not entirely aspirational, and they proposed numerous
amendments to strengthen and elaborate it-although they were unable to
force the inclusion of any direct reference to specific measures of arms
control.'59
The NNWS negotiators also succeeded in putting some teeth into
article VI through linkage to other portions of the NPT: Both article
VIII.3 (review conferences) 1 °  and article X.2 (extension
conference)161 were elaborated as occasions upon which the parties
(particularly the NNWS) could assess the treaty, measure compliance with
it (particularly NWS progress on disarmament), and determine whether
it continued to meet their needs (particularly given the ongoing
discrimination inherent in the treaty). These innovations were sold by the
supra note 134, at 24-26 (statements of the United States and Soviet Union in tabling the
new text).
157. LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 181-83; NPT THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE
BRIEFING No. 1 (Greenpeace, Washington, D.C.), at 2 (quoting a United States delegate
as acknowledging that "[article VI was added, and subsequently strengthened, to give
further effect to the principle that the Treaty should embody an acceptable balance of
obligations"). In 1968, United States Ambassador Arthur Goldberg acknowledged that
"The permanent viability of this treaty will depend in large measure on our success in
further negotiations contemplated in Article VI." At the same time, the British
representative was even more explicit, stating that his government was determined to work
for a variety of specific arms control measures, including CTBT. FISCHER, STOPPING THE
SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 26, at 109.
158. WILLRICH, supra note 143, at 161 (quoting statement of Indian
representative); SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 368.
159. ACDA HISTORY, supra note 139, at 106-08 (recapping several amendment
proposals offered by Sweden, Spain, Germany, and others, designed to augment article
VI by making the disarmament obligation more compelling); Mexico Paper, supra note
134, at 25-30 (reprinting statements and amendment proposals of Romania, Sweden, and
Brazil); Statement by the U.A.R. Representative (Khallaf) to the ENDC (Mar. 16, 1967),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1967, supra note 147, at 154, 158; SHAKER,
ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 139, at 569-70.
160. NPT, supra note 7, art. VIII.3 (providing that a conference of parties to the
treaty be convened every five years to review its operation). See supra text accompanying
notes 48-54.
161. NPT, supra note 7, art. X.2 (a conference of parties will convene in 1995 to
decide upon the future of the treaty).
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NWS as recurrent opportunities for meaningful "second thoughts,"
guarantying the parties a chance to return to the question of whether a
treaty containing such fundamentally asymmetric obligations should be
perpetuated. 162
The NPT was widely seen as a temporary expedient, to deal with the
emergency of nuclear proliferation by freezing the status quo, to preclude
further deterioration of the global security situation, in anticipation of a
later and better resolution.1" It was never articulated as a "final
solution" to the nuclear problem; the metaphor of the day asserted that
something that had been going up (like the arms race) had to stop
ascending, and pause at least momentarily, before it could start
descending toward safety. 1 ' The NPT was intended to assist in this
transition, by arresting the further spread of nuclear capability, halting the
adverse momentum, and then initiating the process of weapons
dismantling. The ultimate long-term goal was the complete-and
equal-eradication of nuclear arms everywhere, by all states.
Through it all, the NNWS continuously asserted the primacy of test
ban limitations in throttling the nuclear arms race. Resolutions in the
General Assembly, arguments in the ENDC, declarations at non-aligned
summit meetings, and other expressions repeatedly pinpointed CTBT as
the fundamental issue for arms control and as the most effective tool for
impeding vertical proliferation. The NNWS spoke of CTBT not merely
162. Mohamed Shaker, The NPT: The First 15 Years and the Current Crisis
(Article VI), in Khan, supra note 20, at 40; Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 31-32
(highlighting the role of the review conferences, in light of article VIII's reference to the
treaty preamble (and especially the CTBT paragraph)); George Bunn & Charles N. Van
Doren, Options for Extension of the NPT: The Intention of the Drafters of Article X.2, in
OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES: THE NPT EXTENSION CONFERENCEOF 1995, PROGRAMME
FOR PROMOTINo NUCLEAR NON-PROLUZERATION STUDY No. 2 (George Bunn et al. eds.,
1991); SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 369; STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE
RESEARCH INST., WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1968/69, at 166-
71(1969).
163. Felix Calderon, The Duration ofArms Control and Disarmament Treaties, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, supra note 23, at 145, 152
("The Non-Proliferation Treaty is considered to be an interim measure against the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, while the definitive
eradication of all nuclear arsenals in the world is being negotiated."); STOCKHOLM INT'L
PEACE RESEARCH INST., THE NPT: THE MAIN POLITICAL BARRIER TO NUCLEAR
WEAPON PROLIFERATION 34 (1980) [hereinafter SIPRI, THE NPT].
164. Epstein, supra note 155, at 135 (citing a Canadian delegate as likening the




as "desirable" or "useful," but as the key component in the global
security regime that the NPT negotiators were seeking to construct.16
There were, of course, other important negotiating issues in 1968,
and some of them have reverberated to the present day: the arrangements
for sharing the access to nuclear technology and materials; the
provision of "security assurances" against nuclear blackmail; 67 the
arrangements regarding "peaceful nuclear explosions" (PNEs);'6 and
the "cutoff" of the production of nuclear weapons materials." But
through it all, the problem of CTBT was highlighted as a special concern
165. Simpson, supra note 83, at 509, 514; SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra
note 130, at 356-57; Zamora, supra note 113, at 14; 1968 HEARINGS, supra note 47, part
2, at 342-43 (summarizing the results of 1968 conference of NNWS, where CTBT was
highlighted as "a matter of high priority" in the discussion of effective measures for
cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament).
166. The provisions of article IV of the NPT, designed to facilitate cooperation in
the exploitation of nuclear power, were controversial at the outset of the treaty and have
remained a point of contention. The NNWS have complained that the NWS have been
insufficiently forthcoming in providing reliable, affordable access to nuclear power, and
have imposed excessively burdensome "safeguards" against diversion. ACDA TREATY
BOOK, supra note 32, at 92-93; SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 363.
167. The NNWS sought statements from the NWS that they would never use
nuclear weapons against states that did not possess them (negative security assurances),
and that they would come to the assistance of NNWS who were victimized by aggressive
nuclear threats or use (positive security assurances). NNWS considered these assurances
vital to avoid a loss of national security that could accompany a decision to abandon
nuclear weapons, and the NWS have developed and reasserted various formulations of the
assurances over the years. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 32, at 93-94; LAST
CHANCE, supra note 20, at 135-46.
168. In the 1960s, advocates of nuclear energy asserted that nuclear explosions
could be adapted for a variety of civil engineering tasks, such as mining or excavation.
Article V of the NPT provides that access to such PNEs should be available cheaply and
without discrimination, but, in fact, few such projects have been undertaken. Ben
Sanders, Non-Proliferation Treaty: A Broken Record?, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, July-
Aug. 1990, at 14, 17; SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 341-52.
169. Many experts proposed measures to terminate the production of additional
fissile material, as a powerful device to halt the development of additional nuclear
weapons. Such a "cutoff" has long been debated internationally, and the United States
has recently undertaken unilateral initiatives toward one, but there has been little progress
toward formal negotiation of a binding treaty. William Lanouette, Plutonium-No Supply,
No Demand?, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTs, Dec. 1989, at 42; William Epstein, A Ban on
the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons, ScI. AM., July 1980, at 43;
Statement by the President and Fact Sheet on Nonproliferation Initiative (July 13, 1992);
R. Jeffrey Smith, Bush Formalizes Halt to Nuclear Production, WASH. POST, July 14,
1992, at A6; Michael R. Gordon, It's Official: U.S. Stops Making Materialfor Nuclear
Warheads, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1992, at A18.
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of the NNWS, as a point they considered central to the entire non-
proliferation apparatus. 1"
The NNWS participants in the ENDC believed (rightly or wrongly)
that a CTBT was then-or would shortly be-politically and
technologically attainable. They observed that the superpowers had
"almost" accomplished the job only a few years earlier with the 1963
LTBT,171 and they believed that the lingering verification hurdles should
be surmountable. 2 They concluded, more importantly, that the very
definition of the items included in article VI-cessation of the arms race
and nuclear disarmament-meant a comprehensive test ban. The world
could not have a complete and durable halt to the arms race without a
CTBT, and, once a prohibition on explosions was in place, disarmament
would surely follow in train. CTBT was thus a necessary precondition
for the achievement of the objectives of article VI: It was widely
appreciated as the most suitable tool for accomplishing the shared task,
and it was clearly the leading issue on people's minds at that time. 7
Observers conceded that, while it might, as a theoretical matter, be
possible to continue building and deploying new generations of nuclear
weaponry, and to resist dismantling obsolete stockpiles, under a test ban
regime, it would hardly be politically or militarily logical to do so."7
A test ban treaty would not by itself usher in the millennium, but it was
deemed by most to be the single most effective mechanism for nudging
the world in that direction under article VI. 175
170. The non-nuclear members of the ENDC drafted a joint memorandum in which
they listed CTBT first among the measures necessary to achieve the disarmament
objectives of non-proliferation. Epstein, supra note 155, at 134.
171. Many NNWS joined the LTBT at least in part because they considered it to
be a helpful non-proliferation measure, making it more difficult for a would-be newcomer
to join the nuclear club. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 32, at 89790.
172. Statement by Swedish Representativeto ENDC (Feb. 13, 1968), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at 57, 63 (anticipating great strides
forward, and perhaps a new agreement, on CTBT during the summer of 1968).
173. LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 181-87; Epstein, supra note 155, at 135:
As regards the interpretation of Article VI, it was well understood by an
parties that "measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race"'was
clearly intended to cover such measures as a CTB, a ban on the production of
fissionable material for weapons, a freeze on the production of additional
nuclear weapons, and a ban on flight testing of delivery vehicles. While there
was room for differences regarding the entire list, a CTB was at the top of
everyone's list of measures, and there can be no doubt that a CTB was
considered as the essential and indispensable measure for cessation of the
nuclear arms race.
174. Epstein, supra note 155, at 135.
175. See SIPRI, THE NPT, supra note 163, at 39 (listing CTBT first among the
steps that the NWS should undertake in order to validate article VI). See also
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A final bit of relevant context for the NPT deliberations was the
concomitant initiation of the SALT I negotiations. Beginning in 1967,
President Lyndon Johnson had attempted to open bilateral talks with the
Soviet Union on the subject of imposing agreed limits on both countries'
strategic offensive arms (ICBMs and other weapons capable of projecting
nuclear warheads to intercontinental distances) and strategic defensive
systems (anti-ballistic missile systems for negating the other party's
weapons). 6 His early overtures were rebuffed, but on July 1, 1968,
at the ceremony signing the NPT, Johnson announced that the Soviets had
then agreed to the initiation of the momentous bilateral talks.' "
The rest of the world was immediately supportive of these efforts and
pleased that the pressures and interests reflected in article VI were
producing such prompt results. And-jumping ahead in the
chronology-the international community has continued to be a keen
observer and a grateful supporter whenever the superpowers have been
able to lurch toward a strategic arms accord."7 But there was never
any suggestion that the partial success of the SALT179 and START"s
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1967, supra note 147 (reprinting statements by several
delegations during the NPT negotiations, linking a test ban with a non-proliferation treaty,
identifying CTBT as the next urgent step to pursue for nuclear arms control); id. at 104
(Sweden); id. at 136 (Brazil); id. at 463 (U.S.S.R.); id. at 691 (Britain).
176. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 32, at 150-51.
177. Remarks by President Johnson on the Signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty,
(July 1, 1968), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at 458,
460.
The initiation of SALT negotiations was delayed, however, by the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Thereafter, President Richard Nixon resumed the
efforts, and formal negotiations opened in Helsinki in November 1969. ACDA TREATY
BOOK, supra note 32, at 151.
178. See Mohamed I. Shaker, The Third NPT Review Conference: Issues and
Prospects, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 22, at
4-5; Vitalii I. Goldanskii & Valerii F. Davydov, A Comprehensive Test Ban and the
Prevention of Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND
THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, supra note 155, at 147, 150.
179. Several subsequent arms control agreements have explicitly cited article VI
of the NPT as one of the parties' leading rationales for conclusion of the additional
restraints. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, pmbl., para. 5 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]; Interim
Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462, pmbl., para. 4 [hereinafter
Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms]; Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, June 18, 1979, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 18 I.L.M. 1112, pmbl., para. 6 (signed
but not ratified) [hereinafter SALT II].
180. In 1980, President Reagan abandoned the SALT negotiations and replaced
them with START talks, addressing a similar range of weapon systems and issues. The
1991 START Treaty, supra note 1, overtly acknowledges the NPT obligation in preamble
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talks could fully discharge the article VI commitment. Right from the
beginning, the NNWS stressed that merely capping the nuclear arsenals
was not sufficient, and throughout the intervening years-whether the
bilateral negotiations have been proceeding quickly or slowly-they have
continued to insist that a CTBT is a key component of the NPT security
regime.'
2. THE NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF ARTICLE VI
With this contextual background, we can now inspect the evolution
of the text of article VI. As noted, the United States and the Soviet
Union provided the bulk of the drafting of treaty language. None of their
early unilateral proposals-nor their identical August 24, 1967
drafts-contained any provision explicitly committing the NWS to
negotiate future measures of nuclear self-control.
The NNWS, however, resolutely demanded inclusion of this element.
Several states emphasized the importance of NWS disarmament
obligations as essential to ease the discrimination inherent in the treaty
and to promote progress toward a safer world." Some implied that
they might not sign the treaty, or sustain it beyond its initial phases, in
the absence of meaningful progress against vertical proliferation."
Many participating delegations spoke ardently about test ban proposals,
often highlighting CTBT as the first item on the list of arms control
undertakings that should follow the NPT."
para. 5.
181. See Final Declaration of the Review Conference by the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [hereinafter Final Declaration of the Review
Conference], reprinted in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION FACTBOOK, supra note 152, at 558,
565-66. In reviewing article VI of the NPT, the first Review Conference "welcomed"
the SALT I and other arms control accords that had been completed during the first five
years of the treaty's life, but "expresse[d] serious concern that the arms race, in particular
the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated." Id. at 565.
182. Epstein, supra note 155, at 136; Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 6-8
(reporting statements by Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, India, Sweden
and Romania, calling for a halt to vertical proliferation as part of a non-proliferation
treaty).
183. Onkar Marwah, The Non-Proliferation Policies of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURrrY, supra note 22, at 105,
110.
184. The Mexico Paper, supra note 134, contains several revealing expressions,
including those by the Nigerian delegate:
The non-nuclear-weapon Powers, therefore, have the right to demand that the
nuclear-weapon Powers should begin the process of nuclear disarmament.
The first action in that direction would be, in our opinion, an agreement on
the cessation of nuclear weapon tests underground and the cessation of the
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The United States, it should be stressed, never spoke out against a
CTBT and never dissented from the notion that a test ban was a crucial
component in the article VI structure. 1& Senior American
spokespersons, in fact, repeatedly endorsed CTBT in the strongest terms,
acknowledging that it could play a vital role in nuclear arms control,
production of fissionable material for weapon purposes. The Nigerian
delegation thinks that these are fields in which agreement is not only necessary
but possible at the present time. It also believes that all the arguments
advanced for urging the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-
nuclear-weapon States are valid for urging the nuclear-weapon States to
conclude an agreement on the two measures I have just mentioned.
Id. at 11. The representative of Burma stated:
If, therefore, a specific provision for a specific nuclear arms-control measure
could not be embodied in the treaty, we feel an article should be formulated,
in clear-cut and precise terms, under which the nuclear-weapon Powers would
assume a definite obligation to take tangible steps towards nuclear
disarmament. Those steps should be explicitly defined. One would envisage
them to include the concluding of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which my
delegation considers is valid also as a measure of balance, since the non-
proliferation treaty will have additionally a comprehensive test-ban effect on
the non-nuclear weapon States; [and several other measures].
Id. at 13. The Swedish delegate said:
We have always considered, and continue to maintain, that a non-proliferation
treaty, important as it is in itself, cannot stand alone. It has to be-and I use
a familiar phrase-coupled with or followed by other international
disarmament agreements covering the nuclear weapon field. It has been
generally recognized that two such measures are of great imminent urgency,
politically speaking, and particularly ripe for decision technically-namely, a
comprehensive test ban and an agreement to cut off production of fissile
material for weapon purposes.
Id. at 21. The representative of the United Kingdom agreed:
I would now like to speak briefly on the urgent need for the suspension of
nuclear and thermonuclear tests. We profoundly hope that when the non-
proliferation treaty is signed the resulting improvement in the political
atmosphere will allow a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and other measures,
to be negotiated as soon as possible. We agree with the distinguished and
expert representative of Sweden, and other delegations, too, that this is one
of the most urgent and important of the disarmament measures which are
currently under consideration.
Id. at 22.
185. There was some internal dissent inside the United States government
regarding test ban policy, and many officials would have made the pending SALT
negotiations an even higher priority. However, prior to the conclusion of the NPT, the
United States and the Soviet Union did not publicly discuss the nascent SALT possibilities,
and they certainly never suggested to the NNWS that SALT would shove CTBT into the
background. The superpowers' public presentations never diverged from their traditional
support for a prompt, verifiable CTBT. SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130,
at 235-45; The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson
Administration, supra note 65.
1993:301 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
accepting a special responsibility for negotiating a suitable text, and
proclaiming that the United States was committed to it as a desirable,
attainable goal." President Johnson, for example, declared in 1966
that the United States "persists in its belief that the perils of proliferation
would be materially reduced by an extension of the limited test ban treaty
to cover underground nuclear tests." 1
With the United States fully supportive of CTBT, the parties devoted
the bulk of their negotiating energies to other armaments matters. The
contemplated establishment of a NATO "Multilateral Force" (MLF) was
long a nettlesome issue, raising the possibility that the American nuclear
arsenal might be shared in some fashion with currently non-nuclear
allies. 1" The debate also focused on "security assurances," eliciting
promises from the NWS that they would refrain from brandishing nuclear
weapons against NNWS and that they would assist NNWS who were
victimized by nuclear aggression. 9 These were the controversial
186. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, in 1968 listed as possible next
steps in pursuit of article VI a "cutoff" in the production of nuclear materials and a
CTBT. WlLLRICH, supra note 143, at 162. See also ACDA HISTORY, supra note 139,
at 22 (statement of Ambassador Goldberg affirming United States interest in CTBT);
News Conference Remarks by ACDA Director Foster (Aug. 11, 1967), DOCUMENTS ON
DISARMAMENT 1967, supra note 147, at 325, 328:
That is a comprehensivetest ban. That would follow on, hopefully. You see,
we have always said that the achievement of a nonproliferation treaty would
form a base on which other measures might take place, one of which certainly
would be the comprehensive test ban which we have been pushing now for
many years.
187. Marin-Bosch, supra note 65, at 85. See also ACDA HISTORY, supra note
139, at 12, 32 (President Johnson renewing American proposals for a CTBT); SEABORO,
STEmmwo THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 160, 227 (Johnson pledging to work for a CTBT
during 1965 and 1966).
President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan had jointly stated in 1963,
"A guaranteed end to all nuclear testing in all environments is a fundamental objective of
the free world. We are deeply convinced that the achievement of this objective would
serve our best national interests and the national interests of all the nations of the world."
SEABORO, STEMMINO THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 83.
The U.S.S.R. also acknowledged the intimate connection between the NPT and a
CTBT. Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin wrote in 1968 that following the conclusion
of the NPT, "the Soviet Government proposes that an understanding be reached on the
implementation of the following urgent measures on an end to the arms race and on
disarmament in the near future." He then included on his list the statement, 'The Soviet
Government is prepared to reach an immediate understanding on the banning of
underground tests of nuclear weapons on the basis of using national means of detection
to control this ban." 1968 Hearings, supra note 47, pt. 1, at 73, 74-75.
188. See WILLRICH, supra note 143, at 71-87; SHAKER, ORIOIN AND
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 139, at 131-89.
189. 1968 Hearings, supra note 47, pt. 1 at 263-65, (reprinting United Nations
Security Council Resolution 255 (adopted June 19, 1968) and the relevant United States
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weapons-related issues in 1968, and once it became apparent that there
was a large measure of consensus upon the importance of a prompt
CTBT, the debate concentrated on the still-disputed points. Delegations
continued to mention CTBT frequently, but there was by then little
occasion to emphasize it as an unresolved point.
The one aspect of the test ban question that did emerge as
contentious was the problem of how directly, and where, to assert the
obligation for future negotiations. The United States (and to a large
extent, the Soviet Union, too) argued that overt reference to CTBT or any
other specific arms control measures should be confined to the NPT
preamble, not shoehorned into article VI. The NNWS, on the other
hand, wanted the commitment to be advertised with more prominence and
specificity, and a variety of formulations were proposed."g Mexico, in
particular, championed the notion that specific measures of arms control
should be worked into the operative language of article VI. 191
The reason for the co-chairs' reluctance was certainly not any
diminished enthusiasm for CTBT or any effort to shuck the lead
responsibility for negotiating and drafting the accord-they reaffirmed its
centrality to the overall arms control endeavor" and their special role
in the process."'
declaration regarding security assurances); SHAKER, ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra
note 139, at 471-552.
190. See Carnahan, supra note 131, at 12, 16-18 (rejection of Romanian and
Indian proposals for article VI demonstrates that the negotiators did not agree upon the
specification of any particular arms control measures in connection with article VI).
191. Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 11; DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1967,
supra note 147, at 394-401 (Mexican draft of treaty provisions specifying an obligation
to produce a CTBT, and statement in support of that language); id. at 514-15 (United
States reaction to the Mexican proposal); id. at 518-19 (Soviet reaction); SHAKER, ORIGIN
AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 139, at 557 (summarizing proposals from Mexico,
India, Romania, and others regarding article VI).
The March 11, 1968 joint United States-Soviet Union draft treaty was the first to
include a direct preambular reference to CTBT and a refined expression of negotiating
objectives in article VI. DocuMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at- 162.
See also Statement by Soviet Representative, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT
1968, supra note 154, at 172; and Statement by ACDA Director, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at 174, 175.
192. See Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 11 (United States delegate asserting that
"[true security for all'Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, lies in progress in the entire
range of arms control and disarmament measures, including control of the strategic arms
race, a verifiable comprehensive test-ban, and a cut-off of production of fissionable
materials for weapons purposes.").
193. Article VI is an obligation upon "[elach of the Parties to the Treaty," but it
was understood at the outset that the nuclear powers, and particularly the superpowers,
would logically bear the lead responsibility for fashioning acceptable disarmament
proposals, especially regarding nuclear weaponry.
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Instead, the United States had two rationales for a "clean" article VI.
First, U.S. leaders were wary about their ability to deliver a prompt
CTBT (or any other significant arms control measure) on a short
timetable. They were apprehensive that the Soviets might-as they had
during the LTBT negotiations a few years earlier-publicly endorse a
sweeping arms control effort but privately resist the verification
arrangements that would be essential to make it work.19" Therefore,
American officials argued that the NPT negotiators should not
"complicate" the draft treaty by attempting to resolve in it the tricky and
potentially divisive questions about the future direction and timing of
subsequent negotiations. They expressed concern that if the already-
prolonged NPF negotiations were further delayed by a requirement that
the parties concurrently agree upon the outlines of additional disarmament
steps, then the entire apparatus of international control might come
unraveled."'
Second, the United States sought to preserve its diplomatic
flexibility: American leaders wanted to retain greater freedom about
precisely when to negotiate the various disarmament protocols, how the
diverse talks should relate to each other, and what the sequence of arms
limitation proceedings should be.1" They worried that if CTBT (or
anything else) were specified in article VI, then the superpowers would
lose their control over the timing of the negotiating agenda."9
Recall that throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the superpowers had
been firmly in the driver's seat in all major multilateral arms control
deliberations. They had decided what issues to address, how each draft
treaty should be crafted, and when to display and sell their joint product
194. Statement by ACDA Deputy Director Fisher to the First Committee of the
General Assembly (Dec. 18, 1967), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENr 1967,
supra note 147, at 717, 718.
195. ACDA HISTORY, supra note 139, at 46, 108, 121; DOCUMENTS ON
DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at 9, 15, 108, 124-25, 230-31, 238 (United States
and Soviet statements opposing the effort to make the NPT conditional upon the
achievement of other measures of arms control); DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1967,
supra note 147, at 514-15 (United States statement); id. at 683 (Soviet statement).
196. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 47, pt. 2, at 350-52 (Secretary of State Rogers
maintains that article VI does not compel the United States to enter into negotiations
regarding the possible limitation of ABM systems on any particular timetable, because the
NPT "doesn't set any priorities" among various arms control initiatives).
197. The American and Soviet representatives asserted that the problems of
developing a CTBT or other accord were complex and difficult, perhaps requiring a
substantial amount of negotiation. The parties should not delay the conclusion of the NPT
long enough to produce these other controversial arms control agreements. WILLIIcH,
supra note 143, at 161-62.
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to the other nations.'" That primacy was valuable, and they did not
want to yield to other countries the right to establish the international
disarmament agenda.
Perhaps the United States and Soviet Union were overly cautious in
this regard. Article VI of the NPT could readily have been drafted in a
fashion to underscore the importance of a CTBT, yet still accord the
leading states considerable leeway regarding how, where, and when to
proceed with the bargaining. Article VI certainly need not have specified
a "due date" for a completed accord or spelled out any particular
compromises that the parties would have to undertake on verification or
other key issues."
But the co-chairs adamantly resisted the NNWS on this point. The
United States was concerned that verification of a CTBT might continue
to prove a contentious issue, one upon which the United States-despite
all good faith in the diplomatic efforts and the creative marshalling of
technology-might not be able to obtain adequate Soviet concession.' °
The United States leadership did not want its "hands tied" on CTBT or
other diplomatic initiatives through a rigid priority system fixed in articleVI.2DI
198. The United States and the Soviet Union had assumed the lead responsibility
in the drafting and promotion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 6, and the Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 23. Subsequent to the NPT, they also controlled the
international deliberations leading to the multilateral Seabeds Arms Control Treaty, supra
note 23, the Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 30, and others. ACDA TREATY
BOOK, supra note 32, at 42, 53, 108, 131.
199. The question of security assurances provides a useful contrast with the
treatment of CTBT. Both issues were salient during the NPT negotiations, with NNWS
demanding greater concessions and more prominent visibility for their concerns.
Regarding both issues, the United States and the Soviet Union expressed sympathy and
promised to provide a suitable response. Regarding both issues, the United States blocked
efforts to insert overt, binding language into article VI. In the case of security assurances,
however, unlike CTBT, the superpowers redeemed their pledges quite promptly, providing
at least a partial set of guarantees shortly after the conclusion of the NPT, and keeping
the subject alive as a matter for meaningful (albeit incremental) improvement thereafter.
See ACDA Treaty Book, supra note 32, at 93-94; WILLRICH, supra note 143, at 167.
200. Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 16. Domestic United States politics also
played a role. The LTBT had been quite controversial inside the United States, with
political opponents insisting upon the elaboration of a series of "safeguards" such as the
continuation of a vigorous program of underground testing. A CTBT surely would have
been even more controversial inside the Senate, as it has been ever since. Belmont
Report, supra note 58.
201. In fact, the next major American arms control initiative after the conclusion
of the NPT concerned the opening of bilateral SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union,
rather than the pursuit of multilateral test ban limitations. Supra text accompanying notes
176-77.
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The NNWS yielded only grudgingly.' They accepted the deletion
from article VI of any overt reference to CTBT, and its placement into
the preamble, on the narrow grounds of ceding to the superpowers their
requisite flexibility in constructing the international negotiating agenda
and avoiding unnecessarily complicating and delaying the conclusion of
the NPT.' The NNWS did not understand this modification as a ploy
to put CTBT "onto the back burner," nor was it ever suggested that the
bargaining on the test ban agenda could legitimately stretch out for
decades. In acquiescing to the co-chairs' asserted need for a limited
acknowledgement of their timetable control, the NNWS were not
moderating their ardor for a test ban, nor did they see the NWS as
stepping back from the commitment. This was a narrow decision, merely
temporizing the demand for test ban, not abandoning it.'
If the NNWS had thought that the superpowers were sliding away
from the obligation to develop a prompt CTBT, many more states might
have joined those who abstained from participation in an unacceptably
discriminatory NPT. If the NNWS had thought that article VI was
becoming an "empty vessel," that they were surrendering to the NWS a
"blank check," with no obligation to conclude any particular types of
arms control at any particular point in time, the treaty would not have
attracted so many adherents.' In fact, the NNWS agreed to omit from
article VI the explicit reference to CTBT because they thought that it
202. Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 12 (United Arab Republic proposes
compromise formula); LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 78-79 (article VI occasioned more
discussion and controversy than any other portion of the revised draft treaty).
203. See Statements of Swedish Representative, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON
DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at 44-45, 305; SHAKER, ORIGIN AND
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 139, at 576-77 (NNWS proposals to strengthen the
superpowers' draft of article VI).
204. LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 77-79; Carnahan, supra note 131, at 18-19.
The Swedish delegate Myrdal observed'that under the co-chairs' draft of article VI, "the
obligations on the nuclear weapon states are considerably weaker" than in various NNWS
drafts. However, she was willing to accept the diluted language in order to retain the
flexibility to take timely advantage of any disarmament options that might become
available: "Mo enumerate some specific measures might be counterproductive, as
agreements on certain other scores may come to present opportunities for earlier
implementation." Id.
205. Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 32 (American delegate assures NNWS that
conclusion of NPT will drive the United States to redouble its efforts toward nuclear arms
control); LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 80-83 (many NNWS criticized the NPT for
failing to specify the disarmament measures that would follow it, but the General




really remained there implicitly in any event." Everyone realized that
the NPT disarmament regime would be incomplete without a
comprehensive test ban; the superpowers had committed to deliver one;
and it might have seemed an excess of caution to insist that the obligation
be stated once again in operative treaty language.'
Again, the history of prior disarmament politicking provides an
important element of context for this debate. Since World War II, the
leading states had exchanged a variety of arms limitation proposals on a
wide range of topics, covering conventional, nuclear, chemical, and other
weaponry. On some occasions, a sponsoring country would "link" these
issues, contending that the progression toward "general and complete
disarmament" should be accomplished via a series of pre-agreed,
carefully-timed stages. This way, the entire long-term structure of arms
reduction would be articulated and advertised in advance, and each
country could be confident that its national security would not be
jeopardized at any point in the progression.' At other times, however,
this effort to develop an all-encompassing, interlocking structure for
disarmament appeared overly ambitious and paralyzingly complex. Some
states therefore proposed more modest, single disarmament steps, which
could be pursued independently, unattached to a grand scheme of total
eradication.'
During the 1950s and 1960s, the world oscillated between these two
strategies, with each being advocated at various times by different
partisans. The United States and the Soviet Union, at sequential points,
took turns on both sides of this question.210 By 1968, however, a
206. See Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 28 (Comments of Swedish
Representative: "From all points of view a test ban would be indicated as the issue most
immediately to be considered according to the commitments made in draft article VI of
the present treaty text."). See also NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE NEAR-NUCLEAR
COUNTRIES 3 (Onkar Marwah & Ann Schulz eds., 1975) [hereinafter Marwah & Schulz];
Greb & Heckrotte, supra note 63, at 36, 39.
207. Of course, the geopolitical realities were that the NNWS collectively could
not force a CTBT upon the United States or the Soviet Union. Regardless of what article
VI said-no matter how specific and binding the NPT language appeared to be-if the
superpowers refused to conclude a further test ban agreement, the NNWS enforcement
options were weak. There would be little point, therefore, to insist upon inserting the
stronger language directly into article VI-in any event, a CTBT would require the
political good will of the superpowers.
208. ACDA HISTORY, supra note 139, at 15, 20 (Sweden and India provide
examples of linkage, attempting to tie progress on a non-proliferation accord to progress
on CTBT).
209. See, e.g., 1968 Hearings, supra note 47, at 203 (expressing the hope that
several arms control initiatives-including notably SALT and CTBT-can proceed
simultaneously, rather than sequentially, as the LTBT and NPT had done).
210. LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 49, 54.
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tentative consensus was emerging in favor of the incremental approach,
as more countries were drawn to the strategy of taking advantage of
whatever partial measures of arms control were attainable, even without
deriving a clear picture of how to accomplish the entire long-term
disarmament task. 11
In this context, the movement of the CTBT reference from article VI
to the preamble must have seemed like a modest, plausible step. It
acknowledged the desirability of seizing the moment, concluding the
limited arms control measure that was then available, and deferring for
tomorrow the debates about the next stage. The NNWS were naturally
hesitant to jeopardize the NPT by insisting upon resolving in it the
controversy over exactly what additional measures would come next and
when, while the NWS were adamant about retaining their flexibility." 2
No one suggested at the time that CTBT was somehow suddenly off
the international bargaining agenda altogether, that its deletion from
article VI made it no longer important or obligatory. To the contrary,
most observers considered that CTBT was the very next item to be taken
up, that it was a top priority for the NWS as for the NNWS, and that the
commitment to conclude such an accord "at an early date" would be
redeemed very shortly." 3 Even the United States delegate assured the
General Assembly in December 1968,
Foremost among the arms control issues which have'seized our
attention for more than two decades is the problem of nuclear
disarmament. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
recognized the pre-eminence of this area of concern in the
programme of work which was adopted at its last session.
From the discussion in this Committee it is also clear that,
within the broad and complex field, the question of further
211. Citation to "general and complete disarmament" has remained a staple of the
disarmament vocabulary, reflected in article VI of the NPT and in the preambles to
several subsequent accords, each of which embodied only partial and incomplete progress
toward that ultimate objective. See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 30,
pmbl., para. 2; ABM Treaty, supra note 179, pmbl., para. 6; SALT II, supra note 179,
pmbl., para. 9.
212. Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 17, 35 (Soviet and United States delegates
oppose the concept of linking NPT and CTBT, saying that strategy would merely delay
and possibly scuttle the NPT); ACDA HISTORY, supra note 139, at 116 (Soviet delegation
reaffirms interest in negotiating a CTBT and other measures, when NPT is concluded).
213. The Soviet Union frequently highlighted CTBT as a top priority in the
disarmament negotiating agenda. DocuMENTs ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154,
at 30, 370, 468, 556, 708. Other countries, too, anticipated concentration on test ban
policy. See, e.g., Statements of Representatives of Japan and Sweden, reprinted in
DOCUMENTs ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at 310, 428.
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limitations on nuclear weapon testing stands as a priority
item.21'
The inexact language of Article VI, therefore, was not produced by
the parties' disagreement over CTBT, or by any unwillingness to express
a commitment to halting nuclear testing; it was a much more narrow
question of preserving for the negotiators a bit of "wiggle room," to
allow them a reasonable period of time to prepare for follow-on
negotiations, to get their technological, military, and diplomatic affairs in
order, and to produce a satisfactory CTBT.215
3. SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE OF THE PARTIES
The next level of treaty interpretation analysis permits recourse to the
parties' "subsequent practice," defined to include public statements, overt
and tacit acquiescences, and other behaviors that may manifest the parties'
original understanding or their de facto assent to an incremental evolution
in the meaning of the obligations.2 6 In the case of the NPT, there is
an unusually rich body of such data available, concentrated in the
proceedings of the four review conferences, as well as from other
traditional sources.
The first shards of relevant practice came in the various states' public
declarations upon, or shortly after, the signing of the NPT. Many
countries, while affiliating themselves with the non-proliferation effort,
simultaneously stressed that this particular treaty was, at best, an
incomplete product.217 Until the qualitative and quantitative nuclear
214. Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 37-38. See also SEABORO, STEMMING THE
TIDE, supra note 130, at 374 (quoting ACDA Director Foster as listing CTBT first among
disarmament steps that would be pursued under article VI after conclusion of the NPT);
Address by Secretary Rusk, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note
154, at 273, 276 (discussing CTBT as part of the answer to "What next?" in
disarmament).
215. The NNWS were (and remain) divided in their assessment of article VI.
Some concluded that the final language was too general and indefinite to provide a real
commitment to specific measures of disarmament; others were also less than completely
satisfied with the text, but accepted it, within the overall context of the NPT, as a
tolerable expression of a commitment to undertake meaningful future steps. DOCUMENTS
ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at 292, 319, 330, 400.
216. The Vienna Convention stresses the role of "any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation." Vienna Convention, supra note 132, art. 31.3(b). RESTATEMENT, supra
note 132, §325.2; Carnahan, supra note 131, at 10-11.
217. See Mexico Paper, supra note 134, at 36 (United Kingdom delegate states,
"In the nuclear field, my own priority is a ban on underground tests .... [lit seems to
us to be a measure of cardinal importance because we think that the real danger of vertical
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arms race was curbed, via a CTBT, there would be little prospect that the
nuclear menace could be reliably contained.21s
Notably, at the first session of the ENDC following the signature of
the NPT, the United States and the Soviet Union, as co-chairs, submitted
a proposed agenda for the future work of the body. Copying the
language of article VI, the first item on the agenda was "Further effective
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament." CTBT was then the first such measure
identified by the co-chairs for discussion under this heading.219
The United Nations General Assembly, in endorsing the NPT, also
highlighted the outstanding promise of article VI and reaffirmed the
crucial role that a comprehensive test ban agreement would play in
promoting global security.' The General Assembly, in fact, has
maintained a watchful eye on the CTBT question ever since, passing
annual resolutions endorsing the concept, calling for negotiations, and
proliferation lies in the development of more sophisticated weapons systems."); id. at 36
(Swedish delegate explains the "reasons for our persistent urging that [CTB] should be the
next disarmament measure to be elaborated"); id. at 37 (Italy endorses prompt action on
CTBT). See also Report of the ENDC, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT
1968, supra note 154, at 591, 593; Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear
Weapon States, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at
668, 674 (proposing agendas for future disarmament negotiations, including CTBT).
218. JENSEN, supra note 8, at 43. Japan, for example, stated during the 1968
General Assembly session (where the draft NPT was endorsed) that the treaty did not
embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities between nuclear and non-nuclear
states, that the treaty would "lose its moral basis" unless the NWS "kept their part of the
bargain" by making the progress called for in article VI, and that the first step in that
direction should be a ban on underground nuclear testing. LAST CHANCE, supra note 20,
at 113. Similarly, at the 1968 summit meeting of non-aligned states, the NNWS asked
the NPT drafters to provide more visible evidence of their plans to accord a high priority
to nuclear arms control, and they listed CTBT first among their concerns. Marwah &
Schulz, supra note 206, at 5.
219. DocuMENTs ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at 583, 812; SHAKER,
ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 139, at 579. This agenda did not include
mention of the pending SALT negotiations, which were to be addressed in bilateral United
States-Soviet Union talks, outside the ENDC.
220. General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII) (June 12, 1968), reprinted in
DocUMENTs ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154, at 431. See also General
Assembly Resolution 2455 (XXIII): Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and
Thermonuclear Tests, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154,
at 796; LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 126-34 (NNWS conference in 1968 endorsed
NPT, but called for negotiations on CTBT to commence no later than March, 1969).
The Secretary-General of the United Nations observed in 1972, "There is an
increasing conviction among the nations of the world that an underground test ban is the
single most important measure, and perhaps the only feasible one in the near future, to
halt the nuclear arms race, at least with regard to its qualitative aspects." Goldblat
Report, supra note 62, app. A, at 42.
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regretting the lack of progress z21 The United Nations has conducted
three "Special Sessions" on disarmament matters, each of which singled
out test ban proposals for heightened consideration.' The Conference
on Disarmament (the eventual successor to the ENDC), in its various
incarnations, has retained test ban as a primary focus of attention, never
flagging in its efforts to highlight the issue and promote prospects for
negotiation.' The United States and the Soviet Union acknowledged
the profound interest of the other states in the topic of test ban
deliberations, and agreed to apprise them regularly of the progress
achieved in their (now defunct) 1977-80 bilateral discussions.'
Similarly, the NNWS have been consistent in their linkage of NPT
and CTBT. As early as the August-September 1968 summit conference
of non-aligned states, the non-nuclear weapons countries both (a)
expressed apprehension about the dangers of the further dissemination of
nuclear weapons and (b) called upon the NWS to conclude a CTBT "as
an important step in the field of nuclear disarmament, and as a matter of
high priority."'
In the formal multilateral deliberations at the 1975 NPT Review
Conference, the first quinquennial event of its type, the NNWS placed
CTBT squarely onto the center stage. Many other issues were discussed,
too, some with substantial energy and dissention, but none approached
CTBT in the depth of attention and the stridency of the debate. The
primary NNWS complaint about the first five years of the NPT was the
NWS failure to conclude a meaningful test ban agreement-the TTBT was
221. Epstein, supra note 155, at 138 (in early 1970s, during SALT I negotiations,
General Assembly continued annually to urge suspension of nuclear testing and the
negotiation of a CTBT); JENSEN, supra note 8, at 43 (20 resolutions calling for an end to
nuclear testing were adopted by the General Assembly between 1975 and 1984). In 1982,
the United States was the lone dissenter when a resolution calling for the outlawing of
nuclear tests passed 111 to 1 with 35 abstentions; 1990 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 183-210,
U.N. Sales No. E.91.IX.8.
222. 1988 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 37-82, U.N. Sales No. E.89.IX.5.; Yasushi
Akashi, Is There Still Life After SSOD III?, DISARMAMENT, Autumn 1988, at 17-22.
223. Stein, supra note 62, at 49. The Committee on Disarmament (CD) has
assumed from its predecessor(the ENDC) the role as "the single multilateral disarmament
negotiating forum" of the international community. It is now a 40-nation body, affiliated
with the United Nations, and it has taken the lead in developing proposals and texts for
various arms control accords. BERNAUER, supra note 3, at 5.
224. See, for example, the trilateral report submitted by the negotiating states to
the Committee on Disarmament in July, 1980, summarizing their progress to date in
drafting a CTBT. Report on CTB Negotiations, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1980, at 47-48.
225. Final Document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear States, reprinted in
SHAKER, ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 139, at 1005.
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a woefully inadequate placebo. '  The 1975 Review Conference was
therefore an unruly affair, and a deadlock was avoided at the last minute
only through the personal efforts of the chair, Inga Thorsson of Sweden,
who managed to cobble together a tolerable final report,'m which
featured strong language on CTBT:
The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a
treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests is one of the most
important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. It expresses
the hope that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty will
take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and
political difficulties on this issue. It appeals to these States to
make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an
effective comprehensive test ban.'
The tenor of the 1975 discussion also reveals an important, subtle
point about the framework for the current debate. That is, the NNWS in
1975 were not merely asserting that they wanted a CTBT, or insisting that
such an accord would have salutary effects on non-proliferation. Rather,
they were saying, in addition, that the NWS already owed the world a
CTBT, that such an agreement had previously been promised in
conjunction with article VI, and that whereas the NNWS had already
begun to "pay" their half of the NPT obligations (by verifiably giving up
nuclear weapons), the NWS had so far illicitly tried to wiggle out of their
reciprocal obligations to "pay" (through constraining the nuclear arms
race).' In short, CTBT was not some new demand of the NWS; it
,226. Onkar Marwah, Epilogue: The NPT Review Conference, Geneva, 1975, in
Marwah & Schulz, supra note 206, at 303-06 (in a preparatory meeting convened prior
to the 1975 review conference, experts listed CTBT first among their policy
recommendations; during the Review Conference itself, the Conference President, in
summarizing the first week of general debate, listed the need for a CTBT as the first item
that had been elaborated). See Final Declaration of the Review Conference, supra note
181, at 558, 566; STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., WORLD ARMAMENTS AND
DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1976, at 379-83; SHAKER, ORIoIN AND IMPLEMENTATION,
supra note 139, at 630-31 (several NNWS proposed to amend the NPT to require a
moratorium on nuclear testing).
.227. Donnelly & Beckman, supra note 152, at 577, 581.
228. Final Declaration of the Review Conference, supra note 181, at 566. The
Declaration also noted that several countries had called for a temporary moratorium on
nuclear tests, pending a complete agreement, and additionally urged the nuclear powers
"to limit the number of their underground nuclear weapons tests to a minimum." Id.
229. Conference President Thorsson summarized the NNWS sentiment:
It seems to me that an enlightened world opinion, reflected in this case, in
statements by non-nuclear-weapons states, rather impatiently awaits concrete
and binding results of on-going bilateral negotiations, aiming at ending the
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was presented as the key component in honoring a commitment already
undertaken.2
A similar pattern obtained at the second review conference, in 1980.
Again, there were occasional rumblings about possible NNWS defections
from the NPT regime-implied threats to leave the treaty if the NWS did
not do more to comply with article VI and conclude a CTBT.? The
hostility toward the NWS reached its peak as the Mexican delegation led
the NNWS in demanding overt acknowledgement of the primacy of a test
ban. The resulting impasse destroyed the conference, and no concluding
document or final statement was issued-the assembly dissolved in
disarray due to the unresolved antagonism over what the NNWS
portrayed as NWS welshing on a fundamental treaty obligation. 2
Notably, the 1980 Review Conference took place during the only
post-1968 interval when the superpowers were actually engaged in active
CTBT negotiations. 3 From 1977 through 1980, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom registered significant
accomplishments in the effort to negotiate a verifiable, mutually-
acceptable multilateral CTBT.? Such an accord might have amply
satisfied the article VI standards, discharging the NWS' shared
obligations.' If ever there was an occasion for the NWS to plead
plausibly for NNWS patience and a bit more time, 1980 was it-yet the
quantitative and qualitative arms race, and reducing substantially the levels of
nuclear armaments. Many have referred to the need for a time-table for
results to be achieved through these negotiations. The agreement on a
comprehensive test ban is clearly recognized as a most decisive element in
these efforts. A least common denominator is apparent in the statements:
Article VI must be implemented, in letter and in spirit.
Donnelly & Beckman, supra note 152, at 577, 581.
230. Epstein, supra note 155, at 138.
231. Donnelly & Beckman, supra note 152, at 577, 582-83 (quoting Mohamed
Shaker of Egypt, President of the 1985 NPT Review Conference, warning about
defections from the NPT if the disarmament issues are not satisfactorily resolved).
232. William Epstein, A Critical Timae for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Sc. AM.,
Aug. 1985, at 33; The Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1981 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 126-47, U.N. Sales No.
E.81.IX.3.
.233. By 1980, after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanstan, the pace of all
arms control negotiations, including the CTBT talks, slowed dramatically. YORK, supra
note 79.
234. Id. at 282-323.
235. The 1977-80 negotiations, however, eventually focused on a treaty that would
have an initial duration of only three years, far short of a discontinuance of testing "for
all time" (as the LTBT preamble contemplated). It is therefore possible that the NNWS
desire for a complete CTBT would not have been satisfied even then, and some states
might still have declined to adhere. Id. at 304-05.
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NNWS were unmoved. They regarded CTBT as "old business,"
something that should have been taken care of long ago, and they were
ill-disposed to tolerate further extensions.'
The United States did not, at the first two Review Conferences,
disassociate itself in any way from the consensus viewpoint about the
importance of test ban agreements. In fact, the United States consistently
underscored the commitment to article VI, the catalytic role that the
superpowers would have to play in controlling the nuclear arms race, and
the value of a CTBT. z" The United States never stated or implied that
a CTBT was peripheral to the NPT, that it was merely one option among
many for satisfaction of article VI, or that it was in any way a new idea
which the NNWS were belatedly trying to read into the language of the
NPT. The United States assertion regarding test bans was in the manner
of "these things take time," but never "this thing should not (or need not)
be promptly done.""
After the election of Ronald Reagan, however, the terms of the
debate shifted. The United States, for the first time, backed away from
the concept of a CTBT altogether, asserting, as noted above, a variety of
shifting rationales for opposing a treaty 39  The new administration,
committed to a massive buildup of nuclear and conventional forces, saw
CTBT as an impediment to the effort to develop new types of nuclear
weaponry, and marched in the opposite direction.
With the benefit of hindsight, we can identify a curious parallel
between the case of the NPT and the case of the ABM treaty,' which
was also imperiled at this time. In the latter situation, a clear and hardy
international agreement stymied the administration's effort to proceed with
236. During the 1980 Review Conference, Sigvard Eklund, Director-General of
the IAEA concluded, "The non-proliferation regime can only survive on the tripod of the
NPT, effective international safeguards, and a CTB [comprehensive test ban] treaty. The
vital third leg is still missing as it was five years ago." William Epstein, The Nuclear
Testing Threat, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, July-Aug. 1990, at 35, 36. See also Informal
Working Paper Reviewing Articles VI, VIII, and IX of the NPT, prepared during the
Second NPT Review Conference, reprinted in STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST.,
WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1981, at 355-62 (highlighting
CTBT, urging faster progress in the trilateral negotiations).
237. Edward M. Kennedy, Article VI and the Importance of a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, in Khan, supra note 20, at 365, 367 (every post-World War II American
President, until Ronald Reagan, supported the negotiation of a CTBT as a matter of
priority).
238. Jimmy Carter asserted that "A comprehensive test ban would also signal to
the world the determination of the signatory states to call a halt to the further development
of nuclear weaponry." BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Oct. 1976, at 11, quoted in Goldanskii
& Davydov, supra note 178, at 149.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 83-114.
240. ABM Treaty, supra note 179.
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futuristic "Star Wars" satellite-based missile interceptors under the
Strategic Defense Initiative."' The government, therefore, propounded
a "new interpretation" of the ABM treaty, contorting its meaning,
ignoring the historical record, and attempting to evade its object and
purpose. A political firestorm of the first order ensued, and the
constitutional and political battle continues to reverberate to this day.' 2
A similar-but less publicized, and probably more successful-ploy
was contemporaneously undertaken with the NPT. The Reagan
administration, determined to abandon CTBT, undertook a de facto
"reinterpretation" of article VI of the NPT, under which the commitment
to a test ban could sanguinely be postponed indefinitely. '  The United
States adopted the posture that article VI is imprecise, imposes no
meaningful timetable, and speaks only vaguely about unnamed
"measures" without specifying a CTBT or any other particular obligation.
In this way, the nuclear arms buildup could continue apace and the
administration could blithely espouse support for CTBT as a "long term
goal"-but it was now a goal encumbered by a fistful of implausible
preconditions. Prior to the 1980 presidential election and the subsequent
American volte-face on test ban policy, there was nothing "ambiguous"
about article VI; there was no international doubt that CTBT was the
primary obligation of the NWS. It was the unilateral Reagan
reinterpretation that cast doubt upon the meaning of the obligation,
elevating an American change of heart into an alleged treaty
ambiguity.'
The third and fourth review conferences, in 1985 and 1990,
respectively, followed the same weary pattern, producing only a
hardening of views on both sides. The NNWS continued to insist that a
CTBT was a requisite part of the overall non-proliferation regime, and
moreover that there had been, in 1968-70, a meeting of the minds to this
241. U.S. CONGRESS, OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
TECHNOLOGIES (1985); PHILIP M. BOFFEY ET AL., CLAIMING THE HEAvENs (1988).
242. RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF, POLICY VERSUS LAW: THE REINTERPRETATION OF
THE ABM TREATY (1987); Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, Testing and Development
of *Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1956 (1986).
243. In a 1988 report to Congress on "The Relationship Between Progress in Other
Areas of Arms Control and More Stringent Limitations on Nuclear Testing," the Reagan
administration asserted, "Thus we do not regard nuclear testing as an evil to be curtailed."
Epstein, supra note 155, at 141.
244. Some have argued that the "reinterpretation" of the NPT occurred even
earlier, with the NWS almost immediately downgrading their obligations under articles
IV, V, and V1, and emphasizing instead the NNWS commitments under articles II and III.
Munir A. Khan, Towards a Universal Framework of Nuclear Restraint, in NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, supra note 155, at 45, 47-48.
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effect, so a test ban had all along been understood as a legal obligation,
albeit an imprecisely stated one.' Threats or rumors about possible
NNWS defections from the treaty regime-based principally on their
surging dissatisfaction with the NWS article VI performance-became
more frequent and ominous.' Resumption of CTBT negotiations was
at the head of nearly every country's agenda of immediate disarmament
steps.u7 The United States, in opposition, averred that article VI
mandated only whatever "measures" the superpowers found to be prudent
and attainable, and that for the foreseeable future, CTBT was off-
limits.2. .
In 1985, a remarkable compromise was brokered, in which both the
NNWS majority and the United States-United Kingdom minority
-autonomously asserted their views about CTBT in the final declaration.
After recounting the various arms control initiatives that had been
advanced, some with success, during the previous five years, and after
recalling the commitment to CTBT that had been reflected in the NPT,
the LTBT, and General Assembly resolutions, as well as in previous
review conference reports, the 1985 declaration "reiterated its conviction
that the objectives of Article VI remain unfulfilled and concluded that the
nuclear-weapon States should make greater efforts." It then added:
245. The Japanese delegate to the 1985 review conference asserted,
My country has stressed the importance of the test ban as an important first
step on the road to nuclear disarmament and thus objects to'any nuclear tests
by any state. A test ban is of importance in preventing the vertical as well as
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and would thus be an important
complement of the NPT regime.
Goldanskii & Davydov, supra note 178, at 153. Others have asserted that the connection
between NNWS obligations under articles I and II and NWS obligations under article VI
"represents the political keel of the Treaty" and that CTBT remains "the most popular
step recommended as proof that Article VI is being implemented." He Jayantha
Dhanapala, The Non-Proliferation Treaty Fiteen Years After: Nuclear Partnership or
Nuclear Apartheid?, in Khan, supra note 20, at 48, 51, 54. See also Miguel Manin-
Bosch, The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Fifteen Years of Frustration, DISARMAMENT, Spring
1985, at 45-52.
246. Rothlat, supra note 20, at 63-64; A.Q. Khan, The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons Among Nations: Militarization or Development, in Khan, supra note 20, at 417,
423; Alesandro Corradini, The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
DISARMAMENT, Spring 1985, at 82-100; I.B. Fonseka, The Third Review Conference of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, DISARMAMENT, Summer 1985,
at 131-38.
247. SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 385-86.
248. Mohamed I. Shaker, The Legacy of the 1985 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Review Conference: The President's Reflections, in NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990s, supra note 57, at 9, 22; Shaker, supra note




The Conference except for certain States whose views are
reflected in the following subparagraph deeply regretted that a
comprehensive multilateral Nuclear Test Ban Treaty banning all
nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time had
not been concluded so far and, therefore, called on the nuclear
weapon States Party to the Treaty to resume trilateral
negotiations in 1985 and called on all the nuclear-weapon States
to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of such
a Treaty as a matter of the highest priority in the Conference on
Disarmament.
At the same time, the Conference noted that certain States
Party to the Treaty, while committed to the goal of an
effectively verifiable comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
considered deep and verifiable reductions in existing arsenals of
nuclear weapons as the highest priority in the process of
pursuing the objectives of Article V1. 9
By 1990, even this type of Janus-faced formulation was unacceptable
to many NNWS (led by Mexico), who insisted upon a more blatant
assertion of the primacy of CTBT, and no concluding document at all was
produced.' The Conference considered a wide variety of verbal
249. Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the NPT, reprinted in
GOLDBLAT, TWENTY YEARS, supra note 23, at 138, 147. See Shaker, supra note 178,
at 15; Lewis A. Dunn, The NPT and Future Global Security, in NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 22, at 13, 19-21; David A. Fischer,
The Third NPT Review Conference, Geneva, 27 August to 21 September 1985: A
Retrospective, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 22,
at 217, 221-22.
250. FISCHER, STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 26, at
111; Simpson, supra note 53, at 34-41; 1990 U.N. Disarmament Y.B. 147-82, U.N. Sales
No. E.90.1X.4; Arpad Prandler, The Fourth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, DISARMAMENT 1991, at 125-54; David Fischer & Harold Muller, The Fourth
Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, STOCKHOM INT'L PEACE INST., WORLD
ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK 1991, at 555-84.
The NNWS appeared to many observers in 1990 to be increasingly resolute on the
question of CTBT. At a 1989 non-aligned summit meeting, parties concluded that a test
ban was "essential" to the preservation of the NPT regime. During the 1990 review
conference, the caucus of non-aligned and other NNWS agreed that the NPT would be
enhanced by further measures of nuclear disarmament, and they specified the key' steps
necessary to satisfy article VI-the first three of which all related to CTBT. Some NNWS
would have gone even further, labeling CTBT "indispensable" to the implementation of
article V1 and stating that "the continuing testing of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-
weapon States Parties to the [NPT] would put the future of the [NPT beyond 1995 in
grave doubt." George Bunn, The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference of 1990,
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formulations, seeking some common expression of concern and promise
about past and future activities related to article VI, but the CTBT
question left them hopelessly divided. 1
The United States spokespersons attempted to develop some
compromise language on test ban progress,"' and hoped to deflect
NNWS fervor for a CTBT by (a) noting that article VI is a commitment
for "each of the Parties," not solely the NWS, and many other countries
had accumulated far worse records of relentless arms buildups than had
the United States; (b) identifying a wealth of other arms control accords
that had been completed during the previous five years, and suggesting
that this record should appease the NNWS; and (c) underscoring the
importance of the NPT, and of non-proliferation more generally, for all
countries, suggesting that the world should not, in 1995, hold the NPT
renewal "hostage" to its interest in a comprehensive nuclear test ban. 3
Behind this posture lay the attitude that it was up to the United States
unilaterally to determine whether and when to proceed with a CTBT, and
in THE DIPLOMATIC RECORD 1990-91, at 195, 197 (David D. Newsom ed., 1992).
Mexico even proposed language asserting that a CTBT would be "the single most
important measure relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date," and
that:
unwillingness of a Party to the Treaty to engage in multilateral comprehensive
test ban treaty negotiations shall be deemed an act contrary to the spirit and
letter of the Treaty since it represents non-compliance with the obligations
under the Treaty.
Carnahan, supra note 131, at 13.
251. See Report of Main Committee I, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Doc. NPT/CONF.IV/MC.I/1
(Sept. 10, 1990); NPT Fourth Review Conference, Drafting Committee: Revised
Proposals Regarding Article VI and Preambular Paragraphs 8 to 12 (Sept. 13, 1990).
252. The United States was willing to have the final declaration state "that the
discontinuance of nuclear testing would play a central role in the future of the NPT." But
the United States also insisted on preserving the notion that yet another partial test ban
agreement (e.g., a iower-threshold TTBT or an agreement embodying a reduced annual
quota on the number of permitted explosions, rather than a complete CTBT) might satisfy
the obligation of article VI, at least for purposes of placating the 1995 conference. Bunn,
supra note 250, at 197-98; Fischer & Muller, supra note 250, at 555-84.
253. Statement by United States Ambassador Bradley Gordon to Main Committee
I (Aug. 27, 1990), reprinted in NON-PROLIFERATION: A COMPILATION OF BASIC
DocuMENTs ON THE INTERNATIONAL, U.S. STATUTORY, AND U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH
COMPONENTs OF NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY 103-04 (Zachary S. Davis & Warren H.
Donnelly eds., 1990); Statement of Ronald F. Lehman II, Director of the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, to the Fourth Review Conference (Aug. 21, 1990),




that the rest of the world had no legitimate role or mechanism for
influencing this autonomous American decision.'
In sum, therefore, in the ongoing debate, test ban proponents seek
to establish only a relatively modest case regarding NPT compliance.-5
They need not assert that article VI is only about a CTBT, that it
necessarily requires a test cessation as the first act of nuclear arms
control, or that the parties undertook to conclude a test ban (or any
particular version of a test ban) by a fixed date. Instead, they rely upon
the political and legal record to demonstrate: (a) that the parties, including
the United States, had CTBT in mind-perhaps foremost in mind-when
they drafted the "effective measures" language of article VI; (b) that the
parties contemplated that such an accord, complementing the NNWS non-
acquisition obligations, would be concluded promptly, pursuant to earnest,
sustained negotiations; (c) that other measures of arms control, as
valuable as they are and as important for long term global security as they
will be, cannot be indefinitely substituted for a test ban agreement; and
(d) that, overall, the idea of CTBT continues to play a special role in
creating and sustaining the "basic bargain" of the NPT-we should not
expect the indefinite perpetuation of the non-proliferation regime in the
absence of significant movement toward an effective test ban accord.'
Before concluding this section's discussion of the meaning of
"effective measures" in article VI, it is useful to step back from the fine-
grained analysis of the legal interpretation of NPT text and history, to
consider the CTBT political terrain from a more macroscopic
perspective.5" That is, several key states have asserted that, for them,
the link between the NPT and a CTBT is fundamental and indissoluble.
Regardless of whether article VI states with convincing precision the
254. See Lehman Statement, supra note 253, at 112.
255. For the converse view, see Carnahan, supra note 131 (arguing that the NPT
negotiators failed to reach consensus on any requirement for a CTBT, and subsequent
practice reveals lack of unanimity on the desirability of such a treaty); Lewis A. Dunn,
Nuclear Proliferation Watch: Some Thoughts on Future Challenges, in NEW
TECHNOLOGIES FOR SECURrTY AND ARMS CONTROL: THREATS AND PROMISE 91, 101
(Eric H. Arnett ed., 1989) ("A close look at the negotiating record does not support the
view that a ban on all nuclear testing is the pre-eminent test of 'good faith'
negotiations.").
256. See Aaron Tovish, letter to the editor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1992; ZAMORA,
supra note 113, at 17 (many countries would resist indefinite extension of NPT if United
States is still conducting nuclear tests).
257. See Lewis Dunn, Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s, in CRrTCAL CHOICES:
SETTING PRIORITIES IN THE CHANGING SECURITrY ENVIRONMENT 221,223 (Eric H. Arnett
et al. eds., 1991) (CTBT has symbolic importance beyond its real merit: "If you go back
into the negotiating record, you cannot find a clear link that the CTB is the only litmus
test of whether [article VI] is being met. But that does not matter.").
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mandate for concluding a timely CTBT, these countries assert that they
will judge the NPT, and they will react to 1995 proposals to renew or
strengthen it, in the light of its accomplishment or failure to promote a
test ban accord. Even if a pettifogging lawyer could conclude that the
text, context, history, and practice of article VI do not quite nail down an
agreed legal commitment to conclude a CTBT, these countries might
nevertheless contend that the "spirit" of the NPT had been violated, that
their security interests may not be well served by a system under which
some states continue the headlong development of new nuclear weapons
while others refrain, and that, overall, the treaty may no longer be worth
sustaining or enhancing. 8
It is hard to assess how much of this international fury is purely a
bluff. Non-proliferation really is in the interest of NNWS and NWS
alike. Even if there were no CTBT, the world should not throw away
one important measure of arms restraint simply out of frustration over the
inability to prepare another. Responsible leaders in all countries should
endeavor both to sustain the NPT and to create a CTBT-not make the
former a hostage to the latter.
There is, moreover, reason to suspect that at least some substantial
component of NNWS disquietude over the "discrimination" of the NPT
is self-serving and insincere. That is, some countries may still harbor
ongoing nuclear ambitions for their own narrow reasons-they see the
nuclear option asa useful card to play in dealing with regional tensions
or potential local hostilities. They might, therefore, choose to remain
outside the NPT umbrella in any event, regardless of what the
superpowers do about CTBT. The alleged shortcomings in the NPT
regime, and the superpower failure to constrain their own nuclear
developments in particular, continue to provide these "problem countries"
with a handy, if cynical, "cover story." 9
India and Pakistan are often cited as examples of this dynamic-both
have criticized the NPT as incomplete pending the conclusion of a CTBT
that would pinch off the NWS' qualitative nuclear arms race as surely as
the NNWS' quantitative competition. Both have been, however,
suspected of prolonging their own nuclear ambitions for other reasons, as
well-dangling on the nuclear precipice may be perceived as advantageous
258. Rotblat, supra note 20, at 65; GOLDBLAT, TWENTY YEARS, supra note 23,
at 11 (India, Argentina, and Brazil all still complain about the discriminatory nature of
the NPT); Goldansky & Davidov, supra note 130, at 15, 23 (CTBT is "an indispensible
condition for further existence of the [NP'r].").
259. Ronald F. Lehman, Lehman's Lessons: The Arms Control Agenda, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1991, at 8, 12 ("For many of the countries that cause
nonproliferation concerns, the CTB is a pretext."); SCHRAo, supra note 62, at 28;
Belmont Report, supra note 58, at 224; LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 197.
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in the recurrent South Asian military confrontations. Perhaps neither
Pakistan nor India would sign a multilateral CTBT even if one were
available and even if it did significantly constrain the United States and
Russia. But it may be suggestive that both India and Pakistan have long
adhered to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, a relatively "non-discriminatory"
accord that constrains all nuclear parties equally.' Perhaps the time
has come to put to the test the stated willingness of those and other
NNWS to join a truly effective non-proliferation order by removing their
stated excuse.2 1
Similarly, the historic non-participation of France and China long
provided a plausible rationale for the United States and the Soviet Union
to proceed only slowly and deliberately on nuclear testing matters.
Arguably, the superpowers could be expected to go only so far, and only
so quickly, toward nuclear restraints as long as the other nuclear powers
remained on the sidelines. Now, however, that artificial constraint, too,
has been largely removed: China has joined the NPT, France has
suspended nuclear testing, and there is a real prospect that an effective
cessation on nuclear explosions could be converted into a truly global
ban.
These and other recent adherences have substantially bolstered the
NPT, making the 1995 conference both an unprecedented opportunity and
an abyssal danger. The world will shortly determine whether the NPT
will be continued in force for a substantial period of time, or whether it
will be consigned to history. The link between CTBT and the NPT-a
link possessing both legal and political attributes-will play a key role in
that decision.
At this point, the United States (with the United Kingdom in the role
of spear-carrier) stands alone against the rest of the world's interest in a
test ban agreement. Whether the votes are tallied in General Assembly
resolutions, the LTBT amendment conference, or the NPT review
conferences, the result has always been the same: The United States is
260. Gary Milhollin, Stopping the Indian Bomb, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 593 (1987);
Barbara Crosette, India Is Pressed on Atom Project, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992, at A7;
R. Jeffrey Smith, Pakistan Official Affirms Capacity for Nuclear Device, WASH. POST,
Feb. 7, 1992, at 18; Edward A. Gargan, Diplomats Are Edgy as India Stubbornly Builds
Its Nuclear Arsenal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1992, at A13; Robert M. Lawrence, The
Nonproliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Aspirants: The Strategic Context of the Indian
Ocean, in Marwah & Schulz, supra note 206, at 59, 65-68; Subrahmanyam, India's
Nuclear Policy, in Marwah & Schulz, supra note 206, at 125-48.
261. Session I Debate, in Khan, supra note 20, at 102, 116-18 (many countries
that have resisted joining the NPT on the grounds that it is discriminatory would be likely
to join a CTBT); Goldanskii & Davydov, supra note 178, at 154-55, 158; Statement by
Indian Representative, reprinted in DOcUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, supra note 154,
at 325 (Indian interest in a CTBT).
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isolated in its interpretation of article VI and in its antipathy to test ban
limitations. The pressure is mounting, and the stridency of the debate has
reached increasingly tense levels.'
On the other hand, some experts are now suggesting a political
transformation, predicting that the 1995 conference may be appreciably
more benign than its predecessors, with consensual support for extension
of the NPT well within reach. They assert that the wealth of other arms
control measures-the dazzling deep cuts achieved in START, the CFE
reductions in conventional forces, and the rest of the panoply of
progress-have obviated the need for a CTBT and satiated the NNWS
desires.' In today's post cold war world, some contend, CTBT has
lost its saliency; by 1995 the rest of the world will be less driven by arms
control matters in general, and CTBT in particular will seem a relatively
minor point of incomplete accomplishment on an otherwise breathtaking
record of disarmament.'
It is certainly possible that the world will relax as the cold war era
tensions unwind, and the acrimony directed against the United States on
test ban issues may begin to find other outlets. But the failure to
conclude a CTBT is not yet a dead issue; the NNWS have not yet
abandoned it as a key ingredient in the global security regime that the
NPT attempted to create.' Even if some of the "old time religion" on
262. The United States has also been the brake on test ban activities conducted
inside the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The CD has retained each year a working
group of scientific experts to address technical advances in the field of seismic
verification. There have been repeated efforts-always rebuffed by the United States-to
cede the CD a greater role in elaborating a full treaty. Kiselev, supra note 90, at 83-84.
263. Leonard speech, supra note 130. It has also been suggested that the NNWS
pressure for a CTBT may be mitigated by another important exogenous factor.
Mexico-long a leader in mobilizing international opinion in favor of a test ban-now has
other, more immediate diplomatic concerns. Foremost among them may be the desire to
conclude and implement an effective trade agreement with the United States, leading to
the creation of a North American Free Trade Zone, which could prove to be enormously
beneficial to the Mexican economy. Diplomatic horse-trading might therefore lead to
Mexico agreeing to recede a bit on the CTBT issue, in return for American commitment
to "sweeten" the trade accord.
264. See John Simpson, Prospect and Retrospect: A Review of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Policies, HARV. INT'L REV., Spring 1992, at 4, 7; Harold Muller, The
Future of the NPT Modifications to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime, HARV.
INT'L REV., Spring 1992, at 10, 12-13; Kathleen Bailey, This Is Not Arms Control,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 17, 1990, at All.
265. Indeed, NNWS may plausibly turn this point on its head, asking why, in the
context of all the other arms control accords that have recently been reached, has the
United States still been unwilling to proceed with a CTBT? To the extent that the answer
reveals an American interest in the possibility of someday developing new types of "third
generation" nuclear arms, or in otherwise improving the performance, safety, or
reliability of existing types of nuclear weaponry, then a CTBT-which would foreclose
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test ban issues has faded, CTBT retains much of its resiliency as a point
of concern and vitriol.' Who knows what misadventures might occur
at a heated 1995 conference; who could foresee with confidence the
outcome of a crowded, disorderly assembly, where partisans might still
be stinging from a quarter century of unrequited pursuit of a CTBTJ? 27
Thus, even if the arguments linking article VI and CTBT could be
partially legally rebutted, they might retain their political cachet. If key
countries in the third world view the NPT as a bad bargain, if they
consider that they are foregoing a nuclear option that the NWS show no
signs of abandoning for themselves, and if they perceive that no CTBT
is forthcoming, they may desert the NPT at precisely the time when it is
most needed and most powerful.' At a minimum, NNWS may well
resist efforts, sponsored by the United States and other non-proliferation
stalwarts, to improve and enhance the NPT regime, such as by upgrading
the timeliness and effectiveness of the IAEA on-site inspections.
Whether the nexus between the NPT and a CTBT is provided by
international law operating through the penumbra of article VI, or
those options for the United States, as for others-is hardly irrelevant. See R. Jeffrey
Smith, 5 Sites Considered for New Nuclear Weapons Facility, WASH. POST, Aug. 6,
1992, at A3 (United States is pursuing the construction of a new factory for manufacturing
plutonium triggers for future nuclear weapons).
266. A Canadian government official wrote in 1987,
Progress towards a CTB treaty has been traditionally associated with
compliance on Article VI. For Canada, the achievement of a CTB treaty
remains a fundamental and abiding Canadian objective. The Canadian
government policy is that a CTB is a concrete, realistic measure which would
constitute a major step in curbing the development of new and more
sophisticated nuclear weapons.
Douglas Roche, Canada and the NPT: The Enduring Relationship, in NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 22, at 165, 169. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations said in 1985, "It is of direct importance to the future of
humanity to end all nuclear explosions. No other means would be as effective in limiting
the further development of nuclear weapons." Id. See also Ashok Kapur, The Future of
the NPT: A View from the Indian Subcontinent, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND
GLOBAL SECURITY, supra note 22, at 201, 202-03 (critique of NPT as serving the
interests of the superpowers, but not of the other states).
267. See Bunn, supra note 250, at 198-99 (attempting to assess how the votes
might have been cast if the parties at the 1990 review conference had been polled on the
strident Mexican position demanding a CTBT).
The NPT has never been quite beloved by some NNWS, who adhered to the treaty
only reluctantly and who continue to view it as a discriminatory agreement, promoting the
interests of NWS ahead of all others. Khan, supra note 244, at 47-48.
268. See FISCHER, STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 26,
at 185, 195, 238 (NPT requires negotiation of a CTBT, the NNWS have made it their top
disarmament priority, and a variety of diplomatic mechanisms for producing a test ban
agreement have been tried, to no avail).
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whether it is provided by international politics operating through
unsatisfied NNWS desires and ambitions, the international community
would ignore it only at great peril. The harsh reality is that without a
timely CTBT, or without at least some substantial progress in that
direction, some key states will feel cheated by the attempted
reinterpretation of article VI, they may be unwilling to prolong or
strengthen the asymmetric arrangements of the NPT, and the arms control
regime may fall into disastrous disarray.'
B. What Does "Good Faith "Require?
Article VI does not, and probably could not, require the conclusion
of a CTBT or any other instrument by any particular date; it merely
obligates the parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith." The scope of
that commitment is obscure-"good faith" is one of those excruciatingly
ambiguous terms in the lawyer's vocabulary-but some traditional
legal source materials shed a bit of light. Over the years, the phrase
"good faith" has become a staple of international law discourse, and
repeated practice has infused it with a greater level of content that might
first be appreciated.'
269. John Simpson, Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the 1990s: An Agenda of Issues
and Policy Choices, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990S,
supra note 57, at 192, 196 (CTBT has importance both as a symbol of commitment to the
NPT and as a valuable measure of arms control); Miguel Marin-Bosch, The Non-
Proliferation Treaty: Fifteen Years of Frustration, DISARMAMENT, Spring 1985, at 45-52.
Bat see Kapur, supra note 266, at 205 (without a CTBT, "Article VI of the NPT has no
force").
270. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990) notes that "Good faith is an
intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence
of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. . . ." The pervasiveness
of the notion of good faith in various aspects of American law is illustrated by indexes to
legal source materials, which contain citations under the heading "good faith" to dozens
of areas of law, from bankruptcy to discovery to search and seizure to uniform
commercial code. See Index to Annotations, ALR 2D, 3D, 4TH, FED. (1986); GENERAL
INDEX, AM. JuR. (2d ed. 1991).
271. 14 Whiteman DIGEST at 366. The Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe enshrines, as its tenth principle, "Fulfillment in
good faith of obligations under international law." Reprinted in JOHN J. MARESCA, To
HELSINKI: THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 1973-75 app.
I!, at 249, 255 (1987). The 1970 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations repeatedly uses the term
"good faith" in elaboration of the proper mode of international conduct. G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. G.A.O.R., 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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Several different areas of law are worth examining; as we walk
around the notion of good faith, viewing it from different perspectives,
we can gain a better appreciation for its impact and role in modem
international practice. None of these illustrations by itself can establish
authoritatively what good faith requires in the context of article VI of the
NPT, but together they can inform our search for its meaning by
supplying diverse precedents.
1. INTERNATIONAL LAW: TREATY STANDARDS
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that every
treaty be interpreted and performed in good faith.' This obligation is
widely considered to be central to the entire notion of treaty law, an
essential predicate to the effective conduct of international affairs.'
Indeed, the requirement for good faith in executing international
agreements underlies the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda,
acknowledged as one of the key starting points for any rational system of
international relations.' 7
Commentators have stressed that reliance upon the concept of "good
faith" is not mere rhetoric. Different verbal formulations have been
recommended for elaborating that term, and much ink has been shed in
attempts to clarify the inherently vague language or to infuse it with some
sort of consensus meaning.' The continuing ambiguity, however, has
not lessened the importance that the international community regularly
attaches to the idea of good faith-in a wide variety of international law
contexts, the phrase is invoked as a standard of conduct possessing
meaning and power, albeit a large measure of uncertainty, too.276
272. Vienna Convention, supra note 132, art. 26, 31.
273. See Richard D. Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM.
J. INT'L L. 495, 516 (1970); Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Eighteenth Session, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 253, 334-36 (1967); Research in International
Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, Part 11, 29 SUPP.
AM. J. INT'L L. 977-92 (1935) [hereinafter,Harvard Research).
274. RESTATEMENT, supra note 132, §321 cmt. a (The doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda "lies at the core of the law of international agreements and is perhaps the most
important principle of international law."); 1.1. Lukashuk, The Principle Pacta Sunt
Servanda and the Nature of Obligation Under International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 513-
18 (1989).
275. Some early commentators argued that the proper standard of observance, at
least for some types of treaties, was "utmost fidelity" rather than "good faith." JOSEPH
M. SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 996
(3d ed. 1988).
276. J.F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW passim (1991).
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The 1935 Harvard Research on the law of treaties, for example,
concluded:
The phrase "carry out in good faith" as used in Article 20 [of
the 1935 Harvard draft convention on the law of treaties] is not
intended to suggest that the obligation of a State to fulfill its
treaty engagements is merely one of good faith rather than a
legal obligation. It has reference rather to the manner or spirit
in which the obligation is to be performed-the degree of
fidelity, strictness and conscientiousness manifested in the
fulfillment of the promise made. The obligation to fulfill in
good faith a treaty engagement requires that its stipulations be
observed in their spirit as well as according to their letter, and
that what has been promised be performed without evasion or
subterfuge, honestly, and to the best of the ability of the party
which made the promise.'m
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW: WORLD COURT DELIBERATIONS
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its predecessor, the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCI), have on several
occasions relied upon the notion of good faith, treating it as an important,
although elusive, standard, applicable in a wide range of international law
controversies. Like other authorities, the world courts have had little
success in fashioning a precise definition of good faith, but have
consistently evaluated it as a central obligation of the law of treaties (and
of international dealings more generally), not as a point of drafter's
surplusage or empty palaver. 8
In the 1948 Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, for example, the ICJ assessed whether a state could in good faith
import additional, frankly political, rationales into its decision about
voting on UN membership for a rival applicant, or whether the legal
criteria established by the Charter were designed to be the sole basis for
admissions decisions.'m In the 1955 South-West Africa Voting
Procedure, Advisory Opinion, several justices debated whether South
Africa's obligation toward the United Nations regarding activities in
Namibia was a matter of enforceable law or merely a principle of moral
277. Harvard Research, supra note 273, at 981.
278. International arbitrations, too, have considered the concept of good faith and
wrestled with its meaning, applying it even in the absence of an agreed definition.
O'CONNOR, supra note 276, at 98-102.
279. 1948 I.C.J. 57 (May 28); O'CONNoR, supra note 276, at 82.
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obligation.' Similarly, in the 1962 Case Concerning the Temple of
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), the ICJ evaluated the parties'
longstanding reliance upon an allegedly erroneous map used in
demarcating the national boundaries, and determined that the map should
be honored in good faith."1
The world courts have also had occasion to pass directly upon
language not too dissimilar from that contained in article VI of the NPT,
and have used the opportunity to flesh out a bit more of what "good
faith" requires in treaty -negotiations. In the 1931 Railway Traffic
Between Lithuania and Poland case, the PCI construed a League of
Nations mandate recommending that the two nations enter into direct
negotiations to resolve transportation issues lingering in the chaotic
aftermath of World War I2 The two parties accepted this
recommendation and devoted considerable energies toward resolution of
the dispute, but were unable to reach an accord. Poland then alleged in
court that in the absence of agreement, Lithuania was nonetheless
obligated promptly to open for traffic a vital railroad link. The PCU,
however, wrote:
The Court is indeed justified in considering that the engagement
incumbent on the two Governments in conformity with the
Council's Resolution is not only to enter into negotiations, but
also to pursue them as far as possible, with a view to
concluding agreements. This point of view appears, moreover,
to have been that adopted by the Council at its subsequent
meetings. But an obligation to negotiate does not imply an
obligation to reach an agreement, nor in particular does it imply
that Lithuania, by undertaking to negotiate, has assumed an
engagement, and is in consequence obliged to conclude the
administrative and technical agreements indispensable for the re-
establishment of traffic on the Landwarow-Kaisiadorys railways
sector.2
More recently, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and Netherlands), the ICJ
added to the articulation of "good faith" in negotiations.' There, the
court determined that several competing international law principles could
be applicable to the drawing of a maritime boundary between the
280. 1955 I.C.J. 67 (June 7); O'CONNOR, supra note 276, at 85.
281. 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15); O'CONNOR, supra note 276, at 92.
282. 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 42, at 108 (Oct. 15).
283. Id. at 116.
284. 1969 I.C.J. 3, 46 (Feb. 20).
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contesting states, and that the parties were accordingly required to
consider in good faith all the possibilities, not simply those that promoted
individual self-interest. The court directed:
mhe parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations
with a view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go
through a formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior
condition for the automatic application of a certain method of
delimitation in the absence of an agreement; they are under an
obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are
meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them
insists upon its own position without contemplating any
modification of it.'
The phrase "good faith" has therefore regularly merited international
judicial respect and weight, despite its imprecision. Good faith is taken
seriously as a matter of international law, even by a world court which
affirms that "[riestrictions upon the independence of States cannot
therefore be presumed"' and which has taken pains to assert that it is
guided strictly by legal criteria, not by the "softer" considerations of
morality or general equity.'
3. UNITED STATES LAW: HUMAN RIGHTS
Within domestic United States jurisprudence, the famous case of Sei
Fujii v. State' casts interesting light upon this proposition. There, the
plaintiff challenged the validity of a California escheat law as
discriminatory against certain categories of aliens,' and he asserted,
inter alia, that the human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter
established a justiciable right to own land.' The California Supreme
285. Id. at 47.
286. The S.S."Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
287. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 46-47; O'CONNOR, supra note
276, at 92-95.
288. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
289. The plaintiff was a Japanese national who was ineligible for United States
citizenship under statutory standards. He had purchased some California agricultural land
in 1948, but the state alien land law did not permit persons in his status to own land, so
the property was ordered forfeited to the state. There was no applicable bilateral treaty
between the United States and Japan, so the only relevant international document was the
Charter of the United Nations.
290. U.N. CHARTER. Article 55 of the Charter states that the United Nations shall
promote "universal respect for, and' observance of, human. rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Article 56
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Court held to the contrary, finding that articles 55 and 56 of the Charter
were not "self-executing," 1 since they were intended to create long
term objectives or requirements for future political steps, rather than to
provide specific rights and remedies that would be immediately
enforceable in an American court.'
In so doing, however, the court was careful not to hold that articles
55 and 56 were void or meaningless. Indeed, the court underscored the
importance of the moral commitment they contained, asserting that "we
must not permit the spirit of our pledge to be compromised or disparaged
in either our domestic or our foreign affairs."' In short, even though
the human rights language of the UN Charter was vague and aspirational,
and even though it was not sufficiently precise to instigate an immediately
enforceable cause of action by a private litigant, it was nonetheless fully
valid on the international plane. It created binding obligations for the
United States and corresponding governments, and it could not be
dismissed as mere rhetoric. Although the UN Charter provisions did not
state with the requisite specificity any particular obligations, they did
create law-they did require the United States and other parties to do
something to pursue the lofty objectives.
4. UNITED STATES LAW: LABOR RELATIONS
One substantial body of United States jurisprudence in which the
notion of "good faith" has long played a prominent role is labor law,
specifically the tangled construction of the National Labor Relations Act,
then states, "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55."
More generally, the Charter refers to "respect for the obligations arising from
treaties" in its preamble, and elsewhere specifically requires parties to fulfill their Charter
obligations "in good faith." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 2.
291. Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 620-22. Under United States practice, a treaty that is
"self-executing" becomes effective in domestic law immediately upon its entry into force,
and it may confer enforceable rights to be vindicated in court. In contrast, a "non-self-
executing" treaty requires some act of domestic lawmaking before it can have direct
consequences inside the country. The test for assessing whether a treaty is self-executing
is obscure, focusing upon whether the drafters of the treaty intended it to be immediately
operative as domestic law, or whether it was addressed more to the legislature than to the
courts, anticipating subsequent enactments to effectuate it. RESTATEMENT, supra note
132, § 111.3-.4; Carlos M. Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (1992).
292. The California Supreme Court went on to rule in favor of the plaintiff, based
upon the 14th Amendment, which the majority found to preclude this type of
discrimination against a category of aliens. Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 622-30.
293. Id. at 622.
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which requires management and unions to bargain collectively in good
faith on a variety of workplace issues.' There, too, the precise
parameters of the obligation are opaque, but courts' and
commentators' have taken the mandate seriously and attempted to
import reliable meaning.
The NLRB has therefore scrutinized the interstices of the private
bargaining process, assessing whether the negotiators exhibit a "sincere
desire to reach an agreement. " ' Thus, a failure to enter into
bargaining at all, insisting upon retaining unilateral freedom of action, has
been held to be an unfair practice,' as has procrastination,
unnecessarily delaying the conclusion of a deal.' Under some
circumstances, failing to offer new proposals, sticking only with proposals
known to be unacceptable to the other side, or withdrawing proposals that
could form the basis for agreement have been determined to be actions
not consistent with "good faith."' Also, unilateral actions undertaken
away from the bargaining table that fundamentally alter the status quo and
294. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1988 and 1992 Supp.); id. § 158(d) defines
the mutual obligation:
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession.
295. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 483-92 (1960)
(tracing the evolution of legislative standards); NLRB v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc., 536 F.2d
60 (5th Cir. 1976).
296. ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 389-401
(10th ed. 1986); Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv.
1401 (1958); W. Gary Vause, The Good Faith Obligation in Public Sector
Bargaining-Uses and Limits of the Private Sector Model, 19 STETSON L. REv. 511
(1990).
297. NLRBv. Reed & Price Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 887 (1953). See also Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 485 (quoting
early NLRB report: "the essential thing is rather the serious intent to adjust differences
and to reach an acceptable common ground"); NLRB v. MacMillan Ring-Free Oil Co.,
394 F.2d 26, 29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968),
298. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962) ("ITihere is no occasion to
consider the issue of good faith if a party has refused even to negotiate in fact.").
299. NLRB v. Cable Vision, 660 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1981) (management foot-
dragging, leading to an unusually slow pace of negotiation, coupled with empty promises
to "study" and "consider" union proposals-and rarely making any substantial concessions
in return-was not good faith) Clear Pine Moldings, Inc. v. NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 728-
29 (9th Cir. 1980).
300. Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1103 (1st Cir. 1981).
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thereby compromise the chances for success in the negotiations are
considered illegitimate."°
Courts have elaborated the meaning of "good faith" in this context,
by inspecting an employer's motivations and subjective intentions, as
manifested by the proposals issued and the responses to union
demands.' The statute makes clear that there is no requirement for the
parties to agree, or for either side to offer concessions or accept
compromises,' and it is permissible to engage in "hard bargaining,"
using economic leverage and insisting upon your own terms even to the
point of reaching an impasse.' But behavior variously characterized
as "shadow boxing" or "surface negotiation," insincerely "going through
the motions," will not suffice under the law.'
Courts in labor cases freely acknowledge the difficulty in making
these fine subjective determinations, and they require a close dissection
of the history of negotiating positions and ploys. Nevertheless this type
of retrospective analysis is routinely undertaken, and the elusive term
"good faith" has frequently revealed its teeth, demanding more
forthcoming negotiating behavior from private parties.M
5. ARMS CONTROL: THE SVERDLOVSK INCIDENT
The sphere of international diplomacy offers another gloss on
concepts related to the notion of "good faith." Throughout the 1980s, the
United States government regularly raised concerns about Soviet activities
alleged to be inconsistent with the obligations of the Biological Weapons
Convention.' Specifically, the United States asserted that a 1979
301. Metromedia, Inc., KMBC-TV v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1182, 1188 (8th Cir.
1978); Soule Glass, 652 F.2d at 1084; Clear Pine Moldings, 632 F.2d at 729-30.
302. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 1981).
303. Pease Co. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1981); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank
v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Tomco Communications, Inc.,
567 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1978).
304. NLRB v. Insurance.Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-92 (1960); Soule
Glass, 652 F.2d at 1103-04; Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 663 F.2d 956.
305. NLRB v. Overnite Transportation Co., 938 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1991); Seattle
First Nat'l Bank, 638 F.2d at 1227; NLRB v. Cable Vision, 660 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1981); Clear Pine Moldings, 632 F.2d 721.
306. Soule Glass, 652 F.2d 1055; Seattle First Nat ' Bank, 638 F.2d 1221; Glomac
Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1979); Continental Insurance Co. v. NLRB,
495 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1974).
307. BWC, supra note 30. The treaty obligates its parties never to develop,
produce, stockpile, acquire or retain any biological weapons agents, exempting the
retention of only small quantities used in defensive research or other peaceful purposes.
Id. art. I. It was the first modem treaty to accomplish true "disarmament," ridding the
parties of an entire category of weaponry.
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outbreak of anthrax in the Siberian city of Sverdlovsk (now called
Yekaterinburg) may have been triggered by an accidental explosion at a
secret, illegal biological weapons facility there. The initial Soviet
response acknowledged the epidemic, but asserted that it had been caused
by black market sales of tainted beef, historically common in the area.
This proffered explanation did not satisfy all Western observers, who
identified inconsistencies in the available data and requested additional
information.'
The Soviets responded with essentially a stonewall denial of
impropriety, declining to provide further data and refusing to permit
access by outside experts who could have clarified the situation. The
United States, proceeding with only inadequate, second-hand data, never
formally charged the Soviet Union with a violation of the substantive
disarmament provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.' At
the same time, however, the United States and others did press the issue
in various diplomatic contacts with the Soviets, citing article V of the
treaty, under which the parties agree "to consult one another and to
cooperate in solving any problems which may arise."31° The United
States argued that the adamant Soviet failure to be more forthcoming in
the dispute resolution process was itself a compliance issue, independent
of the substantive merits of the incident."'
308.. Elisa D. Harris, Sverdlovsk and Yellow Rain: Two Cases of Soviet
Noncompliance?, 11 INT'L SEcuRITrrY 41 (1987). Some Western observers concluded that
the reported symptoms of the Sverdlovsk victims were inconsistent with the type of
anthrax that could be associated with eating spoiled meat, and more likely due to the
inhalation of disease germs, as from a laboratory accident. Certain other Soviet
governmental responses to the incident also suggested the occurrence of a military
disaster, rather than simply a runaway black market. But overall, the evidence was
inconclusive. Id. at 51-56. Later, the Soviet and Russian governments began to release
bits of additional information about the 1979 incident, but the full story remained murky
until June, 1992, when Boris Yeltsin acknowledged the existence of the illegal facility
responsible for the epidemic. R. Jeffrey Smith, Yeltsin Blames '79 Anthrax on Germ
Warfare Efforts, WASH. POST, June 16, 1992, at Al; Milton Leitenberg, Anthrax in
Sverdlovsk: New Pieces to the Puzzle, 22 ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 1992, at 10.
309. Harris, supra note 308, at 46. The United States government said,
We continue to be dissatisfied with Soviet explanations regarding an outbreak
of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979. We have raised the issue repeatedly with
the Soviets since March 1980, and have been told that the outbreak stemmed
from the consumption of contaminated meat. However, based on information
available to the U.S., we concluded that the outbreak occurred as a result of
an accidental release of anthrax spores from a prohibited BW facility.
Bush Administration's report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms
Control Agreements 6 (Feb. 23, 1990).
310. - BWC, supra note 30, art. V.
311. Harris, supra note 308, at 55-56; Milton Leitenberg, A Return to Sverdlovsk:
Allegations of Soviet Activities Related to Biological Weapons, ARMS CONTROL, Sept.
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In short, the United States in that context took very seriously the
obligation-stated in admittedly general, imprecise language-to engage
in international diplomacy and to endeavor to reach a constructive,
mutually-acceptable solution. The United States brushed aside Soviet
statements that their grudging, partial disclosures had been sufficient, and
the United States insisted upon a higher level of active collaboration and
sincerity. There, at least, the obligation to try to reach an agreement in
a delicate area of national security policy was elevated in importance and
enforceability."'
6. ARMS CONTROL: SALT AND OTHER MATTERS
Finally, other existing arms control agreements also provide some
useful precedents because several treaties deliberately obligate the parties
to pursue subsequent accords embodying deeper cuts in permitted
weaponry, or other, more powerful measures of disarmament. The SALT
I negotiations, for example, found the parties able to agree upon stringent
controls on strategic defensive systems,313 but only a relatively modest
freeze on strategic offensive arms. 4 This situation was tolerable for
a five-year interim accord, but the parties also undertook "to continue
active negotiations" toward substantial reductions in the existing offensive
arsenals." 5 In fact, the United States declared unequivocally that unless
such further cuts were promptly developed, America might be unwilling
1991, at 161, 184-85.
The BWC has no verification provisions, and the dispute resolution mechanism
consists essentially of a requirement for consultation and cooperation (article V) and the
possibility of referring any problems to the United Nations Security Council (article VI).
Recently, there have been proposals to strengthen the verification mechanisms, to provide
a data reporting system and the capability for international inspections. Jozef Goldblat &
Thomas Bernauer, Towards a More Effective Ban on Biological Weapons, 23 BULL.
PEACE PROPOSALS 35 (1992).
312. Similarly, in the mid-1980s, the United States made a series of diplomatic
demarches to the Soviet Union regarding compliance with the LTBT, asserting that Soviet
nuclear weapons testing practices had allowed radioactive debris to vent into the
atmosphere and drift outside Soviet territory, in contravention of article 1. 1(b). Moscow
officials were unresponsive on the issue, and the United States government complained
that "our repeated attempts to discuss these occurrences with Soviet authorities have been
rebuffed .... Soviet refusal to discuss this matter calls into question their sincerity on
the whole range of arms control agreements." President's Unclassified Report, Soviet
Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements (Dec. 2, 1987), reprinted in DEP'T ST.
BULL., Mar. 1988, at 51, 54.
313. ABM Treaty, supra note 179.
314. Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, supra note 179.
315. ABM Treaty, supra note 179, art. XI; Interim Agreement on Strategic
Offensive Arms, supra note 179, art. VII.
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to continue its adherence to the existing limitations upon either strategic
defenses or offenses. 16 Similar commitments for future negotiations on
deeper reductions were written into the SALT II agreement3 17 and have
been issued with respect to START, 8 as well.
In the same vein, negotiations in the field of chemical and biological
weapons proceeded in incremental fashion, with each step in the
progression explicitly contemplating its own follow-on. The 1972
Biological Weapons Convention31 9 tackled only half of the overall
problem (and it was considered, for various military and technological
reasons to be by far the easier half),' but the negotiating parties also
undertook (in language patterned after the NPT), "to continue negotiations
in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective
measures for the prohibition"" of chemical weapons, too. Despite this
"vague" treaty language, and despite the absence of a legally enforceable
timetable, the negotiating states doggedly pursued a comprehensive
chemical weapons convention. After more than two decades of sustained
bargaining in one forum or another, a satisfactory chemical weapons
treaty has at last emerged, redeeming the 1972 commitment.3'  Other
examples could also be added to the list of arms control agreements
316. ABM Treaty, supra note 179, unilateral stint. A; Interim Agreement on
Strategic Offensive Arms, supra note 179, unilateral stint. A.
317. SALT II Treaty, supra note 179, Joint Statement of Principles and Basic
Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms.
318. Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. and Russia See New Arms Accords for a July
Summit, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1992, at Al (arms officials from the two countries discuss
additional deep cuts in strategic arms, permitting each side only half the weaponry allowed
under the START Treaty).
319. BWC, supra note 30.
320. Biological weapons were considered in 1972 to be relatively uncontrollable
on the battlefield and to have little military utility. It was therefore relatively easy for the
military officials in various countries to agree to give them up. The United States, in fact,
had unilaterally renounced BW and begun destroying its arsenal even before the BWC
negotiations commenced. ACDA TREATY BOOK, supra note 32, at 129-32. Chemical
weapons, in contrast, had been used in combat on a wide scale (in World War I, for
example), and were deemed to possess significant military potential. In addition, many
of the chemical agents useful for weapons purposes are simultaneously essential to a wide
range of civilian applications throughout the national economy (in plastics, paints,
fertilizers, etc.), so any treaty verification scheme would have to be carefully crafted in
order to shut off the military potential while not inhibiting productive commerce.
BERNAUER, supra note 3, at 18-19, 52-55.
321. BWC, supra note 30, art. IX.
322. CWC, supra note 3; John M. Goshko, Draft Chemical Arms Pact Approved
After 24 Years, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1992, at A27; Agreement Reached on Chemical
Arms Draft Treaty, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1992, at A10; Paul Lewis, Chemical-Arms Ban
Written; Fast Action Asked, N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1992, at All.
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mandating future negotiations-usually with no greater precision (but
occasionally with greater success) than article VI of the NPT.31
In sum, the content of "good faith" is admittedly ambiguous. It is
impossible to state with precision exactly what the parties are required to
do, when they must do it, or how much flexibility they must demonstrate
in order to reach a CTBT or other accord. International law, like
domestic United States law, has not progressed to the point where
aspirational terms are defined with much specific operational content.
On the other hand, the term "good faith" is not meaningless. There
is an obligation to try to reach agreement.' There is an obligation to
negotiate.' There is an obligation to attempt to fashion proposals that
could solve the problems and be acceptable to the other side.' 2 There
is an obligation under the NPT to develop "effective" measures, not
merely empty "window dressing," and to address the critical problems in
realistic ways.' And it would be reasonable to infer some temporal
qualifications: Surely, a party could not fairly attempt to take immediate
advantage of the favorable portions of a bargain and simultaneously defer
forever its reciprocal performance. Surely a party could not, consistent
with good faith, postpone the satisfactory conclusion of mandatory
negotiations to some impossibly-distant future, laden with implausible
conditions precedent. Most clearly, a party could not legitimately
"change its mind" about the wisdom, desirability, or feasibility of
323. See, e.g., Seabeds Arms Control Treaty, supra note 23, art. V; CFE Treaty,
supra note 2, art. XVIII.
324. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 47, pt. 2, at 352 (Secretary of State Rogers
conceding that if the Soviet Union indicates an interest in negotiating toward a possible
limitation on ABM systems, article VI of the NPT obligates the United States to enter into
good faith negotiations, rather than simply proceeding with unilateral deployments).
325. Article VI of the NPT obligates the parties "to pursue" the requisite
negotiations; arguably this commitment could be said to be one step removed from an
immediate obligation "to conduct" negotiations. In practical terms, however, the
mechanism for "pursuing" any durable agreement would be via negotiations, and no party
has argued that this aspect of the semantics of article VI is a significant loophole providing
the United States or other parties with appreciably greater freedom or flexibility to escape
the basic obligation. See SHAKER, ORIGIN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 139, at
570.
326. See NPT THIRD REvIEw CONFERENCE BRIEFING No. 1, supra note 157, at
2 (quoting a United Kingdom delegate saying, "I cannot prove (the nuclear powers')
sincerity. An act of faith rather than objective data is required. I accept that when they
pledge themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race at an
early date they mean what they say.").
327. It could be argued that the TTBT and PNET (and their 1990 protocols) were
so permissive that they did not rise to the level of "effective measures" of nuclear arms
control as mandated by article VI. Agreements that were merely cosmetic or symbolic
would not discharge the NPT obligations.
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carrying out the requirements-at least not if it expected the other parties
to continue to comply with their own treaty commitments.
C. What Are the Consequences of a Breach?
If the United States has been obligated by article VI to do something
about negotiations toward a CTBT, and if the Reagan and Bush
administrations nonetheless determined not to comply, what are the
implications under international law?
The first inquiry is whether the non-performance constitutes a
"material breach" of the treaty. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties defines a material breach as a "violation of a provision essential
to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty."' The
Preamble to the NPT, and other materials cited above, clearly indicate
that the promotion of progress toward a CTBT was one of the leading
objects and purposes of the NPT parties. If the superpowers had been
overtly unwilling to commit to constraining their own qualitative nuclear
arms race, there is little doubt that many of the NNWS negotiators in
1968 would have stayed away from such a fundamentally one-sided trade.
Failure to pursue a comprehensive test ban accord, therefore, goes to the
heart of the NPT, constituting a fundamental abrogation.
The Vienna Convention specifies both the range of remedies
available to an innocent party in the event of a material breach of a
multilateral treaty, and the procedures to be invoked in vindication of the
rights. Following a mandatory period of notification and settlement
attempts,3 the injured states may unanimously elect "to suspend the
operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it."' Short
of unanimity (very unlikely in the case of the NPT) any individual state
"specially affected by the breach" may respond by suspending or
terminating the treaty between itself and the defaulting state.31 Lesser
remedies, such as a decision to decline to renew the treaty substantially
328. Vienna Convention, supra note 132, art. 60.3(b). See Ralph Earle 11 & John
B. Rhinelander, The KrasnoyarskRadar: A "Material Breach " of the ABM Treaty?, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1988, at 9.
329. Vienna Convention, supra note 132, arts. 65-67.
330. Id. art. 60.2 (a). The injured states could decide to make the suspension or
termination effective solely between themselves and the breaching state, or among all
parties. Id. Similar recourse is available to an innocent party aggrieved by the breach
of a bilateral treaty such as the TTBT. Id. art. 60.1.
331. id. art. 60.2 (b). In addition, any party may suspend or terminate the treaty
between itself and the violator, if the treaty is such that a material breach "radically
changes the position" of every party. Id. art. 60.2 (c).
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beyond its initial twenty-five year duration, would also be available as a
matter of political due course. 332
In the case of the NPT, these traditional remedies might appear
unavailing or counterproductive for provoking a CTBT, but they would
have appreciable dramatic effect and political clout nonetheless. An
NNWS party or group of parties could conceivably declare that the United
States had committed a material breach, and could react by suspending
their own corollary NPT obligations. A state might withhold cooperation
with some or all IAEA safeguards, such as by suspending the reporting
of required data or blocking the access of IAEA inspectors. An aggrieved
state might even renege on the fundamental premise of the treaty, by
announcing that it was then undertaking an independent national program
to receive, manufacture, or otherwise acquire its own nuclear device. 3
The most interesting response that the United States might assert to
this putative finding of breach would be to attempt to invoke the doctrine
of rebus sic stantibus, or fundamental change of circumstances, as an
excuse for non-performance. The Vienna Convention, like customary
international law, is generally inhospitable to claims of changed
circumstances, 33  and (unlike domestic United States contract law,
where analogous doctrines are applied with some frequency) few, if any,
332. The NPT also contains a now-standard provision under which a party may
withdraw from the treaty on three months' notice, "if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country." NPT, supra note 7, art. X.1
333. Under the multilateral NPT, each party undertakes obligations toward all
other parties, not solely toward the United States, and those other multilateral obligations
would survive even a determination that the United States had committed a material
breach. Therefore, perhaps the most extreme remedies would be unavailable, unless a
complaining state alleged that the failure to conclude a CTBT (an obligation incumbent
upon all parties under the NPT) was a material breach attributable to all.
In addition, each NNWS party to the NPT has negotiated a separate "safeguards
agreement" with the IAEA, specifying the applicable inspections and reporting procedures
inside its territory. Each safeguards agreement is an independent international agreement,
and a United States breach of the NPT would not automatically provide a basis for
invalidating these subsidiary accords. On the other hand, most safeguards agreements
specify that they shall remain in effect only so long as the NPT is in effect for that
particular state, so a suspension or termination of the NPT might function as a release.
334. The Vienna Convention, supra note 132, art. 62, provides:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with
regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which
was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for
terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis
of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of the
obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
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international law cases have been decided through reliance upon that
principle.33
In some respects, however, the exacting standards of article 62 of the
Vienna Convention might be met here. The transformation of global
politics since 1970-indeed, within the past five years alone-has certainly
been dazzling and far reaching. The fundamental re-ordering of the
global security structure was manifestly "not foreseen" by the negotiators;
it has altered the "essential basis" for the treaty and served "radically to
transform" the parties' obligations. The United States could plausibly
argue that the "new world order" requires a cautious re-appraisal of even
long-standing security arrangements and commitments.
But these developments are not the sort of "fundamental changes"
that should allow the United States unilateral permission to wiggle out of
article VI. First, the current amelioration of world tensions, while not
exactly "foreseen" by the NPT parties, was precisely the type of goal
they were attempting to promote. The NPT was designed to improve
security, to facilitate the reduction of massive nuclear arsenals, and to
assist the parties in reaching a rapprochement. The fact that at least
partial success has been attained so suddenly should not now -eviscerate
the treaty's remaining obligations.
Second, the recent disarmament changes have, in the main, made a
CTBT more desirable, attainable, and safe for the United States and the
rest of the world. These days, even more than in 1968, a freeze on
nuclear weapons development would promote the security interests of the
United States and others, by foreclosing a dangerous and destabilizing
path for renewal of international tensions. The alleged "fundamental
changes" do not justify departure from article VI's commitment to pursue
a test ban; they reinforce it. The only real "fundamental change" has
been that the United States has politically "changed its mind" about the
wisdom or desirability of a CTBT-and that type of remorse is not legally
protected.
Unlike many modern, arms control agreements, the NPT does not
incorporate a specialized dispute-resolution mechanism.337 Presumably,
335. RESTATEMENT, supra note 132, § 336; David J. Bederman, The 1871 London
Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View of the Law of Nations, 82 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1 (1988); John B. Rhinelander & George Bunn, Who's Bound by the Former
Soviet Union's Arms Control Treaties?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1991, at 3, 6-7
(addressing whether "changed circumstances" would apply to the question of Soviet state
succession to arms control agreements).
336. Vienna Convention, supra note 132, art. 62.1.
337. The SALT I negotiations established an enduring precedent with the creation
of the Standing Consultative Commission, a permanent body designed as a venue where
the parties could consider compliance questions, exchange data, agree upon
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therefore, allegations about breach would continue to be fought out in the
diplomatic arena, in tribunals such as the 1995 Review Conference, the
Committee on Disarmament,3' or the LTBT Amendment
Conference.'
The United Nations Security Council could also play a role in
addressing the dispute. The resurgence in vigor and importance of that
organization is salutary for many aspects of international order, but the
continuing veto power ensures that, as a practical matter, nothing very
critical of the United States position could emerge there on this
question.' Conceivably, the International Court of Justice could also
be called upon to construe the meaning of article VI, but unless the
relevant parties consented to jurisdiction, there would be little basis for
an authoritative or effective determination.' 1
Even without a direct finding of a material breach, and short of
initiating international legal actions against the United States, NNWS
parties dissatisfied with the record of American non-performance on
CTBT could respond in other damaging ways. For several years, the
United States has spearheaded international diplomatic efforts to develop
consensus on a variety of measures for strengthening the non-proliferation
regime. The United States and its allies (principally, but not exclusively,
the other NWS) have sought to enhance the timeliness of the data reported
implementation procedures, and discuss possible improvements in the treaty regime.
ABM Treaty, supra note 179, art. XIII. Other arms control treaties have also established
their own parallel bodies. Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R. 27 I.L.M. 84, art. XIII [hereinafter
INF Treaty]; 1990 TTBT Protocol, supra note 92, art. XI; CFE Treaty, supra note 2, art.
XVI.
338. See supra note 262.
339. The 1991 LTBT Amendment Conference ended amidst some disarray on the
question of its future activities. It is possible that the conference will reconvene in the
coming years, but its mandate and timing-and the degree of United States
participation-remain unclear. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 166-71; Miguel Manin-Bosch,
Amendment Conference to the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, 14 DISARMAMENT 83 (1991).
340. Paul Lewis, U.N. May Deprive the Major Powers of Its Top Posts, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at Al; Rochelle L. Stanfield, Back in Fashion, NAT'L J., Nov.
4, 1989, at 2687.
341. The United States has withdrawn from the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, and would be unlikely to consent to jurisdiction in a
contentious case testing the power of article VI of the NPT. The ICJ, however, also has
the authority to issue an "advisory opinion" when requested to do so by the United
Nations Security Council or the General Assembly. Such a case could provide an
opportunity to clarify the interpretation of the NPT. U.N. CHARTER art. 96; Statute of
the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans
1179, arts. 36, 65. See Roberto Ago, *Binding" Advisory Opinions of the International
Court of Justice, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 439 (1991) (considering the possible impact of an
advisory opinion).
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to the IAEA, to improve the caliber and size of the IAEA inspection staff,
and to upgrade the ability of the agency to carry out short-notice
inspection of suspicious sites. The recent revelations about Iraq's covert
nuclear weapons program provided fresh impetus to the effort to fortify
the IAEA's capabilities.
Some of these initiatives have met with general worldwide approval,
and prior NPT review conferences have developed a large measure of
accord on documents and procedures to effectuate the needed
improvements. So far, however, the bulk of the reforms have not been
implemented, as the NNWS have held them "hostage" to movement on
CTBT. Until some new developments resolve that impasse, it seems quite
unlikely that major necessary upgrades in the operations of the
IAEA-and other efforts to enhance the NPT arid the non-proliferation
regime generally-can occur. Thus, even if the NPT survives 1995
intact, continuing discord over CTBT will probably preclude substantial
emendation.
IV. THE BorOM LINE
Substantial uncertainty continues to swirl around the NPT. There is
ambiguity about the core meaning of article VI; there is anxiety about the
post-1995 future of the treaty; and there is disquieting apprehension about
the viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the post-cold-war
world. If there is no CTBT, and no meaningful, concerted progress
toward one, by the time of the next Review Conference, the diplomatic
confrontation could be profound. In this situation, this Article offers the
following five conclusions.
First, the imprecision and the downright mushiness of article VI
mean that as a practical matter it is impossible to state with conviction
exactly what actions are required by whom and at what time. It is
illegitimate, for example, to read a fixed timetable into the treaty, or to
construe it as requiring that the United States offer particular diplomatic
concessions to reach any particular version of a CTBT by any established
date. The treaty drafters simply did not reach the level of specificity that
would be required to convert the "good faith" aspirations into an
enforceable calendar.
Second, the United States and its negotiating partners have already
provided a substantial-and, more recently, a dazzling-array of arms
control accords. In some instances, these achievements go well beyond
what even the most optimistic observers would have fantasized about only
a few years ago, and they are definitely relevant and powerful in helping
to establish a case for the proposition that article VI is being honored.
Even regarding test ban accords, there has been some progress: The
TTBT and PNET, finally brought into force, represent the type of
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stepwise advancement toward a CTBT that many observers contend offers
the surest, safest path.3' 2
Third, however, this record simply is not enough to satisfy article
VI. Progress on other arms control agreements-however laudable and
important-is insufficient to discharge the responsibility to seek, in good
faith, a comprehensive test ban treaty, too. The United States cannot
satisfy this NPT obligation by substituting other types of performance and
deferring the CTBT forever. Some reasonable leeway could be permitted,
and the superpowers were entitled to considerable flexibility in working
their way through the diverse agenda of arms control issues-but the NPT
did not give them a blank check. At some point, even a vague obligation
of "good faith" negotiations gets stretched to the breaking point.
Fourth, therefore, the United States is now in breach of article VI of
the NPT. This conclusion would be much harder to justify if the United
States were currently engaged in negotiations toward further testing
.restrictions, or if the recent American presidents had declared themselves
still committed to the objective of ceasing nuclear weapons testing on a
reasonable timetable.' In that situation, observers would have to parse
the bargaining process carefully, attempting to determine which side is
"really" blocking progress, which countries are cynically just going
through the motions of negotiations that they have no genuine intention
of concluding successfully, and which leaders are not, overall, bargaining
in good faith. That task, given the secrecy that traditionally shrouds the
arms control negotiations process, usually proves impossible.' Where
the bargaining is ongoing-even where, as with chemical weapons, it
proceeds at only a glacial pace 3 -it is hard to establish bad faith.
342. Darryl Howlett & John Simpson, The NPT and the CTBT. An Inextricable
Relationship?, PROGRAMME FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, 1 ISSUE
REVIEW 6 (Mar. 1992); Belmont Report, supra note 58; John Simpson, Nuclear Testing
Limits: Problems and Prospects, 33 SURVIVAL 500 (1991). But see Michael Krepon, U.S.
Must Build on Arms Pact Momentum Beyond Cold War Era, DEF. NEWS, July 13-19,
1992, at 21 (arguing that a phased approach toward a CTBT might have been reasonable
at one time, but now the process should speed up).
343. Cf., Palme, Keynote Address, supra note 20, at 27 (charging that the trilateral
U.S.-U.K.-U.S.S.R. negotiations toward a CTBT were insufficient, and the NWS have
accordingly failed to comply with their article VI obligations).
344. SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 29-31 (noting that, in retrospect, we can identify
cyclic behavior in Soviet and American attitudes toward CTBT: whenever either side was
sincerely ready to conclude a treaty, the other managed to throw up subtle but effective
roadblocks).
345. Article IX of the BWC, supra note 30, requires the parties to continue
negotiations "in good faith" toward a comprehensive prohibition on chemical weapons.
Fitful negotiations on this subject proceeded in a variety of multilateral fora, for over two
decades, and the progress has sometimes been minuscule-a chemical weapons treaty has
only now emerged. BERNAUER, supra note 3; John M. Goshko, Draft Chemical Arms
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Here, however, the proof has been readily apparent. The United
States flatly refused to discuss a CTBT for twelve years. Despite
unilateral Soviet and Russian moratoria on testing, the United States
continued its own explosions program and declined to enter into new
negotiations.' The Bush administration worked to frustrate diplomatic
efforts to elaborate and draft a CTBT, 7 and abandoned commitments
that the Reagan administration-and Bush officials themselves-had
provided to the Congress about a timely resumption of negotiations after
the TTBT and PNET were modified and ratified.' In short, the
American leadership acted to postpone CTBT indefinitely, asserting that
no test ban treaty would be appropriate until attainment of some far-off
nirvana, when nuclear weapons have disappeared as an element of the
United States security structure.' None of this is consistent with a
binding obligation under international law to pursue CTBT negotiations
"in good faith."
In addition, the failure to continue test ban deliberations stands in flat
violation of article I of the TTBT, which-without any of the NPT's fuzzy
language of "good faith"-mandates that "[t]he Parties shall continue their
negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the
cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests." 3" The use of the
Pact Approved After 24 Years, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1992, at A27. Nevertheless, it
would be nearly impossible to establish a case that any particular state has violated this
aspect of article IX, since proof of the lack of effort or political will in the prolonged
negotiations would be so elusive. Critics can complain that a particular country's
articulated positions are unwise or unproductive, but as long as there is ongoing activity,
it is hard to demonstrate the absence of the requisite good faith. See Gerald F. Seib, Bush
Fires up Critics of Chemical-Arms Treaty by Forsaking His Tough Site-Inspection Scheme,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1991, at A14.
346. See supra notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
347. American diplomats hindered the efforts of the international community at the
1991 LTBT Amendment Conference and during the annual Conference on Disarmament
deliberations, where most other countries preferred rapid progress toward a CTBT.
SCHRAO, supra note 62, at 51, 107; GOLDBLAT, TWENTY YEARS, supra note 23, at 35;
Zamora, LTBT Amendment Conference to Continue, But No Test Ban in Sight, ARMS
CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1991, at 14.
348. Supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. It might be possible to
characterize the Reagan/Bush attitude and statements as akin to an "anticipatory breach"
or "denunciation" of the obligations of the NPT, LTBT, and TTBT. In that event, there
would be two overlapping causes of action for aggrieved NNWS: first, the verbal
announcement of the American intention to violate the accords, and second, the actual
failure to comply with the obligations to conduct good faith negotiations. See Vienna
Convention, supra note 132, arts. 56 (denunciation of a treaty) and 60 (defining material
breach of a treaty); RESTATEMENT, supra note 132, §§ 332 (denunciation) and 335
(material breach).
349. Supra notes 85-86 (U.S. statements abandoning CTBT).
350. TTBT, supra note 70, art. 1.3.
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verb "continue" in that 1974 formulation is already something of an
anachronism, since the United States for over a decade refused to
participate in any such negotiations, but the obligation, and the American
violation of it, are clear. Thus, a bilateral United States-Russia treaty
(MTBT) and two critical multilateral treaties (LTBT and NPT) stand
imperiled.
The 1992 statute and the election of a new president have initiated
the long-awaited reversal of this twelve-year pattern of breach, as the
current United States moratorium and the promise of prompt CTBT
negotiations radically depart from the behavior of the Reagan and Bush
administrations. But even this return to law-abiding behavior does not
automatically "cure" the longstanding breach, and the political and legal
repercussions will have to be sorted out in the light of the Clinton
administration's actual performance in developing a test ban treaty.
Finally, this finding of a United States breach is not without its
consequences. As the sole remaining military superpower, the United
States may feel immune from effective enforcement or retaliation, and no
one is going to be able to force a CTBT upon a recalcitrant American
president. But the international legal maneuvering (perhaps declaring a
breach and implementing the Vienna Convention remedies, for example)
would have some weight; the political disquietude will carry significant
costs; and the dangers of rupture of the global non-proliferation campaign
in 1995 may be severe indeed. We have already seen that review
conference efforts to improve the NPT (such as through the enhancement
of the IAEA safeguards system) founder over dissatisfaction with article
VI, and the prospects for the most significant strengthening in the non-
proliferation regime are likely to continue to be frustrated until the
NNWS are satisfied on the test ban issue. In the long term, violation of
international law is usually not free.
V. CONCLUSION
It does not come easily or comfortably to argue that the United States
has violated a solemn international agreement of such surpassing
importance. We want to believe that our government operates lawfully,
fairly, and wisely in the international arena, even when we are confronted
with stark evidence of repeated, wilful misdeeds.351 Nevertheless, this
study and its conclusion that the United States has, indeed, transgressed
the commitments of article VI of the NPT provides a vantagepoint for
offering three sets of closing remarks, related to nuclear testing, nuclear
351. See Bums H. Weston, The Reagan Administration Versus International Law,
19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 295 (1987).
386
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
non-proliferation, and international law and security policy more
generally.
A. Nuclear Testing
The comprehensive test ban treaty is an idea whose time has finally
come. The political weight of the test ban movement is clearer than ever.
Most countries around the world are strongly supportive of, and
increasingly insistent upon, efforts to halt nuclear explosions, and a good
many of them would place this item at the top of their list of disarmament
objectives. They consider a global, permanent test ban treaty to be the
most important item of "unfinished business" on the world's disarmament
agenda, and they remain convinced that it would be a tremendous boon
to their security. Even more than further reductions in strategic offensive
arms, CTBT has become a focus of world attention, and the United States
(sometimes with the United Kingdom) stands in isolation in opposition.
The impatience of the NNWS is surging, and 1995 looms as a potential
crisis. CTBT will not by itself end the dangers of nuclear weaponry, but
in the current political milieu, it provides the most important missing
element in the struggle for stability-it is the logical next step for
disarmament efforts.352
At the same time, the legal dimension of the pursuit of a CTBT is
also emerging with increasing clarity. Article VI of the NPT, together
with prearnbular and operative language in the LTBT and the TTBT,
establishes a firm legal commitment to develop a comprehensive test ban
on a realistic timetable. The United States can no longer plausibly
maintain that a CTBT is merely optional, aspirational, or one goal among
many. Instead the United States is under a legal obligation to pursue a
test ban in good faith-the exact parameters of this commitment are
undefinable, but there is no justification for declining to negotiate or for
deferring those talks forever with impossible conditions and qualifications.
352. As the arguments against a CTBT have fizzled, it has become increasingly
apparent that the United States need not choose between the pursuit of our own national
security and the accommodation of other countries' interests. Instead, a realistic appraisal
of today's global military alignment reveals that a halt to n*uclear testing will serve both
goals simultaneously. The former vocabulary, presenting a tension between these
competing security policies, is therefore obsolete. See William Epstein, The Nuclear
Testing Threat, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, July-Aug. 1990, at 35, 37 (quoting a U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency official as saying, "If the U.S. is forced to
choose between its own national security and its nuclear testing program versus the
survival of the NPT-which we would dearly like to see-the U.S. would choose
maintenance of its own national security and therefore its own nuclear testing program.").
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We said we would do it, other countries acted in deliberate reliance upon
our commitment, and there is no valid excuse for further delay.
One puzzling question in this regard is the possible application of
additional interim measures, imposing further constraints on nuclear
explosions but once again stopping short of a full CTBT. If the United
States were still unwilling to take the plunge toward a complete cessation
of testing, how would the rest of the world react in 1995 to proposals to
negotiate yet another scheme of partial regulation? A reduced threshold
treaty (perhaps lowering the allowable ceiling to ten or twenty-five
kilotons yield), a quota treaty (permitting each side no more than, say,
three tests per year), or some combination of the two could be developed,
with any of several formulas for eventually reducing the residual testing
to zero or nearly that.353 Such a program could allow the world to
"phase in" a CTBT, rather than accepting the full set of constraints all at
once, permitting the nervous segments of the American defense
establishment to accommodate themselves more gradually to a world
without nuclear explosions.3"
The global political impact of such a proposal is hard to gauge.
Surely, some countries would gladly accept whatever progress the NWS
were able to register, and a gradual but certain tightening of the nuclear-
testing noose would be accepted as being far more meaningful than the
charade of TIBT/PNET. Just as surely, other countries would oppose
any further interim steps as self-serving efforts to perpetuate the
anachronism of NWS hegemony, and would complain that only a CTBT
would have any real impact or appeal."' A unilateral or negotiated
moratorium on testing would undoubtedly be welcomed, even if a
sustained period was required to convert it into a durable, global, and
verifiable test ban treaty. My own sense is that the majority of the
world-like a majority of the United States Congress-has lost its patience
with the turgid, step-wise progress toward a CTBT; that efforts to
interpose yet another incremental stage would not be well-received; and
that at this point in the deconstruction of the edifice of cold war security
policy, the global demand is "CTBT or nothing."
353. The 1992 statute, supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text, has imposed
new legal limitations upon future United States testing and mandated a moratorium
beginning in 1996. It also contemplates the negotiation of a CTBT by that date. Any
future test ban treaty that fell short of a CTBT would therefore require the development
of a new legislative consensus.
354. Belmont Report, supra note 58, at 246-53; George Leopold, U.S. Officials
Waver On Nuclear Arms Tests, DEFENSE NEWS, July 13-19, 1992, at 11 (quoting former
Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as supporting a CTBT).
355. George Perkovich, Tne Out in Nuclear Asia, CHRIsTIAN So. MONITOR,
June 18, 1992, at 19; Bunn, supra note 250, at 197-98, 209.
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B. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Regarding efforts to arrest the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, the political and legal considerations again push in
sympathetic directions. Politically, the international community is
beginning to recognize that getting a handle on the spread of advanced
weapons is now at least as important to the future of United States and
global security as any additional fine-tuning of the strategic relationship
with Russia. Indeed, the erstwhile "third world" is now the likely point
of origin for the most intense and deadly future hostilities and the major
source of unresolved conflicts that might jeopardize our national interests.
As the strategic nuclear threat fades, and as the traditional specter of
massive conventional war in Europe becomes increasingly improbable, the
hazards posed by the dissemination of nuclear and other advanced
weaponry into additional, sometimes unstable and hostile, nations
becomes our top security priority.
A CTBT, by itself, would not erase all our security dilemmas, and
it might not initially attract the participation of all the dangerously near-
nuclear states. But at the very least, it would provide the United States
and its allies with a renewed sense of legitimacy and purpose in the non-
proliferation effort-and an enhanced moral and political vantage point to
pressure the remaining holdouts into abandoning their nuclear weapons
options.3'
In the past, efforts to check the spread of nuclear weaponry have
traditionally taken a back seat, compared with the glitzier challenges of
bilateralism. Diverse foreign relations interests often crowded out the
non-proliferation concerns when the United States was dealing with
critical countries on a wide range of issues.357 The convoluted
interactions with Pakistan are a key example of this phenomenon, in
which the American preoccupation with confronting the Soviet Union (by
funneling assistance to the Afghan mujahadeen rebels) led United States
presidents to stifle the non-proliferation concerns, looking the other way
while Islamabad resolutely pursued a nuclear capacity. 58 Even the
tragedy in Iraq is at least partially explainable in terms of American
356. Helen Dewar, Senate Votes Overwhebninglyfor Far-Reaching Nuclear Testing
Moratorium, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1992, at A4 (quoting Sen. Mark Hatfield on how
pursuit of a CTBT would enhance the United States' "moral weight" in urging non-
proliferation).
357. Thomas Graham, Winning the Nonproliferation Batte, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, Sept. 1991, at 8, 12; FISCHER, STOPPING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
supra note 26, at 188-91.
358. John Glenn, This Country Encouraged the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,
WASH. POST, June 24, 1992, at A19.
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willingness to tolerate an insidious nuclear development program, so long
as the sponsoring country serves our purposes in other geopolitical
confrontations.'
In the twenty-first century, in contrast, the United States will have
to be much more attentive to the North-South dichotomy, and much more
alert to the incipient dangers of nuclear, chemical, biological, or other
weapons proliferation.' We will have to care more about-and
construct policies to oppose more resolutely-the spread of weaponry, not
consistently deferring that issue in favor of other, seemingly more
pressing, bilateral questions."6 Tending to the needs of the NPT will
have to be a permanent assignment, not an episodic task assumed only
every few years when a Review Conference, like a Brigadoon fantasy,
fleetingly reappears.
The international non-proliferation regime, of course, is more than
just the NPT; all would not be lost even if that central document were to
fail.' In fact, it is possible to argue that the norm of nuclear non-
proliferation is now so well established that it has evolved into a binding
facet of customary international law, enveloping even non-parties and
providing an independent source of authority even if the treaty itself were
to succumb in 1995.1 The NPT, like all legal instruments, is not an
359. Gary Milhollin, Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
1992, (Magazine), at 30.
360. As a point of precedent, the United States government did consciously decide
in 1965 to elevate the importance of nuclear non-proliferation. National leaders
deliberately opted to sacrifice other important foreign policy goals (then, the interest in
promoting a NATO multilateral nuclear force), where necessary, to give greater priority
to efforts to interdict the spread of nuclear weaponry. SEABORO, STEMMING THE TIDE,
supra note 130, at 143. A similar realignment of national strategy is necessary today.
361. The United States has already begun to elevate weapons proliferation as an
issue of international concern, and President Bush recently signed a secret finding that
authorizes the CIA to develop plans, including covert action programs, to arrest the spread
of weapons. Bush Approved Covert Action by CIA to Halt Spread ofArms, L.A. TIMES,
June 21, 1992, at A20. It is, however, peculiar that the United States has responded to
the proliferation challenge by accentuating the military or paramilitary, rather than the
diplomatic, options.
362. Joseph Pilat, A World Without the NPT?, in NUCLEAR NoN-PROLIFERATION:
AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990S, supra note 57, at 165; Jorge M. Pando, Some Regional
Aspects of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 13 DISARMAMENT 99 (1990); Joseph
S. Nye, Jr., New Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation Policy, 256 ScIENCE 1293 (1992)
(international non-proliferation regime is centered in the NPT, but includes independent
institutions such as the IAEA and regional arrangements such as the Latin American
nuclear weapons free zone).
363. Customary international law is binding upon nations independently of its
possible incorporation into a treaty, and it affects even countries which have refrained
from adhering to the more express form of international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note
132, §102. For the view that nuclear non-proliferation may have achieved the character
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end in itself; it is a vehicle for accomplishing certain human
objectives. 6 If conditions change and a new security structure is
required, then the NPT should adapt, too. Accordingly, there have
already been proposals to amend the NPT, eliminating the most invidious
discriminatory aspects and gradually converting the treaty into a more
durable, comprehensive disarmament pact enforcing nuclear and other
controls more symmetrically upon all its parties. '
The NPT, however, remains terribly important today. It is still the
key component of the international regime opposing the eruption of new
nuclear threats. It is still the most widely-accepted arms control
agreement in history. It is still the main bulwark of non-proliferation,
and efforts to amend or replace it are likely to lead to chaos, to a drawn-
out period of uncertainty, and to dilution of the non-proliferation
imperative. ' Sustaining the treaty past 1995 is, therefore, the single
most important arms control objective of the coming years. 7
At the same time, the NPT is in serious trouble. The NNWS have
tolerated its inequality for over two decades, and their patience is wearing
thin. Many have condemned it as discriminatory, outraged that the NWS
have not done more to fulfill the article VI 'commitment, especially
regarding CTBT. The implied threats about NNWS withdrawal and about
termination (or only short extension) in 1995 must be taken more
seriously. ' An increasing number of NNWS may come to agree with
the NWS negotiator who, years ago, described the NPT as one of the
of binding custom, see Ove Bring, The Non-Proliferation Regime-Stronger than the NPT,
in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, supra note
155, at 31.
364. Bhalchandra Udgaonkar, Beyond Non-Proliferation, in NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, supra note 155, at 168, 177.
365. Lewis A. Dunn, It Ain't Broke-Don't Fix It, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, July-
Aug. 1990, at 19, 20; Mohamed I. Shaker, A Dialogue Between the Parties and Non-
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 13 DISARMAMENT
114, 119 (1990); Goldansky & Davidov, supra note 130, at 22-23; Epstein, supra note
155, at 132, 144.
366. See Dunn, supra note 22, at 22; James F. Keeley, Legitimacy, Capability,
Effectiveness and the Future of the NPT, in NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND GLOBAL
SECURITY, supra note 22, at 25, 43.
367. President Bush called the NPT, "the principal barrier to the spread of nuclear
weapons, and it remains a hallmark in our long quest for peace and for peaceful nuclear
cooperation among nations." Statement to the Fourth NPT Review Conference (Aug.
1990), reprinted in NON-PROLIFERATION: A COMPILATION OF BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra
note 253, at 105.
368. Ashok Kapur, Dump the Treaty, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, July-Aug. 1990,
at 21, 22; K. Subrahmanyam, The Link Between Horizontal and Vertical Proliferation, in
Khan, supra note 20, at 136, 144.
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"greatest con games of modern times."' Certainly, the efforts to
enhance and strengthen the NPT verification regime have already proven
problematic. Only by promptly fulfilling its obligations in good faith can
the United States rescue the NPT and avoid the disintegration of the
global non-proliferation campaign, at a time when much better outcomes
are now attainable and urgent.3'
C. International Law and International Security
It is in evaluation of the international legal dimension of the NPT that
the United States leadership perhaps has the most to learn. Oddly, what
is required here is first of all a greater willingness to take seriously
America's own speeches about a "new world order" and the primacy of
the rule of law. That is, the United States asserted repeatedly during the
war with Iraq that the stakes involved nothing less than respect for
international obligations and deference to the legitimate demands of the
world community. 71 That rhetoric was correct then, and it is even
more correct now.
The United States has more to gain than any other country from the
further establishment and promotion of international law. More than any
other state, we rely upon the ability to reach practical accommodations to
achieve our international ends. We, more than others, depend upon
notions of "good faith" to sustain efficient international commerce. We
are the foremost maker of significant treaties and have the greatest
possible stake in sustaining that form of international communications,
ensuring that this vital coin of the global realm is not debased through
facile evasions or short-sighted exploitation of the vagaries of language.
When the global economy and the global security system evolve to place
even greater reliance on diplomatic, legal, and judicial systems-rather
369. LAST CHANCE, supra note 20, at 118. See also Sun Jiadong, China's
Position on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, in Khan, supra note 20, at 33, 34; SEABORO,
STEMMING THE TIDE, supra note 130, at 371 (quoting a former diplomat as saying, "If
we, had known in 1968 how little the nuclear powers would do ... to meet their end of
the Nonproliferation Treaty bargain by controlling their arms race, I would have advised
my government not to sign the treaty.").
370. David A. Fischer, Eastern Europe After Pax Sovietica, BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISS, July-Aug. 1990, at 23 (ending the NPT would gravely complicate
proliferation concerns in Eastern Europe, where prior Soviet domination kept a lid on
earlier potential nuclear dangers).
371. President George Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress, reprinted in
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1990, at A20 (describing the objective of a "new world order" and
asserting "today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from
the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the
jungle .... America and the world must support the rule of law. And we will.").
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
than on warfare-for resolution of disputes and for ensuring the smooth
conduct of everyday affairs, the United States will be the greatest winner.
Arms control accords, from START to the Biological Weapons
Convention to the Open Skies Treaty, depend upon the sufferance of other
states-only by entrenching a norm of good faith compliance with the full
intentions and spirit of the agreements can the United States ensure its
ability to achieve vital national security goals.
It might sometimes appear that the United States, with its
unchallenged superiority in high-technology intercontinental mechanisms
of violence, would be well positioned to throw its, military weight
around.3" The greater insight, however, is that the United States has
an even more profound "comparative advantage" in peaceful, legalistic
proceedings. The more the world turns toward the rule of law, and the
more successfully the United States can set an example of honoring even
a vague and imprecise commitment to negotiate "in good faith," the more
we will serve our true long-run interests. The illustration of a rogue
state, successfully reneging upon its international obligations, is hardly the
model that the United States should promote. Even if we could, in the
short run, "get away with it," the precedent of disrespect for international
law would disserve our overall goals. As Thomas Jefferson wrote over
two centuries ago:
I think with others, that nations are to be governed with regard
to their own interest, but I am convinced that it is their interest,
in the long run, to be . . .faithful to their engagements, even
in the worst of circumstances, and honorable and generous
always."
It may be appropriate, as the modern world is re-creating its legal
and political institutions, to go back to some of those ancient principles,
to shed some of the haphazard arrangements for preserving the fragile
peace to which we acclimated ourselves during the artificial bipolarity of
the cold war. The discriminatory aspects of the NPT are now
372. Pentagon officials, for example, drafted a provisional 1994-99 Defense
Planning Guidance document which called for the United States to play a global
superpower role for the indefinite future, retaining the ability to fight future wars single-
handedly in a variety of contexts. Patrick E. Tyler, Pentagon Imagines New Enemies To
Fight in Post-Cold-War Era, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1992, at Al; Jack Mendelsohn,
Pentagon Wants to Stay Lonely at the Top, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 1992, at 19.
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obsolete;37 the continued U.S. insistence upon nuclear testing is now
anachronistic and counterproductive. Perhaps international affairs can
now take more seriously the notion that states are obligated, not merely
to tolerate each other, but actively to cooperate in shared pursuit of
planetary objectives. 3" This concept of mandatory collaboration has
long been enshrined in international rhetoric, 6 but its realization has
been obscured by the cold war. Perhaps now we can move it to the next
plateau of international life.
In the more immediate perspective, a comprehensive test ban treaty
is now required-required both by binding obligations of international law
and by enlightened security concerns of the modern world. "Good faith"
in arms control mandates test ban treaty negotiations that the United States
should have undertaken and concluded long ago. The United States
would be foolish and illegitimate to continue to dishonor this
commitment.
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S. Nye, Jr., NPT: The Logic of Inequality, FOREION POLICY, Summer 1985, at 123.
375. See William D. Jackson, The Principles of Cooperation and Good Faith
Fuffilbnent of International Obligations, in Stephan & Klimenko, supra note 26, at 275-
76; V.I. Kuznetsov, in Stephan & Klimenko, supra note 26, at 287-90.
376. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
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